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[T]he apocryphal axe
[is that] of which [its] owner brags:
"This is my great-grandfather's original axe, although
the handle has been replaced five times,
and the head twice. 1
This Article discusses the mischief that ensues when courts must
solve the riddle of the apocryphal axe in order to determine patent
infringement. The stakes are enormous. Consider the owners of axe
patents, who are pleased to sell axes, but would be even happier if
they could control the multi-million-dollar replacement-parts market
in axe handles and heads.2 This control is elusive, however, because a
supplier of unpatented handles or heads infringes the axe patent only
if a customer uses a replacement handle or head to make a new axe.'
1. FMC Corp. v. Up-Right, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 1455, 1464 n.15 (N.D. Cal. 1993), affd,
21 F.3d 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
2. In a number of industries, the sale of replacement parts for a patented invention
may account for the bulk of the revenue derived from the invention. See, e.g., Kendall Co.
v. Progressive Med. Tech., Inc., 85 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting the patent
holder's argument that "much of the profit arises from sale of the replaceable sleeves
rather than from sale of the original device").
3. The customer would incur liability for direct infringement as a result of the unau-
thorized making. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996). The supplier might be liable
under an indirect infringement theory, either for intentionally inducing the customer to
infringe, id. § 271(b), or for knowingly contributing to the customer's infringement by
supplying a replacement part that is especially designed for use in a patented device and
that is neither a staple article nor suitable for any substantial non-infringing use, id.
§ 271(c). In order for the supplier to be indirectly liable on either theory, however, the
customer must indeed directly infringe the patent. See Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d
1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding that "[t]here can be no contributory infringement
without direct infringement").
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So what does it take to "make" a new axe? An axe handle breaks;
a customer fits a new handle to the old head. What has occurred? Is
this an extinguishment of the original, followed by incarnation of a
new axe? This would be an illegal "reconstruction." Or is this the
same old axe, dressed in a new suit? This, by contrast, would be a
permissible "repair." Although this question seems better suited to
some sort of mystic of machine tools than to a jurist, liability for pat-
ent infringement, with its serious financial consequences, turns on it.
The intellectual history of patent law's repair-reconstruction di-
chotomy is, if not exactly rich, at least varied, and unquestionably idio-
syncratic. The repair-reconstruction dichotomy has baffled and
annoyed courts for decades,4 often driving courts to employ "loose
language."5 It moved Justice Black to song,6 and it impelled Justice
Brown to render what is presumably (one hopes) the United States
Supreme Court's only considered judgment on the inherently perish-
able nature of toilet paper.' This dichotomy originated in an ex-
traordinary case concerning one of the most frequently litigated
patents in the history of the U.S. patent system; Daniel Webster and
William H. Seward, two towering figures of nineteenth century Ameri-
can politics, were co-counsel in this case at the very moment when
their political rivalry portended the disintegration of the Union.8
For a scholarly analysis of the contributory infringement theory, see A. Samuel Oddi,
Contributory Infringement/Patent Misuse: Metaphysics and Metamorphosis, 44 U. PrTr. L. REv.
73, 76 (1982) (characterizing the doctrine simply as "the patent law application of the tort
doctrine of imposingjoint and several liability on tortfeasors acting in concert" and tracing
its origin in American law to Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No.
17,100)).
4. See infra Part I.B.
5. F.F. Slocomb & Co. v. A.C. Layman Mach. Co., 227 F. 94, 97 (D. Del. 1915) (noting
that such language has been used in addressing "the question whether the furnishing of
particular parts of patented mechanism will amount to reconstruction and consequently
an invasion of the exclusive rights of the patentee"), affd, 230 F. 1021 (3d Cir. 1916); see
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Although'the rule
is straightforward its implementation is less so, for it is not always clear where the boundary
lies: how much 'repair' is fair before the device is deemed reconstructed."); Standard
Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting
that "[t]he difference between a repair and a reconstruction is a difficult question that
must be resolved case by case"); Hess-Bright Mfg. Co. v. Bearings Co. of Philadelphia, 271
F. 350, 352 (E.D. Pa. 1921) ("The dividing line between repairs and a making over cannot
be verbally located.").
6. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
7. See Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425,
436 (1894) (discussing a patent for a package of toilet paper).
8. See Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109 (1850); infra Part I.B.1.
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Courts long ago abandoned all efforts to cabin the repair- recon-
struction dichotomy within a rigid framework of rules.9 Instead, they
rest their decisions on "the exercise of sound common sense and an
intelligent judgment."1° This lack of a clear framework is not helpful
to patent owners attempting to recoup research and development ex-
penditures,1 replacement parts suppliers endeavoring to carry on a
legitimate business, or to customers, whose axe handles regularly
break. It also is probably not satisfactory to judges, who routinely
must confront the repair-reconstruction problem in patent cases. In-
deed, the issue has recently been the subject of two key appellate deci-
sions, both of which generated certiorari petitions.
12
As a matter of sheer practicality and doctrinal stability, then, the
repair-reconstruction problem needs closer scrutiny. Additionally,
the dichotomy is of considerable theoretical and practical significance
as one aspect of a larger problem in defining the extent to which the
authorized sale of goods exhausts intellectual property rights in the
subsequent use and resale of those goods." Exhaustion of rights is an
issue of considerable theoretical importance' 4 with which jurists of the
world's leading courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
15
9. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Up-Right, Inc., 21 F.3d 1073, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("It is
impracticable, as well as unwise, to attempt to lay down any rule on this subject, owing to
the number and infinite variety of patented inventions." (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Goodyear Shoe Mach. Co. v.Jackson, 112 F. 146, 150 (1st Cir. 1901))); Elec-
tric Auto-Lite Co. v. P. & D. Mfg. Co., 109 F.2d 566, 567 (2d Cir. 1940) (per curiam)
(asserting that "in the nature of things there can be no rule as to where repair ends and
reconstruction begins").
10. Goodyear Shoe, 112 F. at 150.
11. See FMC, 21 F.3d at 1078 (noting the patent owner's request for a clearer legal
standard by which to distinguish infringement-through-reconstruction from permissible
repair).
12. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 1445 (Fed. Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1304 (1998); Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co., 121 F.3d 669 (Fed. Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1337 (1998).
13. In general terms, exhaustion of intellectual property rights refers to the loss of
intellectual property rights with regard to particular products, occurring when those prod-
ucts are the subject of an authorized sale. See infra Part L.A (providing an introduction to
the concept of exhaustion and exploring additional definitions).
14. See generally Darren E. Donnelly, Parallel Trade and International Harmonization of the
Exhaustion of Rights Doctrine, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 445 (1997)
(discussing the international dimension of the exhaustion of rights problem); David C.L.
Perkins & Marleen Van Kerckhove, Licensing Intellectual Property Rights in the EU: The Com-
munity Exhaustion Doctrine, 490 PRAc. LAw INST. 419 (1997) (examining the way in which
the exhaustion principle is applied in the European Union).
15. See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1125, 1130-
34 (1998) (holding that, under the first sale doctrine, authorized sale of copyrighted work
outside the United States exhausts copyright protection within the United States, thus pro-
viding a defense against a claim of unauthorized importation).
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the European Court of Justice, 6 and the Supreme Court of Japan,17
have recently grappled.
This Article seeks to scrutinize the repair-reconstruction dichot-
omy,18 with particular attention to the following question: Should the
exhaustion doctrine, the historic basis from which the "right" of per-
missible repair springs, continue to serve as its organizing principle?
This Article argues that it should not. The exhaustion doctrine has
driven courts to frame the repair-reconstruction distinction as an ex-
ercise in distinguishing permissible "using" from impermissible new
"making." Although the analyses vary widely, the general approach
falls under the concept of spentness: If the patented device has be-
come "spent," then further replacement activities designed to restore
the device to usefulness constitute illegal reconstruction.19
The rhetoric of "spentness," however, invites numerous calami-
ties; the riddle of the apocryphal axe is emblematic of them. Analyses
of spentness tend to be overly focused on the peculiarities of particu-
lar devices and the technical aspects of the replacement activities em-
16. Joined Cases C267 & 268/95, Merck & Co. v. Primecrown Ltd., [1997] 1 C.M.L.R.
83 (1996) (holding that the first sale of patented product within the EU, even in a country
where no patent protection for the product is available, exhausts patent rights throughout
the EU). For recent commentary, see Paul Torremans & Irini Stamatoudi, Merck is Back to
Stay: The Court ofJustice'sJudgment in Merck v. Primecrown, 9 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 545,
545 (1997) (discussing cases involving patent exhaustion by virtue of marketing a product
within a member state of the European community that does not grant a patent for the
product at issue).
17. BBS Kraftfahrzeug Technik AG v. Kabushiki Kaisha Racimex Japan (Sup. Ct. 1,
1997), available atJinzo Fujino, Parallel Imports of Patented Goods: The Supreme Court Talks
About its Legality (visitedJan. 29, 1999) <http://www.okuyama.com/c3v01ok.htm> (holding
that authorized sales of patented aluminum wheels in Germany exhausts patent rights in
Japan, thus allowing a purchaser in Germany to export products into Japan and sell them
in Japan in competition with the patent owner). This internet site provides a translation of
the decision and commentary. For a discussion of lower court decisions in the BBS case,
see Nanao Naoko et al., Decisions on Parallel Imports of Patented Goods, 36 IDEA 567, 572(1996) (concluding that the High Court in BBS found that "parallel imports of patented
goods are permitted if patent rights to the imported goods exist both in the country where
they are sold for the first time and in the country into which they are imported").
18. Other commentators have taken up the topic, but only infrequently. See, e.g., Mark
A. Farley, Infringement Questions Stemming from the Repair or Reconstruction of Patented Combina-
tions, 68J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 149 (1986); Ronald B. Hildreth, Contributory In-fringement, 44 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 512 (1962); Edmund J. Sease, Patent Law: Repair-
Reconstruction-A Review, Analysis, and Proposal 20 DRAKE L. REV. 85 (1970). No compre-
hensive recent treatment of the issue exists to my knowledge.
19. Two senses of spentness can be discerned from the cases. The first, described in
the accompanying text, might be termed "overall spentness." Yet the cases also refer to the
spentness of individual components of the combination. Used in this fashion, spentness
cuts in the other direction. Subsequent replacement of a spent component might well
constitute permissible repair. See infra Part I.B.2 for a fuller discussion.
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ployed.2 ° Such analyses are particularly troubling because they mask,
and sometimes even ignore altogether, the reasonable expectations of
the patentee and purchaser, respectively.
This Article argues that courts should turn away from an exhaus-
tion of rights model for analyzing the repair-reconstruction dichot-
omy, and instead embrace an implied license model. A purchaser of
patented goods may be said to take an implied license to use and re-
sell the goods, but not to remake them. Framed this way, the repair-
reconstruction inquiry becomes an inquiry into the scope of the im-
plied license. At first glance, this formulation may seem interchange-
able with the exhaustion principle, and United States courts have
routinely jumped from one formulation to the other in considering
the repair-reconstruction problem.2 1 This Article argues, however,
that the implications of the implied license analysis have not been ap-
preciated. In particular, this Article maintains that courts following
an implied license model for repair-reconstruction should look first,
and predominantly, to evidence of the reasonable expectations of the
patentee and the purchaser concerning use and maintenance of the
patented device. Courts should, in addition, be free to consult all evi-
dence from which expectations might be inferred, including evidence
of commercial custom in the industry. Evidence of "spentness" of the
patented device would be relevant in such a regime, but only to the
extent that it would illuminate the parties' probable expectations.
Part I considers the dichotomy's origins in the exhaustion princi-
ple and its confused evolution in leading Supreme Court decisions.
Part II addresses the failings of "spentness," still the dominant rhetoric
by which courts attempt to analyze infringement claims involving re-
pair and reconstruction. Part III briefly comments on the uncertain
role of patentees' and purchasers' expectations under the exhaustion
model. Part IV considers the potential for reconceptualizing the re-
pair-reconstruction dichotomy as an exercise in defining the scope of
an implied license. The point here is to consider whether analyses of
the scope of an implied license employed in other contexts can be
used to illuminate the repair-reconstruction dichotomy. This Part
looks to decisions in three areas: intellectual property generally, real
property, and contracts. Finally, Part V argues that the adoption of an
implied license model would reshape repair-reconstruction doctrine
in a number of significant ways.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part I.B.
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I. THE EXHAUSTION OF RIGHTS AND THE REPAIR-
RECONSTRUCTION PROBLEM
The origins of the exhaustion principle in United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence, and the origins of its progeny-the repair-recon-
struction dichotomy-can be traced to litigation over a single, ex-
traordinary patent.2 2 In America's "Wooden Age,"2 the cutting edge
technology, to be quite literal, consisted of sawmills and planing ma-
chines.2 4 William Woodworth's planing machine, which dominated
the marketplace,2 5 featured rotary cutting cylinders that were eventu-
ally adapted for a variety of operations, but were particularly effective
in cutting boards for floorboards. 6
William Woodworth managed to secure patent protection cover-
ing the planing machine,2 7 and he (and, later, his heirs and their suc-
cessors) set about enforcing it with considerable vigor.2 .Woodworth
apparently granted some one thousand licenses under the patent.2 9
Litigation concerning the patent resulted in more than a dozen
Supreme Court cases,3 ° and countless cases in the lower courts. 3 1 Per-
22. See Nathan Rosenberg, America's Rise to Woodworking Leadership, in AMERICA'S
WOODEN AGE: ASPECTS OF rrs EARLY TECHNOLOGY 37, 48 (Brooke Hindle ed., 1975) (refer-
ring to the "tortuous history of litigation" of the planing machine invented by William
Woodworth).
23. For references to the term, see Brooke Hindle, Introduction: The Span of the Wooden
Age, in AMERICA'S WOODEN AGE, supra note 22, at 3, 3 (noting that the "Wooden Age"
extended at least into the mid-nineteenth century); William C. Lipke, Introduction to TooLs
& TECHNOLOGIES: AMERICA'S WOODEN AGE 1, 1 (Paul B. Kebabian & William C. Lipke eds.,
1979) (discussing an exhibit exemplifying "America's early dependence on wood"). The
label, I am convinced, pertains to the dominance of wood as an industrial resource and is
not meant to be a wry social or cultural commentary.
24. See Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 48 (noting that "[p]laning machines were second
only to saws in a ranking of woodworking machines by their relative importance").
25. Id.
26. Id. at 48-49.
27. See id. at 48 (noting that the patent was issued on December 27, 1828).
28. See id. ("The many attempts to invent around this 'notorious monopoly,' as it was
frequently called, led to numerous suits for patent infringement.").
29. See PAUL B. KEBABTAN & DUDLEY WrrNEY, AMERICAN WOODWORING Toots 196
(1978).
30. See Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 340, 351-52 (1863) (stating that "if a
person legally acquires a title to that which is the subject of letters patent, he may continue
to use it until it is worn out, or he may repair it or improve upon it as he pleases"); Dean v.
Mason, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 198, 202 (1857) (reviewing a claim of a violation of"a territorial
right to the exclusive use of the Woodworth patent for planing boards"); Brown v. Shan-
non, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 55, 56 (1857) (dismissing for lack ofjurisdiction a claim for the
specific execution of contracts regarding the assignment of the exclusive use of the Wood-
worth planing machine in Maryland); Livingston v. Woodworth, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 546,
553 (1853) (reviewing "an injunction to restrain [Livingston] from using or vending one
or more planing machines substantially the same in construction and mode of operation as
the machine which had been patented to William Woodworth"); Brooks v. Fiske, 56 U.S.
1999] 429
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haps understandably, the industry reportedly came to refer to the
(15 How.) 212, 222 (1853) (holding that a planing machine known as the Norcross
machine did not infringe the Woodworth patent); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14
How.) 539, 546 (1852) (affirming the circuit court's dismissal of a bill seeking an injunc-
tion "restraining [McQuewan] from the use of two of Woodworth's planing machines in
the city of Pittsburgh"); Wilson v. Barnum, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 258, 261 (1850) (remanding
due to a lack of jurisdiction a bill requesting "an injunction against the defendant to re-
strain him from using a certain machine, in which,. . . boards were planed, tongued, and
grooved in the same manner as in the Woodworth machine"); Wilson v. Sandford, 51 U.S.
(10 How.) 99, 101 (1850) (dismissing for lack ofjurisdiction a claim to rescind a contract
which granted Sandford "permission to use, or vend to others to be used, one of Wood-
worth's planing machines"); Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109, 126 (1850) (holding
that the defendants did not violate the rights of the holder of the patent by replacing the
cutterknives in their machines); Barnard v. Gibson, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 650, 656 (1849) (dis-
missing on procedural grounds a "claim [of] conflicting interests as assignees of Wood-
worth's patented planing-machine"); Woodworth v. Wilson, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 712, 716
(1846) (issuing an injunction to enjoin the defendant's erection and operation of a
machine that was substantially like the Woodworth machine); Wilson v. Turner, 45 U.S. (4
How.) 712, 712 (1846) (affirming the circuit court's dismissal of a suit involving the assign-
ment and use of the Woodworth patent); Simpson v. Wilson, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 709, 710
(1846) (reviewing a claim in equity for infringement of the plaintiffs rights under an as-
signment of the Woodworth patent); Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646, 687-88
(1846) (considering the effect of the Patent Act of 1836 on assignments, extensions, and
amendments to the Woodworth patent).
31. References to many of these cases can be found in an editor's note made in Bicknell
v. Todd, 3 F. Cas. 334, 336 (C.C.D. Ohio 1851) (No. 1389). See id. (citing Bloomer v.
Gilpin, 3 F. Cas. 726 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1859) (No. 1558); Pitts v. Edmonds, 19 F. Cas. 751
(C.C.E.D. Mich. 1857) (No. 11,191);Jenkins v. Greenwald, 13 F. Gas. 519 (C.C.S.D. Ohio
1857) (No. 7270); Foss v. Herbert, 9 F. Gas. 503 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1856) (No. 4957); Ritter v.
Serrell, 20 F. Gas. 843 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1852) (No. 11,866); Sloat v. Patton, 22 F. Cas. 327
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1852) (No. 12,947); Brooks v. Norcross, 4 F. Gas. 294 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851)
(No. 1957); Gibson v. Van Dresar, 10 F. Cas. 329 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 5402); Gibson
v. Cook, 10 F. Gas. 314 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 5393); Gibson v. Gifford, 10 F. Cas. 317
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 5395); Wilson v. Sherman, 30 F. Gas. 215 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1850)
(No. 17,833); Woodworth v. Cook, 30 F. Gas. 561 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 18,011);
Bloomer v. Stolley, 3 F. Gas. 729 (C.C.D. Ohio 1850) (No. 1559); Motte v. Bennett, 17 F.
Cas. 909 (C.C.D.S.C. 1849) (No. 9884); Olcott v. Hawkins, 18 F. Gas. 639 (D.C. Wis. 1849)
(No. 10,480); Gibson v. Barnard, 10 F. Cas. 307 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1848) (No. 5389); Van Hook
v. Pendleton, 28 F. Gas. 998 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1848) (No. 16,852); Woodworth v. Curtis, 30 F.
Gas. 565 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847) (No. 18,013); Woodworth v. Edwards, 30 F. Gas. 567 (C.C.D.
Me. 1847) (No. 18,014); Wilson v. Stolley, 30 F. Gas. 226 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 17,839);
Woodworth v. Hall, 30 F. Cas. 572 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 18,016); Gibson v. Betts, 10 F.
Cas. 309 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1846) (No. 5390); Gibson v. Harris, 10 F. Gas. 318 (C.C.N.D.N.Y.
1846) (No. 5396); Woodworth v. Weed, 30 F. Gas. 595 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1846) (No. 18,022);
Woodworth v. Stone, 30 F. Gas. 593 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 18,021); Wilson v. Turner, 30
F. Gas. 233 (C.C.D. Md. 1845) (No. 17,845); Brooks v. Stolley, 4 F. Cas. 302 (C.C.D. Ohio
1845) (No. 1962); Woodworth v. Sherman, 30 F. Gas. 586 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No.
18,019); Washburn v. Gould, 29 F. Cas. 313 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No. 17,214); Brooks v.
Jenkins, 4 F. Gas. 275 (C.C.D. Ohio 1844) (No. 1953); Lippincott v. Kelly, 15 F. Cas. 571
(C.C.W.D. Pa. 1844) (No. 8381); Brooks v. Bicknell, 4 F. Gas. 247 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No.
1944)).
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Woodworth patent as that "notorious monopoly." 2 With hundreds,
possibly thousands, of Woodworth planing machines in use around
the country, the extent to which the patentee could limit use after an
authorized sale became a matter of considerable economic signifi-
cance. Eventually, the Supreme Court was forced to confront the no-
tions of exhaustion and permissible repair."3
A. Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights
Litigation over the Woodworth planing machine set the stage for
the introduction of the exhaustion of rights principle in the Court's
jurisprudence.3 4 In Wilson v. Rousseau," the exhaustion issue arose as
a by-product of William W. Woodworth's successful effort to secure an
extension of the term of the Woodworth patent.36 A few weeks before
the patent was due to expire in December 1842, Woodworth success-
fully petitioned a board comprised of the Patent Commissioner and
the Secretaries of State and the Treasury under an extension provi-
sion in the 1836 Patent Act to grant an extension of seven years.3 7
Daniel Webster, the renowned lawyer, congressman, and presidential
32. See Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 48; see also KEaRAtAN & WrrNry, supra note 29, at
196 (relating that even the editor of the Official Gazette of the Patent Office referred to
the Woodworth patent as an "odious monopoly").
33. See infra Parts IA-B.
34. The exhaustion principle does appear in at least one earlier case in the lower
courts. See Boyd v. Brown, 3 F. Cas. 1095 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 1747). Boyd was a
nineteenth century predecessor to current international transboundary exhaustion cases.
The plaintiff had certain rights concerning the manufacture and sale of patented bed-
steads, but the rights were limited geographically to Hamilton County, Ohio. Id. The de-
fendant had similar rights under the patent, but the rights were limited to Indiana. Id. It
appeared that some purchasers from the defendant in Indiana had resold their products in
Hamilton County. Id. at 1096. The court held for the defendant, articulating a theory of
exhaustion without citing any authority. Id. ("[T]he bedstead, which is the product, so
soon as it is sold, mingles with the common mass of property, and is only subject to the
general laws of property.").
35. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646 (1846).
36. Id. at 687. The inventor, William Woodworth, died in 1839, and William W. Wood-
worth, in his capacity as the administrator of the inventor's estate, attempted to secure the
extension of the patent. Id. at 658-59.
37. Id. The Act provided for a seven-year extension if the board determined that the
patentee had failed to obtain, through no fault of his own, sufficient remuneration for the
development costs of the patent. See id. at 658 (quoting Act ofJuly 4, 1836, Ch. 357, 5 Stat.
117, § 18 (repealed 1870)). The board granted Woodworth's petition after an evidentiary
hearing in November 1842. Id. at 659.
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aspirant,38 was then serving as Secretary of State, and signed the order
granting Woodworth's petition. 9
Four years later, Daniel Webster represented James G. Wilson
(the new owner of the Woodworth patent)40 before the Supreme
Court in Wilson's suit to determine the legal effect of the extension.4 '
Webster's co-counsel was William Henry Seward, former governor of
New York, future senator and Secretary of State, and an accomplished
lawyer in his own right.42 The issue before the Court was whether
licensees for the original term continued to enjoy the right to use the
Woodworth planing machine under the extended term.4' Although
the Court devoted the bulk of its opinion to a tortured construction of
a clause in the statute's extension provision,4 4 glimmers of the exhaus-
tion doctrine can be detected. First, the Court addressed the difficul-
ties that would arise if users of patented goods, purchased from
authorized sources, could freely be divested of their uses under the
extension provision of the 1836 Patent Act:
By the report of the Commissioner of Patents it appears, that
five hundred and two patents were issued in the year 1844
... and embrace articles to be found in common use in every
38. For information on Daniel Webster, see MAURICE G. BAXTER, DANIEL WEBSTER &
THE SUPREME COURT (1966) (discussing Webster's preeminence as a Supreme Court law-
yer); ROBERT V. REMINI, DANIEL WEBSTER: THE MAN AND His TIME (1997) (addressing Web-
ster's life and career).
39. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 659.
40. Id. at 661 (noting that Woodworth assigned his patent rights in some states to Wil-
son in 1843).
41. Id. at 673.
42. Id. Seward served as governor in Albany from 1839-42, and would, in succeeding
years, go on to serve as Abraham Lincoln's Secretary of State. He would survive a vicious
stabbing attack on the night of Lincoln's assassination, and, continuing as Secretary of
State under AndrewJohnson, would brilliantly negotiate the purchase of Alaska from Rus-
sia. See generally GLYNDON G. VAN DEUSEN, WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD (1967). For a highly
imaginative and entertaining portrayal of Seward as historical figure, see WALTER A. MC-
DOUGALL, LET THE SEA MAKE A NOISE .. . 197, 299-304, 317 (1993).
Webster and Seward's paths had crossed previously in the political arena. While both
seeking influence in the Whig party, Seward and Webster had quarreled with one another
when Seward was Governor of New York and Webster was Secretary of State in the Tyler
administration. See VAN DEUSEN, supra, at 77-78 (describing a trial in the New York courts
of a Canadian sheriff who had been attempting to prevent delivery of guns from New York
to rebels in Canada).
43. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 675.
44. The following language created the difficulty:
[Tihereupon the said patent shall have the same effect in law as though it had
been originally granted for the term of twenty-one years. And the benefit of such
renewal shall extend to assignees and grantees of the right to use the thing pat-
ented, to the extent of their respective interest therein.
Id. at 658 (quoting Act of July 4, 1836, Ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, § 18 (repealed 1870)).
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department of labor or art, on the farm, in the workshop,
and factory. These articles have been purchased from the
patentee, and have gone into common use. But, if the con-
struction against which we have been contending should pre-
vail, the moment the patent of either article is renewed, the
common use is arrested, by the exclusive grant to the paten-
tee. It is true the owner may repurchase the right to use, and
doubtless would be compelled from necessity; but he is left
to the discretion or caprice of the patentee. A construction
leading to such consequences, and fraught with such un-
mixed evil, we must be satisfied, was never contemplated by
45Congress....
This reasoning set the stage for the Court in a later case to put for-
ward a rationale for the exhaustion doctrine based on the considera-
tion that the purchaser paid to the patentee for the patented goods.4 6
Second, the Court seemed to frame its analysis in terms of a dis-
tinction that would emerge as crucial in developing the exhaustion
doctrine: exclusive rights of "making" as opposed to exclusive rights of
"using." The central concept was that the patentee, upon sale of the
patented goods, lost the right to control use exclusively, but main-
tained the exclusive right to make the claimed invention: " [W] hen in
connection with the simple right to use, the exclusive right to make
and vend being in another, the right to use the thing patented neces-
sarily results in a right to use the machine, and nothing more."47
Webster and Seward would rely on this distinction later in laying the
foundational arguments for the repair-reconstruction distinction.48
The exhaustion principle is only barely recognizable in Wilson v.
Rousseau, but it sufficed as a starting point for later refinements. One
such refinement grew out of another case involving the Woodworth
patent, Bloomer v. McQuewan.49 The Woodworth patent term had
again been extended for seven years, this time by special legislation
passed by Congress in 1845.50 Bloomer, a successor in interest to the
ownership of the Woodworth patent, asserted the patent against par-
ties who had constructed planing machines during the original patent
45. Id. at 684.
46. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
47. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 683.
48. See infra Part I.B.
49. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852). Webster died before this case was argued, and there
is nothing to indicate that Seward was involved in the case.
50. Id. at 547.
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term and who now sought to continue using them during the newly-
extended period.5"
The legal issue in Bloomer v. McQuewan differed from that in Wil-
son v. Rousseau because, unlike the general provision in the 1836 Act,
Congress's special 1845 legislation contained no language directed to
the rights of those who had constructed machines with the patent
owner's authorization during the original term.52 Nevertheless, the
Court concluded that the policy interests at stake in McQuewan were
identical to those in Rousseau, and again decided that the defendants,
having purchased the right to use the planing machine during the
original term of the patent, were entitled to continue its use during
the extended term.5 5
This time, however, the Court expressly set forth a general rule of
exhaustion of rights:
[W] hen the machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it
is no longer within the limits of the monopoly. It passes
outside of it, and is no longer under the protection of the act
of Congress .... The implement or machine becomes his
private, individual property, not protected by the laws of the
United States, but by the laws of the State in which it is situ-
ated. Contracts in relation to it are regulated by the laws of
the State, and are subject to State jurisdiction.54
The concept of a patented device "passing outside" the limits of the
patent right upon sale is important. It serves as a reminder that the
exhaustion doctrine straddles the fence between the legal regimes of
intellectual and tangible property, hinting, perhaps, that property
concepts extrinsic to patent law may be analytically important within
it. 5 In addition, this concept seems to imply that the purchaser of
patented goods receives an "absolute" personal property right in those
51. Id.
52. Id. at 541-42.
53. Id. at 550. The Court also reinforced the Wilson v. Rousseau distinction between
"the right to make and vend the machine, and the grant of the right to use it." Id. at 548.
54. Id. at 549.
55. See Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895) (reviewing the
evolution of the patent exhaustion principle and concluding that the cases establish "that
one who buys patented articles of manufacture from one authorized to sell them becomes
possessed of an absolute property in such articles, unrestricted in time or place"); Chaffee
v. Boston Belting Co., 63 U.S. (22 How.) 217, 223 (1859) ("By a valid sale and purchase,
the patented machine becomes the private individual property of the purchaser, and is no
longer protected by the laws of the United States, but by the laws of the State in which it is
situated."); Incandescent Gas Light Co. v. Cantelo, [1895] 12 R.P.D. & T.M. 262, 264
(1895) (concluding that once the proper sale of a patented item occurs, the seller cannot
belatedly place conditions upon the use of the item).
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goods. Consistent with the general antipathy towards restraints on
alienation, especially of chattels, such a right includes not only use,
but also resale.56 The exhaustion doctrine, defined according to
these basic parameters, rapidly became established in patent cases in
the Supreme Court as well as lower courts.5 7 The Court also seemed
to signal that the exhaustion principle would be applied broadly in
favor of purchasers." Other cases brought to light the international
dimension of the exhaustion problem, arising when a patentee made
56. See Goodyear v. Beverly Rubber Co., 10 F. Cas. 638, 641 (C.C.D. Mass. 1859) (No.
5557) (noting that, upon a valid sale of a patented article, it becomes the private property
of the purchaser).
57. The Goodyear court stated that, from the rule that a patented article becomes pri-
vate property upon sale:
[I]t follows that, if a purchaser acquires an absolute, unconditional title to that
which is the subject of a patent, he may continue to use it until it is worn out, or
he may repair it or improve upon it as he pleases, in the same manner as if deal-
ing with any other kind of property.
Id.; see also Aiken v. Manchester Print Works, 1 F. Cas. 245, 247 (C.C.D.N.H. 1865) (No.
113) (asserting that "[r]epeated decisions" of the Supreme Court have set forth the ex-
haustion doctrine "until it cannot any longer be regarded as an open question").
The exhaustion principle is also the subject of some British cases from the same gen-
eral time period. See, e.g., Betts. v. Willmott, 6 Ch. App. 239, 245 (1871) (stating that when
someone buys a patented article, "he expects to have the control of it, and there must be
some clear and explicit agreement to the contrary to justify the vendor in saying that he
has not given the purchaser his license to sell the article, or to use it wherever he pleases as
against himself'). For a more recent discussion of the principle enunciated in these cases,
see Interstate Parcel Express Co. v. Time-Life International (Nederlands) BV (1977) 15 A.L.R.
353, 359 (Austl.) ("[A] patentee is granted exclusive power to 'make, use, exercise and
vend' the invention. The sale of a patented article, by the patentee, would be quite futile,
from the point of view of the buyer, if the buyer was not entitled... to re-sell the article
which he had bought.").
Professor Adelman has sought to define the concept of exhaustion more precisely
than does this Article. Under Professor Adelman's definition, exhaustion is strictly defined
as a rule that operates independently of the intent of the parties. See Martin J. Adeiman,
The Exhaustion Doctrine in American Patent Law, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH ANNUAL
FoRDMAN UNrvERsrrY CONFERENCE ON INTERNAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POucy,
PROGRAM VB (Apr. 16-17, 1998) (on file with author). Under this definition, a case such as
Betts v. Willmot is better characterized as an implied contract case in which exhaustion
operates as a default rule. What is important for purposes of the present Article is that
exhaustion models, however defined, are always characterized either by the subjugation
(or, under Professor Adelman's definition, the elimination) of the expectations of the par-
ties from the analysis.
58. SeeAdams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456-57 (1873) (holding that an author-
ized sale by the patentee's assignee within his specified geographic territory carried with it
the right to use the patented goods anywhere); see also Hobbie v. Jennison, 149 U.S. 355
(1893) (rejecting the argument that Adams did not apply where the seller knew that the
purchased goods would be used outside the seller's territory and suggesting that the paten-
tee could readily protect itself through express restrictions in a formal, written agreement).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 58:423
authorized sales in one country to a purchaser, who in turn exported
the goods into another country in competition with the purchaser.59
The Court also made explicit the consideration rationale for pat-
ent exhaustion: when the purchaser paid the patentee for the pat-
ented goods, the purchase price was presumed to include fees for use
and resale. 60 Thus, upon sale, the patentee received adequate consid-
eration for the rights in using and selling.61 This is the prevailing rule
today.62
B. The Repair-Reconstruction Problem: Origins, Evolution, Confusion
Two United States Supreme Court cases have principally shaped
the law of the repair-reconstruction problem. These cases seem to
employ exhaustion as the organizing principle for permissible repair,
and clearly establish repair-reconstruction as the operative distinction.
They also hint, however, at the inadequacy of the exhaustion model to
support a coherent vision of permissible repair. In particular, while
these cases raise the possibility that a multiplicity of factors could bear
on the repair-reconstruction dichotomy, they fail to explain both the
basis of these factors, as well as which of them is important, leaving
courts without much guidance in analyzing the repair-reconstruction
issue.
59. See Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697, 703 (1890) (asserting that the right to make and
sell a patented product under the laws of one country meant that "purchasers from [the
patentee] could not be thereby authorized to sell the articles in the United States in defi-
ance of the rights of patentees under a United States patent").
60. See Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (26 Wall.) 544, 547 (1872) (stating that when a
patentee unconditionally sells a patented item, "and the consideration has been paid to
him for the thing patented, the rule is well established that the patentee must be under-
stood to have parted to that extent with all his exclusive right, and that he ceases to have
any interest whatever in the patented machine so sold").
61. See id.; see also United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 252 (1942) (stating
that, after the first sale of a patented good, the patentee "has received in the purchase
price every benefit of that monopoly which the patent law secures to him"); Adams, 84 U.S.
(17 Wall.) at 456 (stating that, when the patentee or his assignee receives upon sale "all the
royalty or consideration which he claims for the use of his invention in that particular
machine or instrument, it is open to the use of the purchaser without further restriction on
account of the monopoly of the patentees").
62. There are, to be sure, continuing controversies, especially concerning the impact
of express restrictions against reuse on the exhaustion doctrine. For a controversial deci-
sion on the issue, see Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992),
in which the court determined that "the district court erred in holding that the restriction
on reuse was, as a matter of law, unenforceable under the patent law." A full discussion of
this important issue is outside the scope of this Article.
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1. The Ambivalence of Wilson v. Simpson.-The case of Wilson v.
Simpson" once again brought the Woodworth patent before the
Supreme Court, this time under extraordinary circumstances.64 In
the tumultuous opening weeks of 1850, the country was confronting
problems far more ominous and intractable than those posed by mo-
nopolies, even notorious ones. Amidst serious threats of Southern se-
cession," the Senate clashed over Henry Clay's compromise
proposal.66 On March 7, before a packed Senate chamber, Senator
Daniel Webster, by now a legendary elder statesman, spoke "not as a
Massachusetts man, nor as a Northern man, but as an American,"
counseling for compromise, even on slavery, and warning against im-
pending war.67
Four days later, William H. Seward, a recently elected senator
from New York, counterattacked.68 Invoking "a higher law than the
Constitution," he denounced Webster's notion of compromise on the
slavery question.69
Yet the preservation of the American republic was one thing, and
the practice of law quite another. While upstairs, in the Senate cham-
ber, Seward and Webster's political rivalry became emblematic of a
national crisis that would eventually precipitate civil war, downstairs,
in the Supreme Court chambers, Seward and Webster had cases to
argue. Four years earlier, they had appeared as co-counsel in Wilson v.
Rousseau, and, in January Term 1850, in the midst of the Senate battle,
they collaborated again on behalf of the owner of the Woodworth pat-
ent.7 ° Although they lost the case, Seward and Webster crafted argu-
ments that still dominate the current discourse over the repair-
reconstruction problem.7 1
63. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109 (1850).
64. See REMINI, supra note 38, at 678-79 (discussing the political tension in 1850 be-
tween North and South over the spread of slavery in the territories).
65. The clash of political wills in the Senate presaged a clash of a different dimension
altogether. In one well-known episode, Henry Foote, senator from Mississippi, drew a pis-
tol in a heated debate with Thomas Hart Benton, senator from Missouri. Id. at 679.
66. Id. at 663-65.
67. Id. at 669.
68. Id. at 678.
69. VAN DEUSEN, supra note 42, at 123.
70. Then, as now, patent litigation was a lucrative endeavor, and it seems safe to as-
sume that the promise of generous fees induced Webster and Seward to set aside their
ideological clash to take on the joint representation. See id. at 98 (providing an account of
Seward's role in the Woodworth patent litigation).
71. See, e.g., Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co., 121 F.3d 669, 673-74 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing Wilson
v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109 (1850)), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1337 (1998).
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The case that brought Webster and Seward to the Court in the
January Term, 1850, also arose from the continued use of a Wood-
worth planing machine beyond the original term by a party whose use
had been licensed during the original term.72 Webster and Seward
admitted that under Wilson v. Rousseau's basic principle of exhaustion,
the authorized purchase of a machine during the original term of the
patent conferred the right to continue to use the machine during the
extended term. They argued, however, that this right of use in the
invention was not general, but was "strictly limited to a right to the
continued use of the specific machine or machines legally in use at
the time of the renewal."73 Moreover, Wilson v. Rousseau had specifi-
cally excluded such purchasers from enjoying the right to make." Ac-
cordingly, if the tangible machine ceased to exist, the purchaser's
right to use would cease with it.7" Further use by the purchaser would
be possible only after a remaking of the machine, which would consti-
tute infringement.
76
Consequently, the most important part of the argument, as Web-
ster and Seward explained it, was to determine when the patented
planing machine ceased to exist.77 As might be expected, Webster
and Seward had a ready answer: the patented planing machine was
comprised of a combination of elements, so that "when any one of
these elements is either worn out by use, or otherwise destroyed, then
the combination invented-the thing patented-no longer exists, and
cannot be restored without the exercise of the right to make."78 Be-
cause the evidence showed that the cutter-knives of the planing
machine wore out after two to three months, 79 it followed that use
beyond that time would amount to an improper new making of the
patented invention.80
The Court incorporated Webster and Seward's argument into its
opinion in large part, accepting the argument and disagreeing only as
to its application to the facts.81 To begin with, the Court accepted the
argument that it was dealing with a limitation on the principle of ex-
72. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) at 110-11.
73. Id. at 112-13.
74. Id. at 112.
75. Id. at 115.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 116.
79. Id. at 111.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 122.
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haustion.82 Accordingly, it started its analysis by reaffirming the basic
rule on exhaustion as established in Wilson v. Rousseau: "[W]hen the
material of the combination ceases to exist, in whatever way that may
occur, the right to renew it depends upon the right to make the inven-
tion. If the right to make does not exist, there is no right to rebuild
the combination."83 The Court then fashioned the limitation argued
for by Webster and Seward, distinguishing between "restoration" and
"reconstruction":
But it does not follow, when one of the elements of the com-
bination has become so much worn as to be inoperative, or
has been broken, that the machine no longer exists, for res-
toration to its original use, by the owner who has bought its
use. When the wearing or injury is partial, then repair is res-
toration, and not reconstruction.8 4
This basic distinction became the foundation for jurisprudence in the
United States and abroad 5 for dealing with the extent of the right of
82. Id.
83. Id. at 123.
84. Id.
85. The earliest reported British case on the repair-reconstruction distinction appears
to be Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Neal, [1899] 16 R.P.D. & T.M. 247, 250 (1899) ("Any
simple repairs, I think, may be done by a person without any license from the manufac-
turer, but when he takes the whole thing and sells what is a new tyre with merely the old
wires in it, in my opinion there has been no license to use those old wires . . . for the
purpose of putting them into and making up precisely the same combination which is the
subject of the Letters Patent."). See also Sirdar Rubber Co. v. Wallington, Weston & Co.,
[1905] 1 Ch. 451, 454 (1905) (concluding that the defendant's replacement activity "is not
a repair amounting to reconstruction, and a new article, but a fair repair"); Dunlop Pneu-
matic Tyre Co. v. Holborn Tyre Co., [1901] 18 R.P.D. & T.M. 222, 226 (1901) (addressing
whether repairs to tires constituted repair or reconstruction).
For more recent statements of the rule, see Dellareed Ltd. v. Delkim Developments, [1988]
F.S.R. 329, 344-46 (1987) (summarizing the early cases as establishing the rule that "in
respect of repairing a patented article, the implied license is restricted to what 'may fairly
be termed a repair'; it does not extend to making a new article 'under cover of repair'");
British Leyland Motor Corp. v. Armstrong Patents Co., [1986] R.P.C. 279, 358 (H.L. 1986) ("In
the field of repair it is clear that a person who acquires a patented article has an implied
license to keep it in repair, but must stop short of renewal."). See generally DAVID YOUNG ET
AL., TERRELL ON THE LAw OF PATENTS § 6.62 (14th ed. 1994) (citing British cases on the
distinction between repairing and making).
For a Canadian case on repair-reconstruction, see Rucker Co. v. Gavel's Vulcanizing Ltd.,
7 C.P.R. (3d) 294 (1985). For authorities from German, French, and Dutch courts, see
Friedrich-Karl Beier, Protection for Spare Parts in the Proposals for a European Design Law, 25
INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & Cos'viGucrr 840, 859 & n.54 (1994) (citing authorities that estab-
lish that the repair of patented articles is permissible where replacement parts are not
independently protected, and the replacement activity "does not amount to re-manufactur-
ing the entire patented product, but remains within the framework of normal measures to
preserve, service and repair the product").
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use enjoyed by the purchaser of authorized patented goods.86 In ap-
plying the test, however, the Simpson Court found that the defendant's
replacement of knives on the planing machine constituted permissi-
ble repair, and thus affirmed the dismissal of the patentee's
complaint. 87
The result may seem entirely inoffensive on an intuitive level, and
no doubt the case would be decided the same way today, even after
150 years of judicial gloss. Yet the Court's opinion in Simpson is, if not
totally incomprehensible, at least murky.
First, the Court's articulation of the "foundation of the right to
repair and replace" 88 leaves a great deal to be desired. The Court
resorted to vague notions of equity and harm:
Has the patentee a more equitable right to force the disuse
of the machine entirely; on account of the inoperativeness of
a part of it, than the purchaser has to repair, who has, in the
whole of it, a right of use? And what harm is done to the
patentee in the use of his right of invention, when the repair
and replacement of a partial injury are confined to the
machine which the purchaser has bought?89
The Court did not make clear whether these concerns are merely a
restatement of the basic consideration rationale for the exhaustion
doctrine, or, by contrast, a new supplementary equitable principle de-
voted uniquely to the permissible repair aspect of exhaustion. Courts
have never squarely addressed this question as to the foundational
premise for the repair-reconstruction dichotomy.
Second, in its application of the repair-reconstruction standard,
the Court set the stage for decades of confusion by presenting a wan-
dering, unfocused analysis in which nearly anything seemed to have
potential relevance to the repair-reconstruction question. In one part
of the opinion, for example, the Court seemed to favor an "identity of
the machine" standard, under which a replacement activity that al-
tered the identity of the machine triggered the patentee's right to an
additional royalty.9°
86. See, e.g., Sirdar Rubber, I Ch. at 454 (noting that a purchaser must be able to repair
the patented good in order to "obtain the use of [it] for the fair period of its life").
87. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) at 126.
88. Id. at 123.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 125 (asserting that replacement of a worn out component of a patented
machine would constitute repair when limited to that which was "absolutely necessary to
identify the machine with what it was in the beginning of its use, or before that part of it
had been worn out").
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In other parts of the opinion, however, the expected useful life of
the replaced component (i.e., whether or not it was a "temporary"
part) seemed the dominant factor: If the replaced component was a
temporary one anyway, then the replacement activity could be
deemed repair.91 Similarly, the Court seemed to differentiate be-
tween replacement of a worn part, which would be considered an in-
stance of repair, and replacement of a broken or useless part, which
tended to suggest reconstruction.92 The Supreme Court in Aro p3
later seized upon this distinction.94
In still other portions of its opinion, the Simpson Court consid-
ered whether the repair-reconstruction dichotomy could be analyzed
by reference to the importance (or "essentialness") of the replaced
component.9 5 Here, the Court conveyed a mixed message. On the
one hand, the Court observed that if a replaced component "is a part
of an original combination, essential to its use, then the right to repair
and replace recurs."96 On the other hand, the Court seemed to de-
clare the essentialness of the component to be irrelevant, stating that
there was no reconstruction if the defendant could replace the cutter-
knives from time to time "though they are an essential and distinct
constituent of the principle or combination of the invention."97
Finally, even as the Court explained the repair-reconstruction
problem in terms of the physical qualities of the overall device and its
91. Importantly, the Court was not interested in the perishability of the replaced com-
ponent absolutely, but instead its perishability relative to the useful life of the overall
machine. See id. (noting that "[t]he right... to replace the cutter-knives is not because
they are of perishable materials, but because the inventor of the machine has so arranged
them as a part of its combination, that the machine could not be continued in use without
a succession of knives at short intervals"). The machine at issue was designed to last for
several years, while the cutting-knives would wear out and require replacement every sixty
to ninety days. Id. at 111.
92. The Court spoke in the quaint language of nineteenth century technology:
Between repairing and replacing there is a difference.
Form may be given to a piece of any material-wood, metal, or glass .... It
would be the right of the purchaser to repair such a thing as that, so as to give to
it what was its first shape, if it had been turned from it, or, by filing, grinding, or
cutting, to keep it up to the performance of its original use. But if, as a whole, it
should happen to be broken, so that its parts could not be readjusted, or so much
worn out as to be useless, then a purchaser cannot make or replace it by another,
but he must buy a new one. The doing of either would be entire reconstruction.
Id. at 124.
93. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961) (Aro 1).
94. See infra Part I.B.2.
95. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) at 124.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 125.
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components,9" it afforded some role to expectations, both those of the
inventor and, it would seem, of the purchaser of the patented prod-
uct.99 For example, in connection with its discussion of the useful life
of the replaced component as compared to the useful life of the
machine, the Court spoke of the right to replace a component "which
is liable to be often worn out or to become inoperative for its intended
effect, which the inventor contemplated would have to be frequently re-
placed anew, during the time that the machine, as a whole, might
last."' °° The Court also showed that the contrast between these "tem-
porary" parts that were subject to permissible replacement, and per-
manent parts that were not, could also be framed in terms of intent:
[Some components] are contemplated by the inventor to last so
long as the materials of which they are formed can hold to-
gether in use in such a combination .... With such inten-
tions, they are put into the structure. So it is understood by a
purchaser .... *o'
This passage raises important issues. Even a relatively confined read-
ing of the passage suggests that there is a nexus between the rhetoric
of spentness and the rhetoric of intent: The physical qualities of the
replaced components might be analyzed because they serve as a useful
proxy for the patentee's intent. This in turn suggests that the paten-
tee's intent has a greater role in the repair-reconstruction analysis
than is evident from other parts of the Simpson opinion.
Construed more broadly, the passage opens the door to consider-
ations that are potentially separate from the rhetoric of spentness.
The patentee's, and perhaps the purchaser's, intents and expectations
might be evidenced directly, or by circumstantial evidence quite apart
from the physical qualities of the device at issue. But the Court in
Simpson was silent on the question of whether such evidence could be
considered. This has left unclear what role the inventor's and pur-
chaser's expectations should play in the analysis, if any.
To summarize, Simpson left open a number of questions. Most
broadly, is permissible repair a direct application of the principle of
exhaustion, or a special case involving additional equitable considera-
tions? More narrowly, is permissible repair to be analyzed by way of a
loose, multiple-factor approach in which all factors receive equal
98. This Article will refer to this mode of analysis as the rhetoric of "spentness." See
infra Part II.
99. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) at 126. For additional analysis of the role of intent in the
repair-reconstruction inquiry, see infra Part III.
100. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) at 125 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
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weight, or by way of a more structured standard? If the latter, is the
standard to be defined in terms of spentness, in terms of the parties'
expectations, or in terms of something different entirely?
2. A "Pandora's Flock" and Two Contradictory Notions of Spentness:
The Aro I Case.-Just over a hundred years after Wilson v. Simpson, the
Supreme Court delivered another major decision on the repair-recon-
struction problem.1"2 In Aro Manufacturing (Aro 1), the Court dealt
with claims covering a folding top for a convertible automobile that
consisted of "a flexible top fabric, supporting structures, and a mecha-
nism for sealing the fabric against the side of the automobile body in
order to keep out the rain."10 3 Defendants manufactured and sold
102. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961). The Aro I
decision generated a flurry of commentary, some of which approved of the Court's opin-
ion. See, e.g.,James C. Bageman, Note, Contributory Infringement and the "Repair" Doctrine, 38
S. CAL. L. REv. 363, 371 (1965) (approving of Aro I as providing a "clearer, more well-
defined standard"); Thomas F. Caffrey, Case Note, 7 ViIL. L. REV. 149, 152 (1961) (approv-
ing of Aro I as lending greater certainty to the repair-reconstruction problem); Comment,
36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1395, 1400 (1961) (approving of Aro Ias striking the proper balance of
interests between the patentee and the supplier of unpatented components); Stuart
Lubitz, Case Note, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 952, 955-56 (1961) (approving of Aro !'s shift
away from an intent-based rationale and concluding that Aro I is a proper extension of
Wilson v. Simpson); Irwin M. Stein, Note, Repair and Reconstruction in Patented Combinations,
23 U. Prrr. L. REv. 184, 197 (1961) (arguing that Aro Is ajustifiable extension of Wilson v.
Simpson).
In contrast, a great deal of the literature criticized the Court's opinion. See, e.g.,
Michael Conner, Editorial Note, Contributory Inftingement: The Aro Manufacturing Case, 31
U. CIN. L. REv. 61, 70 (1962) (arguing that Justice Brennan's concurring opinion repre-
sents the correct approach to repair-reconstruction and asserting that Aro Ivirtually elimi-
pates the contributory infringement remedy); Melvin F. Jager, Recent Decision, 1961 U.
ILL. L.F. 343, 350 (1961) (arguing that Aro I severely undercuts the contributory infringe-
ment remedy); Note, 30 FoiRwAm L. REv. 373, 376 (1961) (arguing that courts following
Aro Iwill give "short shrift to claims of reconstruction");Julius A. Shafran, Note, 49 CAL. L.
REv. 988, 992 (1961) (same). Other commentary discussed the future implications of the
case. See, e.g., Sease, supra note 18, at 85 (arguing against the broad sweep of the Aro I
decision and proposing specific standards for certain sets of cases); Donald H. Ray, Note,
40 TEX. L. REv. 728, 732 (1962) (discussing the limitation of the contributory infringement
remedy); The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARv. L. REV. 40, 243 (1961) (discussing
whether Aro I abandoned the contributory infringement rationale).
103. Aro I, 365 U.S. at 337. Justice Black, wondering how the invention could have been
the result "of anything more than the simplest childlike mechanical skill," id. at 351 (Black,
J., concurring), was moved to song: "[T]he patentee must have known all about the old-
fashioned surrey with the fringe on top and with isinglass curtains you could roll right
down in case of a change in the weather." Id. As another example of prior art, Justice
Black referred to the "tops of Model T Fords which began to scare horses on country roads
nearly haif a century ago." Id. Although patentability over the prior art was not at issue,
hostility towards the validity of the grant of the patent may have played a part in the
Court's noninfringement determination.
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replacement fabrics that had been cut to fit into the patented
combination.
10 4
The Court concluded that replacement of the fabric constituted
permissible repair' in an opinion whose reasoning was endorsed by
only four justices.16 Justice Black filed a strongly worded concur-
rence, 10 7 and Justice Brennan filed an equally strong opinion concur-
ring only in the result.' 8 Justice Harlan, joined by Justices
Frankfurter and Stewart, dissented.' 09
Two broad aspects of these confused and confusing opinions
merit close scrutiny. First, the Court's opinion expressly proscribed
the use of a multifactor approach to repair-reconstruction, resorting
instead to a unitary "spentness" standard."0 Second, the Court's
"spentness" standard allowed for two entirely contradictory interpreta-
tions, and the Court's opinion did not make clear which one was
correct.'
a. Aro I's Rejection of a Multifactor Approach to Repair-Recon-
struction.-The Wilson v. Simpson opinion can rightly be criticized for
its meandering rhetoric, and the Court in Aro I could have taken the
opportunity to make a clear break from it. Instead, the Court tried to
have it both ways. In some passages, the Court's opinion purported to
endorse Wilson v. Simpson as the authoritative exposition of the repair-
reconstruction doctrine. 12 In other passages, however, the Court's
opinion repudiated the multifactor approach to repair-reconstruc-
tion, asserting inaccurately that such an approach had appeared only
in lower court opinions."
13
In particular, the Court's opinion chided the Aro I appellate tri-
bunal for focusing attention "on operative facts not properly determi-
native of the question of permissible repair versus forbidden
reconstruction."'14 Such forbidden operative facts included, for ex-
ample, whether the fabric was 6-a minor or relatively inexpensive com-
104. Aro 1, 365 U.S. at 338.
105. Id, at 346.
106. Id. at 337.
107. Id. at 346 (Black, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 369 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
110. See infra notes 112-124 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 125-130 and accompanying text.
112. Aro I, 365 U.S. at 342, 343 n.9.
113. Id. at 345 (admitting that "there is language in some lower court opinions indicat-
ing that 'repair' or 'reconstruction' depends on a number of factors" but claiming that
Supreme Court opinions had avoided that approach).
114. Id. at 343.
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ponent, ' 11  and whether the fabric would be expected to have a
particularly short useful life.' 16 Justice Black's concurring opinion was
even more strident, criticizing the appellate court for using a "Pan-
dora's flock of insignificant standards" instead of the "simple test of
'making,"' for analyzing the repair-reconstruction problem.'1 7
Yet the Simpson opinion clearly discussed multiple factors on the
way to its repair-reconstruction conclusion, including some of the very
factors that the Aro I Court's opinion disparaged.' 18 The Aro I opin-
ion, accordingly, has left courts to sort out the dilemma under which
Simpson must be treated as authoritative, but Simpson's multifactor ap-
proach must be avoided.
Many courts have resolved the dilemma by default, upon discov-
ering that thoughtful analysis of the repair-reconstruction problem in-
evitably required a return to at least some form of a multiple-factor
approach. For example, in Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill,"9 the Fifth Cir-
cuit cited Aro /s reduction of the multifactor approach to a "simpler"
inquiry,1 2 ° but then proceeded to invoke what appeared to be a mul-
tifactor test:
[I]t does not take long to recognize that such simplicity is
beguiling, and in the process of a judicial determination [of
115. Id. (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 270 F.2d 200, 205
(1st Cir. 1959)).
116. Id. at 343-44.
117. Id. at 355 (Black, J., concurring).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 90-101. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in
Aro I correctly characterized Wilson v. Simpson as articulating a multiple factor analysis. Aro
1, 365 U.S. at 363-64 (Brennan, J., concurring). According to Justice Brennan, the appro-
.priate factors include:
the life of the part replaced in relation to the useful life of the whole combina-
tion, the importance of the replaced element to the inventive concept, the cost of
the component relative to the cost of the combination, the common sense under-
standing and intention of the patent owner and the buyer of the combination as
to its perishable components, whether the purchased component replaces a
worn-out part or is bought for some other purpose, and other pertinent factors.
Id. at 363-64 (footnotes omitted).
119. 315 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1963). See infra text accompanying notes 383-396 for a
more detailed discussion of the Fifth Circuit's Fromberg decision and the Ninth Circuit's
contrary approach taken in a related case.
120. Fromberg, Inc., 315 F.2d at 412. The court stated:
Where once the ultimate question seems to have been fractured into a series of
subsidiary inquiries as to the length of life, cost, etc. of the replaced element of a
combination patent in relation to other elements or the completed device as a
whole, it has now been reduced to the simpler one: does this really make a new
device?
Id. (citing Aro I, 365 U.S. at 336).
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repair versus reconstruction] a number of factors must be
considered.
12 1
Courts continue to pay lip service to Aro f's proscription against the
multiple-factor approach, yet they still apply it to one degree or an-
other. This is particularly evident in the Federal Circuit's most recent
decisions on the issue. For example, in Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co.,'
2 2 the
court acknowledged Aro f's rejection of certain classical factors as rele-
vant to the repair-reconstruction distinction,1 23 but then proceeded
unabashedly to declare that "a number of factors" are relevant to this
distinction. 124 Aro I has thus made more difficult an already compli-
cated inquiry.
b. Aro I's "Spentness" Standard.-Having discarded the mul-
tifactor approach by means of a questionable analysis of precedent,
the Aro I Court sought to impose a unitary spentness standard for re-
pair-reconstruction. 125 In searching for a "plain and practical" test to
stand in the stead of the multifactor standard, the Court adopted an
offhand comment by Judge Learned Hand from a lengthy antitrust
opinion as the "distilled essence" of the permissible repair doctrine:
"'The [patent] monopolist cannot prevent those to whom he sells
from . . . reconditioning articles worn by use, unless they in fact make
a new article.""126 This observation, of course, is nothing but a restate-
ment of the exhaustion principle, unaccompanied by any thoughtful
analysis as to whether exhaustion is an appropriate organizing princi-
ple for repair-reconstruction. This is Aro /'s crucial omission.
127
121. Id. A district court more recently expressed a similar sentiment:
[H]ow can one determine whether the article as a whole has been spent, if not by
reference to whether some proportion of its individual parts are in fact worn or
broken? In practice, an article becomes ripe for discarding or replacement for
one of two reasons: Either it will have enough worn or broken parts that it is no
longer economically rational to repair it, or it will have become obsolete due to
advances in the art.
FMC Corp. v. Up-Right, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 1455, 1462 (N.D. Cal. 1993), af]'d, 21 F.3d 1073
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
122. 121 F.3d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1337 (1998).
123. See id. at 673 (noting Aro t's rejection of component inventiveness as a factor in
repair-reconstruction analysis); infra Part II.B (discussing component importance and in-
ventiveness as a repair-reconstruction factor).
124. Aktiebolag, 121 F.3d at 673.
125. Aro I, 365 U.S. at 343-46. The reference to a "unitary" standard here means some-
thing other than a multifactor standard, reflecting the Court's insistence on avoiding the
multifactor approach.
126. Id. at 343 (ellipsis and alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1945)).
127. See infra Parts IV-V (analyzing this issue).
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Another critical problem with the Aro I opinion is its choice of
the spentness rhetoric as the repair-reconstruction standard.'28 The
exhaustion model encourages courts to think about the repair-recon-
struction problem in terms of spentness. Distinguishing making from
using seems to call for close attention to the physical qualities of the
device and, perhaps, the physical nature of the replacement activities
being performed on the device. Spentness is a very natural rubric
here, and the Aro I opinion resorted to it in formulating a holding:
The decisions of this Court require the conclusion that
reconstruction of a patented entity, comprised of unpat-
ented elements, is limited to such a true reconstruction of
the entity as to "in fact make a new article," after the entity,
viewed as a whole, has become spent. In order to call the monop-
oly, conferred by the patent grant, into play for a second
time, it must, indeed, be a second creation of the patented
entity . . . . Mere replacement of individual unpatented
parts, one at a time, whether of the same part repeatedly or
different parts successively, is no more than the lawful right
of the owner to repair his property. 129
On its face, the inquiry into the spentness of the article may appear to
be appealing, but the Court left almost no guidelines by which lower
courts could implement this inquiry. The Aro I opinion provides a
perplexing mix of messages regarding traditional indicia of spentness,
such as machine identity, component importance, component perish-
ability and useful life, and dominance of new over old components.
Courts are thus left to seek guidance from the myriad cases before
and after Aro I that have explored these aspects of spentness.
Another major problem with Aro I concerns the Court's contra-
dictory uses of the spentness rubric. Under one notion of spentness,
which would seem to be supported by the passage quoted above, the
fact of device spentness presages impermissible reconstruction. That
is, the notion is one of overall spentness. Patentees would presumably
argue, for example, that the failure of a component of a patented
device rendered the device itself spent, and efforts to replace that
component would be impermissible attempts to reconstruct the spent
device.
One could also speak, however, of the spentness of an individual
component. The Aro I opinion refers to spentness in this fashion as
well, but without explanation: "We hold that maintenance of the 'use
128. Aro I, 365 U.S. at 346.
129. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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of the whole' of the patented combination through replacement of a
spent, unpatented element does not constitute reconstruction.
Used in this way, spentness cuts in the opposite direction: defendants
would argue that a replaced component was spent, and that its re-
placement constitutes mere permissible repair of the patented device.
In sum, Aro I installed spentness as the standard for repair-recon-
struction, but failed to provide reasonable guidance for analyzing
spentness, and failed to specify whether spentness referred to the
whole device or to a part of it. More fundamentally, the Court, again
perhaps unwittingly, adopted an exhaustion model without consider-
ing its limitations, or what alternative models might have had to offer.
II. THE HEART, THE SOUL, AND THE PARTS OF THE WHOLE: THE
FAILURE OF SPENTNESS AS A STANDARD FOR
REPAIR-RECONSTRUCTION
If spentness is the operative standard after Arc Ifor analyzing the
repair-reconstruction problem, how can one evaluate whether a pat-
ented device has indeed become spent? Case law before and after Art
I reveals a dizzying array of potential approaches. While some are
more satisfactory than others, they share a common weakness because
they force attention towards the peculiarities of the patented device
and away from the circumstances surrounding the sales transaction
between the patentee and the purchaser. In particular, spentness
analyses overemphasize the importance of the physical qualities of
patented devices and fail to recognize that the physical qualities
should merely function as a proxy for the reasonable expectations of
the parties. Ultimately, long experience with the spentness standard
highlights the limitations inherent in it and undercuts the proposition
that exhaustion is a satisfactory model by which to resolve repair-re-
construction disputes.
A. The Soul of the Invention: The Metaphysics of Machine Identity
One approach to assessing spentness is to consider whether, in
the course of a series of replacement activities, the patented device at
issue has undergone a change in identity. At the point at which the
original device becomes transformed, through replacement activities,
to a new device, the original device is deemed spent and the replace-
ment activities responsible for the transformation, and certainly any
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It would be difficult to imagine a more intractable legal standard.
Nevertheless, there is ample precedential support for the "identity of
the machine" test. Wilson v. Simpson includes language that can be
taken as an expression of this test.1 31
The identity of the machine standard also shows up in quite a
number of pre-Aro Icases,'32 but, it seems, to very little ultimate effect.
In some cases the standard seems to have been merely recited by
rote. 133 In other cases, the court proceeded only marginally further in
attempting to apply the standard, usually injecting it as a conclusory
label in the analysis. For example, in Gottied v. Conrad Seipp Brewing
Co.,1 34 the court stated that the defendant had the right to replace
parts that wore out, as often as necessary, "so long as the identity of
the machine is retained."135  The court's analysis amounts to little
more than a declaration that "[t]he proof in this case shows, to my
satisfaction, that as the grates, pipes, and blowers were worn out, they
were renewed, and therefore the identity of the machine is re-
131. See Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109, 126 (1850) (noting that the "replace-
ment of temporary parts does not alter the identity of the machine, but preserves it,
though there may not be in it every part of its original material"). In this regard, the Aro I
case contains mischaracterizations of Simpson. See Aro I, 365 U.S. at 352-53 (Black, J., con-
curring) (arguing that the Simpson Court rejected the "conceptualistic and misleading ar-
gument" that "the machine ceased to exist or have any 'material existence' the moment its
knives wore out.... [so that] replacement of the knives amounted to a[n] [impermissible]
Imaking,'" in favor of a "common-sense rule"). Despite Justice Black's characterization,
the Simpson Court, and several after it, did adopt the "conceptualistic" "identity of the
machine" standard. See, e.g., Ideal Wrapping Mach. Co. v. George Close Co., 23 F.2d 848,
850 (D. Mass. 1928) (noting that although "[d]ifficulties arise in determining the legal
limits between repair and reconstruction[,] . . . [t]he test is whether the identity of the
machine is preserved by the repairs"), affd, 29 F.2d 533 (1st Cir. 1928). For an early Brit-
ish case to the same effect, see Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Holborn Tyre Co., [1901] 18
R-P.D. & T.M. 222, 226 (1901) (implying an identity of the machine test by asking "[i]s
[the item] substantially, in common parlance, honestly, a new article, or is it an old article
repaired?").
132. See infra notes 133, 134 and 137. It appears that a number of treatises of the time
had also picked up on the "identity of the machine" standard. See Miller Hatcheries, Inc. v.
Buckeye Incubator Co., 41 F.2d 619, 621 (8th Cir. 1930) (citing treatises).
133. For cases mentioning the standard in passing, see Morrin v. Robert White Engineering
Works, 143 F. 519, 520 (2d Cir. 1905); Ideal Wrapping, 23 F.2d at 850; C. & RL Research Corp.
v. Write, Inc., 19 F.2d 380, 381 (D. Del. 1927); Youngv. Foerster, 37 F. 203, 204 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1889); Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Springfield Foundry Co., 34 F. 393, 395 (C.C.D. Mass.
1888).
134. 8 F. 322 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1881).
135. Id. at 323.
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tained."3 6 Similar conclusory assessments of machine identity can be
found in a number of cases.
13 7
Several reasons might explain why the identity of the machine
standard has proven to be such a dismal failure. First, it seems at best
highly unlikely that courts could ever reliably formulate an "identity"
of a machine, much less assess whether that identity had "changed."
Second, and more importantly, the identity standard, as applied in
many cases, will call for the court to confront the riddle of the apocry-
phal axe. This means that the court will have to determine whether
"identity" of a machine is something definable only with regard to
certain components, certain groups of components, or separately
from the components altogether.
The British court in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Holborn Tyre
Co.13s offers a simple illustration of the identity standard that betrays
its difficulties:
Take the case of an ordinary farm cart. A man has at
the beginning a new cart. By-and-bye the wheels, one or
both of them, have worn out, and he puts on a pair of new
wheels. Is it or is it not the old cart? Few people would doubt
that it is the old cart .... But by-and-bye the shafts fail, and
for the old shafts are substituted new ones. I do not wish to
express a decided opinion, but it is quite possible you have
still the old cart. But if after that you come to the body of
the cart, and the body of the cart is either taken away and a
new body is put there, or new wood is put for a large portion
of the cart, surely it is impossible to then say that the old cart
still remains.'" 9
The court's hesitance as it proceeds through the sequence of replace-
ments is significant. Is there something inherent about the wood of
the cart's body that makes it uniquely an identifier of farm carts, so
that whenever the body is replaced, a new cart is constructed? Or
does the significance really lie in the sequence of replacements, so
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Morgan Gardner Elec. Co. v. Buettner & Shelburne Mach. Co., 203 F. 490,
493 (7th Cir. 1913) (concluding that "[t]o replace the hollow washer and other separate
parts of the protective device did not destroy the identity of the patented device").
Many of these cases also followed Simpson's lead in treating the identity of the machine
standard as one consideration among other indicia of repair, rather than as an overarching
standard. See, e.g., Wagner Typewriter Co. v. F.S. Webster Co., 144 F. 405, 416
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906) (delineating a number of factors that the court should consider in
rendering its determination, in addition to whether an item "is easily removable and re-
placed without affecting the identity of the machine").
138. [1901] R.P.D. & T.M. 222 (1901).
139. Id. at 226.
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that the cumulative replacement of wheels, shafts, and then body fi-
nally works the change in identity?140 If this is so, then what about the
case in which the body is replaced, but not the wheels or shaft?
It is obvious that these questions could continue endlessly in any
given repair-reconstruction case, which might involve multiple farm
carts having vastly different repair histories. One could conclude that
the fault here lies merely with the choice of the "identity" standard,
which delves hopelessly into the metaphysics of machinery. But the
failure of the identity standard should also raise questions about the
wisdom of Aro l's heavy reliance on spentness as an overarching stan-
dard for repair-reconstruction disputes. Is the point of the repair-re-
construction distinction really to draw hypertechnical distinctions
between making and using? Or is it to give legal effect to the unstated
expectations of the patentee and purchaser regarding the use of the
patented device? The spentness rhetoric, unfortunately, encourages
the former.
B. The "Heart of the Invention": Component Importance
and Inventiveness
Courts have shown no great proclivity for identifying the soul of
the invention pursuant to the identity of the machine test, but they
have continued to search for its heart. Courts have frequently consid-
ered whether the component replaced in the course of a replacement
activity amounts to the "inventive" or "important" part of the patented
device. Under this approach, replacement constitutes permissible re-
pair if the purchaser replaces only the unimportant or non-inventive
components of the device.141 Ordinarily, component inventiveness
has been used as one factor in a multifactor analysis of repair-
reconstruction. 42
A number of decisions have included an analysis that purports to
assess the "inventiveness" of a component of the claimed combina-
tion. For example, in Electric Auto-Lite Co. v. P. & D. Manufacturing
Co., 4  which involved a patent directed to an automobile ignition sys-
140. This question arises in modem cases in the form of the "dominance" test. See infra
Part II.D.
141. This standard, then, may be classified as another overall spentness standard, like
the identity of machine test. That is, the fact that replacement of an "inventive" or "impor-
tant" component is required indicates that the original device has become spent overall.
142. See, e.g., Wagner Typewriter Co. v. F.S. Webster Co., 144 F. 405, 417 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1906) (noting that in the case of a typewriter patent, "[t] he typewriter ribbon and spool do
not constitute a vital element ... of the patented device," and as such, their replacement
does not "affect[ ] the identity of the machine").
143. 78 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1935).
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tem, the court listed the replacement parts sold by the defendant
(springs, condensers, coils, and the like), and declared that none of
the parts "is the essence of the inventions sued upon, nor do any con-
stitute the part which serves to distinguish the invention."1 44 This,
coupled with other factors, justified a finding of repair.145 Similarly,
in Micromatic Hone Corp. v. Mid-West Abrasive Co., 1 4 6 which concerned a
holder for an abrasive stone, the court found it important that the
replaced part (the stone) was not a "dominant" inventive element in
the patent. 47 Perhaps expressing a similar approach, in Standard
Stoker Co. v. Berkley Machine Works & Foundry Co.,' 48 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that it was "not infringement for the
defendant to manufacture repair parts old in the art."'49
Some early decisions, at least, appeared to recognize the fallacy of
attempting to analyze a combination claim in terms of "inventive" and
"non-inventive" components.' 50 As the court in Automotive Parts Co. v.
Wisconsin Axle Co. 1 5 1 stated:
The invention is for a composite thing, embracing sev-
eral elements or parts, all of which are necessary to and co-
operate in the operation of the patented unit. We cannot
subscribe to the view that the test of contributory infringe-
ment in the furnishing of parts for a combination invention
144. Id. at 703.
145. Id. at 704; see also Foglesong Mach. Co. v. J.D. Randall Co., 239 F. 893, 895 (6th Cir.
1917) (finding permissible repair because the defendant did not disturb those elements
"which represent the advance in the art").
146. 177 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1949).
147. Id. at 937 (finding permissible repair because "the abrasive stone is not patented,
.and is not] the dominant element of the invention").
148. 106 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1939).
149. Id. at 477. The decisions in Fogtesong Machine, Micromatic, and Standard Stoker proba-
bly reflect a distinct lack of comfort with the notion of a contributory infringement rem-
edy. The supply of unpatented components can give rise to liability under a contributory
infringement theory. Requiring that those unpatented components at least be "patent-
able" or "inventive" may have seemed attractive to courts which thought that, otherwise,
the patent right was being extended too far.
150. The fallacy is, of course, that the combination as a whole is inventive; each of the
components may well be, and often are, "old" when considered in isolation. As Judge
Markey put it, with characteristically acerbic wit: "Only God works from nothing. Man
must work with old elements." Howard T. Markey, Why Not the Statute?, 65 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'v 331, 334 (1983); see also Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807
F.2d 955, 959 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (arguing that because virtually all patent claims are drawn to
combinations of elements, "[c] asting an invention as 'a combination of old elements' leads
improperly to an analysis of the claimed invention by the parts, not by the whole"); From-
son v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 755 F.2d 1549, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("There is no basis
in the law . . . for treating combinations of old elements differently in determining
patentability.").
151. 81 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1935).
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is whether the parts furnished constitute the gist or essence
of the invention; indeed, we cannot see how it may be said
that any one element or another marks the advance step or is
the essence of such an invention. There are cases, it is true,
in which the phrase "essence of the invention" is used; but in
our view, when the facts in those cases are considered, it can-
not be said that the conclusions reached were the result of a
logical selection of one or more elements of the combina-
tion as the gist or essence of the invention. 152
In addition to focusing on the "inventive" status of the replaced
component, some courts have attempted to distinguish reconstruction
from permissible repair by assessing the relative importance of the
components. For example, in Wagner Typewriter Co. v. FS. Webster
Co.,153 which addressed a typewriter ribbon mechanism that included
a ribbon spool, the court found that the spool was not a "chief" or
"vital" element of the combination, but merely an "ordinary working
part," thus supporting the conclusion that replacement of the spool
was permissible repair."' The Supreme Court, in Leeds & Catlin Co. v.
Victor Talking Machine Co. (No. 2),155 tentatively endorsed this ap-
proach. The Court found that the sale of records to replace ones that
were sold as part of a "talking machine," but that had worn out, consti-
tuted infringement because the records were "important" to the in-
vention, and because, by contrast to the stylus, they served "to
distinguish the invention-to mark advance upon the prior art." '56
Like the exercise of identifying the "inventiveness" of a replaced
component, analyzing an individual component against some notion
of "importance" presents fundamental difficulties. 157 First, like the
failure of an "important" component, the failure of even a seemingly
152. Id. at 126.
153. 144 F. 405 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906).
154. Id. at 417; see also Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Kelsey Elec. Ry. Specialty Co., 75 F.
1005, 1009 (2d Cir. 1896) (stating that the permissible repair doctrine was "not intended
to permit the unauthorized substitution of the vital and distinctively new part of an inven-
tion in place of one worn out by use"); Hayslip v. Textag Co., 94 F. Supp. 425, 427 (N.D.
Ga. 1950) (concluding that because "the tags are the main inventive element of the system
... they are protected by the patent irrespective of whether they are separately patented"),
affd, 192 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1951).
155. 213 U.S. 325 (1909), overruled in part by Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co.,
320 U.S. 661 (1944).
156. Id. at 330.
157. At least one British court came to this conclusion very early on. See Dunlop Pneu-
matic Tyre Co. v. Holborn Tyre Co., [1901] 18 R.P.D. & T.M. 222, 226 (1901) (rejecting an
"essential element" test). But cf. Sirdar Rubber Co. v. Wallington, Weston & Co., 1 Ch. 451,
454 (1905) (finding no impermissible reconstruction because defendant's replacement ac-
tivities did not change "the distinguishing feature of the invention").
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trivial component may, of course, render the entire combination in-
operable. As the District Court in F. Slocomb & Co. v. A.C. Layman
Machine Co."' stated:
It has been said that the furnishing of a vital feature or part
of a patented mechanism, when essential to its construction
and operation for the accomplishment of the ends for which
it is intended, will amount, if unauthorized by the patentee,
to a wrongful construction. But this cannot be sound as a
general rule. The wearing out or breaking of a screw or bolt
will as effectually prevent the operation of the mechanism as
the destruction of a larger and more expensive feature. The
wearing out or breaking down of a particular part essential to
the operation of the mechanism therefore cannot be relied
on as furnishing the test whether reconstruction, or merely
repair or renewal, is required.159
This reasoning may reflect the court's instinctive reaction against giv-
ing dispositive weight to device-oriented factors. One might specu-
late, for example, that the Slocomb court thought that the relative
importance of a component was not likely to indicate the patentee's
and purchaser's expectations; the importance of the component
might have little to do with whether the purchaser could reasonably
expect to need to replace the component in order to keep the combi-
nation in working order.
Second, the idea of dissecting a component from a patented com-
bination and analyzing it violates principles that, today at least, are
well-settled in patent law: Patent law inquiries as to the inventiveness
of a claim must consider the combination as a whole, rather than iso-
late an individual element, whether or not the element is identifiable
as the gist or heart of the invention.16 The Supreme Court in Aro I
rejected the patentee's argument that the "particular shape of the
fabric" in a convertible top assembly "was the advance in the art-the
very 'heart' of the invention-which brought the combination up to
the inventive level," so that replacement of the fabric constituted re-
construction.16 1 The Court stated:
[I]f anything is settled in the patent law, it is that the combi-
nation patent covers only the totality of the elements in the
claim.... [T] his Court has made it clear in the two Mercoid
cases that there is no legally recognizable or protected "es-
158. 227 F. 94 (D. Del. 1915), affd, 230 F. 1021 (3d Cir. 1916).
159. Id. at 97-98.
160. Aro Mfg. Co, v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 344 (1961).
161. Id.
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sential" element, "gist" or "heart" of the invention in a com-
bination patent.162
One would suppose that in the wake of Aro I, it would be clear that
reliance on an evaluation of the inventiveness or importance of an
individual replaced component, isolated from the entirety of the pat-
ented combination, would be erroneous. The Supreme Court seemed
to take this position when it explained Aro f's impact in Dawson Chemi-
cal Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.' 63 Additionally, the Federal Circuit has
gone out of its way to reinforce the notion that considering the heart
of the invention in any of a variety of contexts, including the doctrine
of permissible repair, would be improper. 164 Unfortunately, vestiges
of the "heart of the invention" analysis have persisted, despite Aro l's
unmistakable denunciation.
For example, in High Voltage Engineering Corp. v. Potentials, Inc.,'65
the District Court paid lip service to the relevant language in Aro I, but
then found it "appropriate to note that the essential advance in the art
of Plaintiffs patented inclined-field acceleration tube is the inclina-
162. Id. at 344-45. The cases referred to by the Court are Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944) and Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320
U.S. 661 (1944). In these cases, the Court used the proscription against considering the
"heart" of the invention to restrict the availability of the contributory infringement remedy;
because there was no "heart" of the invention, there could be no contributory infringe-
ment even when a supplier sold articles specifically adapted for use as components in a
patented combination. See Minneapolis-Honeywell, 320 U.S. at 684; Mid-Continent, 320 U.S. at
666-67. Accordingly, licensing others to sell such articles constituted patent misuse. Min-
neapolis-Honeywell 320 U.S. at 684; Mid-Continent, 320 U.S. at 668. In the latter case, Justice
Douglas declared that the Court "limitted] substantially the doctrine of contributory in-
fringement. What residuum may be left we need not stop to consider." Id. at 669. How-
ever, less than ten years later, Congress restored the contributory infringement remedy.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), (c) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
The Aro I Court, too, undoubtedly was motivated by the desire to limit the contribu-
tory infringement remedy, and thus gave considerable weight to the language of the Mer-
coid cases notwithstanding the intervening passage of §§ 271 (b) and (c). See Aro I, 365 U.S.
at 340-41.
163. See 448 U.S. 176, 217 (1980) (explaining that the Court had "eschewed the sugges-
tion that the legal distinction between 'reconstruction' and 'repair' should be affected by
whether the element of the combination that has been replaced is an 'essential' or 'distin-
guishing' part of the invention").
164. See, e.g., Para-Ordnance Mfg., Inc. v. SGS Importers Int'l, Inc., 73 F.3d 1085, 1087
(Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[W]hen determining obviousness, the claimed invention should be con-
sidered as a whole; there is no legally recognizable 'heart' of the invention."); Porter v.
Farmers Supply Serv., Inc., 790 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (rejecting an apparent
"'heart of the invention argument'" in the context of a permissible repair decision). But cf
Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1533 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(acknowledging dicta that suggests that the "gist" or "essence" of the invention may be
considered in determining priority of invention, and in determining infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents, so long as claim limitations are not ignored).
165. 398 F. Supp. 18 (W.D. Tex. 1974), affd, 519 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1975).
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tion of the electrodes to minimize the drag on particles being acceler-
ated through the tube."' 6 6 The fact that the defendant never altered
the inclination characteristic in the course of defendant's replace-
ment activities seemed to weigh importantly in its favor on the issue of
permissible repair.
16 1
In other cases, courts have resurrected the heart of the invention
notion, but their use of it may have been justifiable on other grounds.
The Supreme Court itself, speaking only a few years after Aro I, argu-
ably relied upon this concept in finding permissible repair in Wilbur-
Ellis Co. v. Kuther. 68 Reviewing an infringement claim arising when
the purchaser of secondhand fish canning machines refurbished
them and resized some of the components, Justice Douglas seemed to
consider it important that the invention did not reside in "either the
size or locational characteristics of the replaced elements . . . or the
size of the commodity on which the machine operated."'69 If this is
an assertion that repair should be found because the replaced compo-
nents were those other than the essential or novel components, then
Justice Douglas's analysis unquestionably strays from Aro I and cannot
be squared with the Court's subsequent statements in Dawson Chemi-
cal.'70 On the other hand, the language might be read as merely recit-
ing, albeit in clumsy fashion, the rule that the permissible repair
doctrine does not apply when the replaced component is itself sepa-
rately patented, because the replacement activity would in most cir-
cumstances clearly constitute an unauthorized making.
There is another example in Federal Circuit jurisprudence. In
Lummus Industries, Inc. v. D.M. & E. Corp., 7' the patentee had appar-
ently argued that a component of its patented cutting apparatus
amounted to the heart of the invention, and the "heart" language
found its way into the district court's jury instructions.' 72 Fortunately
for the patentee, the Federal Circuit determined that the language
concerning the "heart of the invention" had been presented in con-
nection with the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 271 (c) that a component
giving rise to a contributory infringement claim be "a material part of
166. Id. at 20.
167. Id.
168. 377 U.S. 422 (1964).
169. Id. at 423; see id. at 424-25 (noting that the "size of cans serviced by the machine was
no part of the invention; nor were characteristics of size, location, shape and construction
of the six elements in question patented").
170. See supra note 163.
171. 862 F.2d 267 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
172. Id. at 271.
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the invention." '173 Acknowledging the Aro I and Dawson Chemical pro-
scriptions against considering the "heart" in the repair-reconstruction
analysis, the Federal Circuit nevertheless found the instructions free
from error given the connection to the materiality language in
§ 271 (C). 1 74
While it would seem that reference to the "heart" of the invention
could be rationalized in this fashion in nearly any repair-reconstruc-
tion case, more recent pronouncements from the Federal Circuit con-
firm that cases like Lummus will be the exception. In Sage Products, Inc.
v. Devon Industries, Inc.,175 the court insisted that "[t]he size or relative
importance of the replacement part to the patented combination is
not relevant when determining whether conduct constitutes repair or
replacement. "176
C. The Parts of the Invention: Component Spentness
It seems unlikely that quests for the heart or soul of the invention
will ever yield satisfactory results in repair-reconstruction disputes.
Many courts, however, have turned to an analysis of the remaining
parts of the invention to distinguish repair from reconstruction. In
general, courts have attempted to assess the physical qualities of the
replaced component as an indicator of repair or reconstruction, rea-
soning that if the replaced component is perishable, has a short useful
life, or is a low cost component, replacement of such a component
should be deemed repair.1
77
Twin notions of spentness are at work in many of these cases.
Certainly, many of them may be considered true component spent-
ness cases, insofar as a perishable component that has become worn
out through use or has otherwise reached the end of its useful life
might be considered spent. Courts inclined to find reconstruction,
however, have used the concept of useful life to substantiate overall
spentness, by concluding that when a component reaches the end of
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 45 F.3d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
176. Id. at 1578 (citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336,
345-46 (1961)).
177. Often, these qualities are relative measures-e.g., the useful life of the component
relative to the useful life of the overall device. Thus, the inquiry is immediately more
complicated than it would initially appear, because the qualities of the overall device, in
addition to the qualities of the component, must be assessed.
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its useful life, this is an indication that the patented device as a whole
has become spent.'
78
What is perhaps most striking about the perishability and useful
life cases, however, is that they, too, illustrate the pitfalls of the spent-
ness rhetoric. Indeed, a number of courts have an intuitive sense for
this problem, and have employed perishability and useful life con-
cepts as a proxy for the parties' expectations, rather than as evidence
of spentness.
1. Component Perishability, or How the Supreme Court Declared Toilet
Paper To Be Disposable.--Notwithstanding Simpson's express rejection of
a component's "perishability" as a rationale for finding that a replace-
ment activity concerning the component was permissible repair,'79
courts have, to varying degrees, considered perishability in their analy-
ses. This is especially true of courts considering the repair-reconstruc-
tion problem prior to the Supreme Court's 1961 Aro I decision,
although some post-Aro I cases also discuss perishability.
A notable early example is Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated
Wrapping Paper Co., 8 ' in which the Court addressed the issue of tissue.
The claimed invention concerned a problem of no little moment: the
"temptation offered to greed or wastefulness" in the dispensing of toi-
let paper by the traditional cylindrical roll. 181 The pertinent patent
claims recited a toilet paper dispenser and an oblong or oval toilet
paper roll designed to fit into the dispenser.18 Defendant produced
the "Wheeler Pocket Companion, " "' an oval toilet paper roll, with
"the knowledge and intention that the paper so sold was to be used"
by customers who had made authorized purchases of the plaintiff's
toilet paper dispenser.
1 84
The Court struggled greatly with interrelated concepts of claim
interpretation, 18 contributory infringement,186 and the repair-recon-
struction distinction. The Court purported to decide the case on con-
178. See, e.g., Williams v. Barnes, 234 F. 339, 340 (7th Cir. 1916) (noting that "[tihe test
[of contributory infringement] is whether the element, as part of the patent combination,
is perishable in its nature, consumed in the use, and necessarily to be replaced in each
successive use of the combination").
179. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
180. 152 U.S. 425 (1894).
181. Id. at 426. In the true American entrepreneurial spirit, the inventors set out confi-
dently to address this intractable problem of human nature via improved technology.
182. Id. at 427-30.
183. Id. at 429.
184. Id. at 431.
185. In particular, the Court had difficulty with the notion that the oval roll of toilet
paper could properly be an element of the claimed combination. The court stated:
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tributory infringement principles, finding that the patentee could not
invoke the rationale of the contributory infringement cases because:
these cases have no application to one where the element
made by the alleged infringer is an article of manufacture
perishable in its nature, which it is the object of the mecha-
nism to deliver, and which must be renewed periodically,
whenever the device is put to use .... In this view, the dis-
tinction between repair and reconstruction becomes of no
value, since the renewal of the paper is ... neither the one
nor the other.
18 7
Nevertheless, the Court proceeded to consider the repair-reconstruc-
tion distinction, concluding that an owner of the plaintiffs dispensers
who purchased oval replacement rolls from the defendant did not di-
rectly infringe because he was doing "precisely what the patentee in-
tended he should do: he replaces that which is in its nature
perishable, and without the replacement of which the remainder of
the device is of no value."' 88 According to the Court, this result was
consistent with the repair-reconstruction cases due to the perishable
nature of the replaced component.18 9
If this be so, then it would seem to follow that the log which is sawn in the mill;
the wheat which is ground by the rollers; the pin which is produced by the pat-
ented machine; the paper which is folded and delivered by the printing press,
may be claimed as an element of a combination of which the mechanism doing
the work is another element_
Id.
186. Today, contributory infringement is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (Supp. 1996),
which provides that:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United
States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or compo-
sition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, consti-
tuting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use,
shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
Id.
Although at the time of Morgan Envelope no statutory provision on contributory in-
fringement existed in U.S. patent law, the Court had recognized the doctrine in a number
of cases. See Morgan Envelope, 152 U.S. at 433 (citing cases); supra note 3 and accompanying
text (discussing contributory infringement).
187. Morgan Envelope, 152 U.S. at 433.
188. Id. at 434. The Court stated that the case was analogous to Simpson, and quoted the
Simpson Court's language rejecting perishability as a factor in the repair-reconstruction
analysis. Id. at 434-35.
189. Id. at 433-35.
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The Supreme Court again turned to the perishability factor in
Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co. (No. 2).190 The patent
claims concerned a record player and recorded disc. The patentee
alleged that the defendant's sale of discs which could be played on the
patentee's machine violated an injunction that had been entered after
an infringement proceeding.191 The Court stated that "the lower
courts found that the discs were not perishable," distinguishing the
earlier case of Morgan Envelope where "it was made a determining cir-
cumstance that the paper perished by its use."192 Indeed, as might be
guessed, the defendant's customers generally were purchasing discs
"'to increase the repertory of tunes,"' not to replace worn-out or bro-
ken records. 9 ' This fact counseled in favor of reconstruction.
19 4
Some courts appeared to hold up the inherently perishable or
non-perishable nature of the replaced components as the standard of
repair.195 For example, in Goodyear Shoe Machinery Co. v. Jackson,'96 the
court expressly defined repair as "'restoration to a sound, good, or
complete state after decay, injury, dilapidation, or partial
destruction. '197
This definition may have encouraged other courts to take the de-
vice-oriented spentness rhetoric to its extreme. For example, in Micro-
matic Hone Corp. v. Mid-West Abrasive Co.,9'9 the court characterized
cases such as Simpson and Morgan Envelope as resting on a distinction
between "soft" and "hard" parts:
It has long been the established rule that if one of the parts
of a patented combination, the part being not patentable
per se, is made of soft material and wears out, the other parts
of the combination remaining capable of performing their
normal and expected functions, the right to replace the
190. 213 U.S. 325 (1909), overruled in part by Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Atlantic Inv. Co., 320
U.S. 661 (1944).
191. Id. at 329-31.
192. Id. at 335.
193. Id. at 336 (quoting Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Leeds & Catlin Co., 150 F. 147, 147
(S.D.N.Y. 1907)).
194. Id. at 336-37; cf William v. Barnes, 234 F. 339, 340 (7th Cir. 1916) (finding permis-
sible repair under the Morgan Envelope principle that a purchaser may replace an inher-
ently perishable component in a patented combination).
195. See, e.g., Hayslip v. Textag Co., 94 F. Supp. 425, 427 (N.D. Ga. 1950) (noting as a
factor counting in favor of reconstruction the fact that replaced tags were not "perishable,
fragile or intended to be consumed or exhausted in normal operation of the system"),
affrd, 192 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1951).
196. 112 F. 146 (1st Cir. 1901).
197. Id. at 150.
198. 177 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1949).
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worn-out part exists quite as definitely as in the case of
breakage. 199
The court seemed to be suggesting that the repair-reconstruction in-
quiry-which might seem to be about actions and expectations in ad-
dition to being about devices themselves-turns predominantly on
the inherent qualities of the replaced component.200
Like the "importance" and "inventiveness" criteria, perishability
usually appears in these cases as one factor in a multifactor analysis. It
might be argued, then, that if Aro I rejected the multifactor ap-
proach, 20 1 it must have thrown out the perishability factor as well.
While the Court's opinion in Aro I is unclear, Justice Black's concur-
ring opinion does declare that the Court did, indeed, expunge the
perishability factor.2 °2
Nevertheless, the perishability criterion has continued to mani-
fest itself in post-Aro I case law. For example, in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
International Harvester Co.,2°3 the Seventh Circuit analogized to the
Micromatic Hone. 4 decision, apparently persuaded by the distinction
between "soft" components and other types of components. 205 In the
Federal Circuit, in Porter v. Farmers Supply Service, Inc.,2°6 the court, tak-
ing note of lower court findings that the replaced components-har-
vester disks used in a tomato harvesting machine-had to be
repeatedly replaced due to wear, and that the patentee sold replace-
ment disks, made a determination of repair.20 7 The Federal Circuit
199. Id. at 936 (citations omitted); see also Automotive Parts Co. v. Wisconsin Axle Co.,
81 F.2d 125, 126-27 (6th Cir. 1935) (stating that "if one of the parts is made of defective or
soft material and wears out, the other parts of the combination being capable of perform-
ing their normal and expected functions, the right to replace the worn-out part exists...
quite as definitely as in the case of breakage"). For an earlier British case on point, see
Sirdar Rubber Co. v. Wallington, Weston & Co., I Ch. 451, 454 (1905) (finding permissible
repair in a case involving a patent on a tire and rim combination, because only the tire,
which was "the soft wearing part" of the combination, was replaced).
200. See Micromatic Hone, 177 F.2d at 936-37.
201. See supra notes 112-124 and accompanying text.
202. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 354 (1961)(Black, J., concurring) (arguing that "deciding whether a patented article is 'made' does
not depend on whether an unpatented element of it is perishable").
203. 406 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1968).
204. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
205. Id. at 55 (concluding that the replacement of certain parts in a "doffer assembly" in
a rotary cotton-picking machine constituted permissible repair). The district court, by con-
trast, had concluded that after Ar0 I perishability was not a factor which courts should
consider. See Tractor Supply Co. v. International Harvester Co., 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 420,
423 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (noting that "[t]he remaking of a patented article does not depend
upon whether an element thereof is perishable" (citing Aro I, 365 U.S. at 338-39)).
206. 790 F.2d 882 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
207. Id. at 885.
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stated that courts in "a number of cases, before and after Aro I, that
involve[d] tools having parts subject to wear . . . 'have held almost
uniformly that replacement of a worn part in a patented combination
is repair.'
20
The continued use of the perishability factor is probably unfortu-
nate because it binds the repair-reconstruction standard too tightly to
the qualities of the device at issue. This may be counterproductive
because, first, as a matter of precedent, it seems difficult to square the
notion of perishability as presented in later cases with Simpson's ex-
press prohibition and Aro f's apparent disapproval of this criterion. 20 9
Second, a perishability standard might create too broad a right of re-
pair. Most repair-reconstruction cases concern the replacement of
worn components, and, as at least one court recognized long ago, it
would seem that any component that becomes so worn that a user is
motivated to replace it is, for this very reason, perishable.2 10
On the other hand, reliance on perishability could also be under-
inclusive to the extent that the replacement activities concerned per-
fectly durable parts that broke as a result of ordinary use of the
patented combination. For example, in a case involving tips on "blow-
pipes" used in metal cutting and welding operations, the plaintiff ar-
gued that the doctrine of permissible repair could not apply because
the evidence showed that tips had to be replaced "not because the tips
wear out, but because they are abused by careless and incompetent
workers and destroyed by accidents." 21 1 Rather than admitting to the
inadequacy of the perishability standard, the court "deemed" the re-
placed tips perishable:
If it is usual for a material number of accidents to occur in
carrying on the trade, if it is customary for hasty workmen to
accelerate the completion of their tasks by rough handling of
their blowpipes, if the blowpipes are frequently used by un-
208. Id. at 886 (quoting Porter v. Farmers Supply Serv., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1175, 1186 (D.
Del. 1985)).
209. See supra notes 91, 202 and accompanying text.
210. See F.F. Slocomb & Co. v. A-C. Layman Mach. Co., 227 F. 94 (D. Del. 1915), aff'd,
230 F. 1021 (3d Cir. 1916). This court stated:
If the parts of the mechanism replaced by the repair parts furnished by the de-
fendant were "substantially non-perishable" I fail to perceive why they should
have been replaced, unless the owners and users of the machines desired to throw
away their money in paying the defendant for repair parts of which there was no
need. It is more reasonable to conclude that repair parts were bought from the
defendant because the owners and users of the machines found there was need of
them for the operation or efficient operation of the patented mechanism.
Id. at 98.
211. Harris Calorific Co. v. Marra, 95 F.2d 870, 871 (3d Cir. 1938).
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skilled welders, and if these practices result in or contribute
to the destruction of the tips, then we are of the opinion that
the tips may be deemed perishable through use.2 12
Third, heavy reliance on perishability, or on spentness rhetoric
generally, threatens to retard the common law evolution of repair-re-
construction standards because the standards cannot easily be di-
vorced from the physical peculiarities of the devices at issue.
Decisions become purely device-specific, leading to the emergence of
a crazy quilt pattern in which "knife" cases abide by one standard,
"drill" cases another, and so forth.
Finally, reliance on the inherently perishable nature of the goods
as a criterion in itself would simply miss the point. In a correct analy-
sis, perishability would be a useful factor, among many others, as a
proxy for the patentee's and the purchaser's expectations.
Indeed, careful analysis of the early cases yields abundant evi-
dence that at least some courts followed precisely this approach, 1 3
while others employed perishability as a proxy for intent. For exam-
ple, in Morgan Envelope, the perishable nature of the toilet paper easily
supported the inference that the purchaser who replaced the toilet
paper was doing "precisely what the patentee intended he should
do."214 In another early case which concerned a claim directed to a
coal-mining machine in combination with a protective device, the
court found it "evident that the protective device was of a perishable
character" because "[i] ts destruction, or that of some of its parts, was
contemplated by the appellant."215 Finally, the use of perishability as a
proxy for intent, expressed as merely one of a number of factors that
might bear on repair-reconstruction, is precisely the use of perishabil-
ity urged by Justice Brennan's concurrence in Aro L216
212. Id. The court's reliance on customary practice is important, because this may be
the most reliable indicator of the patentee's and purchaser's expectations. See infra Parts
IV-V.
213. See, e.g., Goodyear Shoe Mach. Co. v.Jackson, 112 F. 146, 150 (1st Cir. 1901) (favor-
ing a multifactor approach taking into account "all the facts and circumstances presented,
with an intelligent comprehension of the scope, nature, and purpose of the patented in-
vention, and the fair and reasonable intention of the parties"); see also Wagner Typewriter
Co. v. F.S. Webster Co., 144 F. 405, 416 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906) (holding that perishability is
one of several factors for courts to consider in evaluating infringement).
214. Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425, 434
(1894).
215. Morgan Gardner Elec. Co. v. Buettner & Shelburne Mach. Co., 203 F. 490, 493 (7th
Cir. 1913) (emphasis added).
216. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 364 (1961) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) (listing among factors for consideration the "common sense under-
standing and intention of the patent owner and the buyer of the combination as to its
1999]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Another line of cases seems to employ perishability as a proxy for
the patentee's intent, although perhaps less directly. One such case
concerned a patent claiming a horse collar stuffing machine contain-
ing numerous parts, some of which had been replaced by the defend-
ant." 7 The court found it significant that the replaced components
"were such as the plaintiff sold or voluntarily furnished to customers
for use in repairing."218 It might seem that the evidence would be
significant as an indicator of the patentee's expectations, and perhaps
the court had that in mind. 9 However, it articulated its analysis in
device-oriented terms: by participating in a replacement parts mar-
ket, the plaintiff recognized the "perishable nature" of the compo-
nents.22° This is a fine example of the roundabout analysis that the
spentness rhetoric encourages, because the real significance in find-
ing the components "perishable" was to indicate that the patentee
could not complain when the defendant replaced those parts.
221
2. Component Useful Life and Cost.-Many courts have analyzed
the repair-reconstruction problem by assessing component useful life
and, on occasion, component cost. Two distinct uses of these con-
cepts are apparent. First, a number of courts have employed the use-
ful life concept to support a conclusion of reconstruction. They
reason that the patented device becomes spent overall when a certain
component reaches the end of its useful life, so that its replacement
constitutes reconstruction. Other cases more closely resemble the
perishability cases, in that a finding that a component has reached the
end of its useful life before being replaced justifies a conclusion that
the replacement is mere repair.
An example of the first approach can be found in the prototypi-
cal reconstruction case, Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons,122 which concerned
claims to a cotton bale tie that included a metallic band and a buckle
perishable components"); see also Hildreth, supra note 18, at 535 (arguing that the patentee's
intent is the controlling factor underlying component spentness).
217. Foglesong Mach. Co. v.J.D. Randall Co., 239 F. 893, 894-95 (6th Cir. 1917).
218. Id. at 895.
219. Id.; see also Aktiebolag v. EJ. Co., 121 F.3d 669, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating that
the existence of a replacement parts market is a factor in the repair-reconstruction deter-
mination, but failing to explain whether the factor is a proxy for the parties' reasonable
expectations), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1337 (1998).
220. Foglesong Mach., 239 F. at 895.
221. See also Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Hesser, 131 F.2d 406, 410 (6th Cir. 1942)
(placing significance on the recognition by the patentee of the "perishable nature of the
parts" in finding repair and not reconstruction).
222. 106 U.S. 89 (1882).
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capable of receiving the free end of the band.22 In this case, the
defendants pieced together sections of old bands and attached to the
refurbished band a used buckle, notwithstanding a warning against
reuse that the patentee had stamped into the metal bands. 224
The Court found reconstruction because a component of the pat-
ented device-specifically, the band-had reached the end of its use-
ful life once the bales had been delivered to their destination.2 25
Because the functionality of the band had been exhausted, the Court
determined that the patented device as a whole was spent, and that
the piecing together of the bands was impermissible reconstruc-
tion.2 2 6 As the Court stated:
The band was voluntarily severed by the consumer at the cot-
ton-mill because the tie had performed its function of con-
fining the bale of cotton in its transit from the plantation or
the press to the mill. Its capacity for use as a tie was volunta-
rily destroyed. As it left the bale it could not be used again as
a tie. As a tie the defendants reconstructed it .... 227
Another early case, Davis Electrical Works v. Edison Electrical Light
Co., 228 similarly presents an excellent example of the resort to a useful
life concept as part of a reconstruction determination. 229 Defendants
refurbished patented Edison incandescent light bulbs2 0 by breaking
off the tip of the glass lamp bulb, removing and replacing the burned-
out filament, and then evacuating and resealing the bulb.231
223. Id. at 92.
224. See id. at 91 (noting that the warning stated "Licensed to use once only").
225. Id. at 94.
226. Id.
227. Id. Although the Court noted that Wilson v. Simpson stood for the principle that
"temporary parts wearing out in a machine might be replaced to preserve the machine,"
id., the Court clearly applied an overall spentness approach, noting that the device's "use
as a tie was voluntarily destroyed," id. Moreover, the component spentness approach
might have yielded the opposite result. The defendant might have argued that the metal
band was a "temporary" part because it had a shorter useful life than the combination as a
whole and that replacement of the band was therefore permissible repair. Had the Court
followed this approach, the label license on the bands would have figured more promi-
nently in the analysis. The role of the label license in Cotton-Tie has been a source of
considerable debate. See Fromberg, Inc. v. Gross Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 803, 809 (9th Cir.
1964) (stating that, "if [Cotton-Tie] still has validity," it has been given "a very narrow
effect").
228. 60 F. 276 (1st Cir. 1894).
229. Id. at 279.
230. Edison's claim was broadly stated as "[t]he combination of carbon filaments with a
receiver made entirely of glass, and conductors passing through the glass, and from which
receiver the air is exhausted." Id. at 278.
231. Id. at 276.
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Had the court adhered strictly to a component perishability anal-
ysis, perhaps it would have reached the uncomfortable result that the
defendant's activities amounted to permissible repair, because it
would have been difficult to avoid the conclusion that the filament
was a perishable component of the combination. 23 2 Instead, the court
looked to the combination as a whole in light of an economic concep-
tion of overall spentness; the court implied that the combination was
spent prior to the replacement activity, and that the replacement ac-
tivity should be categorized as reconstruction because the cost of the
replacement activity was far greater than the sale price of the original
light bulb.21
3
This persuaded the court, speaking "in view of things as things,
and of a practical understanding of reparation and reconstruction,"234
to adopt the district court's conclusion that opening the glass bulb
and inserting a new filament was the act of making a new lamp, and
thus reconstruction.235
A second group of cases employs the useful life concept to justify
a conclusion of repair. A good early example can be found in Justice
Holmes's opinion in Heyer v. Duplicator Manufacturing Co.2 6 The
claim was directed to a copying machine that included a machine
frame, a "duplicating band" containing a gelatine substance, and "a
spool on which said duplicating band [was] wound."237 The duplicat-
ing band apparently contained enough gelatin to make about 100
copies. 238 Justice Holmes found the defendant's sale of replacement
duplicator bands to be permissible repair based in part upon the rela-
tively short expected useful lifetime of the bands: "The [copying]
machine lasts indefinitely, the bands are exhausted after a limited use
232. The same result would have followed if the court, applying a component spentness
approach, had considered the filament to have reached the end of its useful life.
233. Davis, 60 F. at 281; see id. at 282 (invoking the identity of the machine standard by
observing that the combination without a filament was not a lamp at all, but a mere manu-
facturer's blank).
234. Id.; see also Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Precision Rebuilders, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 347,
352 (D. Kan. 1964) (finding impermissible reconstruction because the seal that was re-
placed "was intended to last the life of the shock absorber ... and was not merely a tempo-
rary part; and [because] at the time the used shock absorbers were processed, they had
fulfilled their intended purpose and had been substantially destroyed as intended, and
were considered junk"); Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Emener, 16 F. Supp. 816, 821 (E.D.
Mich. 1936) (distinguishing permissible reconditioning of used spark plugs from imper-
missible refabrication of the "functional properties" of spark plugs that had "fully per-
formed their purpose and had no further value except as scrap").
235. Davis, 60 F. at 282.
236. 263 U.S. 100 (1923).
237. Id. at 101 n.1.
238. Id. at 101.
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and manifestly must be replaced.""3 9 In addition, Justice Holmes ob-
served that while the copying machine was "costly," the duplicator
bands were "cheap."24 This factor, too, clearly contributed to the
Court's conclusion that the defendant was engaged in mere permissi-
ble repair.241
Courts have employed a cost-of-component criterion in the same
fashion, 24 2 but the current status of the cost-of-component factor is
uncertain. The Aro I opinion arguably rejects it as one of the im-
proper factors considered by the lower courts.243 However, this factor
finds at least some limited support among Federal Circuit cases.2"
Superficially, the useful life concept seems attractive, whether
used as part of an "overall spentness" approach to find reconstruction,
or as part of a component spentness approach to find repair. Useful
life (and, relatedly, component cost) would seem to be readily quanti-
fiable, and might be invested with a bit more precision than uncertain
notions of "perishability. ' 245 Whether the case law supports this con-
239. Id. at 102 (citing Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109, 126 (1850)). Like the
cases that adopt the perishability rhetoric, this case places considerable importance on the
spentness of a component. It is important to recognize that this analysis differs fundamen-
tally from an analysis of the overall spentness of the combination. The former analysis
assesses spentness of the component and finds repair where the replaced component is
truly spent at the time of the replacement activity. The latter might also involve an assess-
ment of the spentness of the component, but only as a way of determining whether the
overall combination was spent. Accordingly, under the latter analysis, a finding that the
component was truly spent at the time of the replacement activity might lead to the conclu-
sion that the overall combination was rendered incomplete and that replacing the spent
component would be tantamount to remaking the combination.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. That is, where the cost of the replaced component is low relative to the cost of the
entire combination, the court is more likely to find repair. See, e.g., Electric Auto-Lite Co.
v. P. & D. Mfg. Co., 109 F.2d 566, 567 (2d Cir. 1940) (per curiam) (asserting that permissi-
ble repair depends in part on whether "it is cheaper to insert a new part than to cobble the
old one back into service").
243. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 345 (1961) ("No
element, not itself separately patented, that constitutes one of the elements of a combina-
tion patent is entitled to patent monopoly, however essential it may be to the patented
combination and no matter how costly or difficult replacement may be." (emphasis added)).
244. See, e.g., Porter v. Farmers Supply Serv., Inc., 790 F.2d 882, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(acknowledging that the district court took into account the fact that the replaced compo-
nents were inexpensive compared to the cost of the patented machine). Other cases have
proposed to consider the cost of the component as a way of determining whether the
overall combination should be deemed spent. See infra Part II.D.
245. See, e.g., F.F. Slocomb & Co. v. A.C. Layman Mach. Co., 227 F. 94, 98 (D. Del. 1915)
(criticizing the "perishability" rhetoric, and embracing an analysis that blended useful life
and component cost), affd, 230 F. 1021 (3d Cir. 1916). The court stated:
If, by way of illustration, patented mechanism be composed of various parts and
elements the most expensive of which have an average life of twenty years, and
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cept of useful life depends upon whether Aro I strictly forbids resort to
a multiple-factor inquiry. The Aro I majority opinion does not explic-
itly preclude the analysis of useful life, and the concurring opinions
provide contradictory signals.
246
In practice, however, the useful life/component cost standard
has given rise to numerous dilemmas. One difficulty, of course, is that
the assessment of useful life (or of component cost) might conflict
with the assessments of component importance or inventiveness.
Even worse, assessments of useful life and of component cost might
conflict with each other. For example, in Micromatic Hone, the paten-
tee contended that the replacement of the abrasive stone was recon-
struction because the stone was a relatively expensive component
compared to the cost of the overall combination.2 47 Although cor-
rect, this contention conflicted with the court's assessment of useful
life, and of the importance and inventiveness contributed to the over-
all combination by another element of the combination-the backing
member or "stone holder. '2 48  Unable to resolve this conflict, the
court discarded the cost-of-component standard:
Obviously, the dominant element in the patent was in the
improved stone holder, regardless of its low cost of manufac-
ture. It also seems clear to us that while its low cost of manu-
facture warranted a purchaser in throwing it away after the
initial stone was worn down, rather than returning it for a
refill when the purchaser did not care to be bothered with
such details, nevertheless, the metal stone holder was not ex-
pended or destroyed, but, on the contrary, had a continued
useful life and was available to the purchaser of it for refilling
if he desired to do so .... Under the circumstances, it does
other parts or features of comparatively trifling cost are subjected in the opera-
tion of the mechanism to such wear as to require renewal or replacement within a
period of a few months, or of a year or two, it would seem reasonable and sensible
to treat such renewal or replacement as involving repairs in contradistinction to
reconstruction.
Id.
246. Compare Aro I, 365 U.S. at 363 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Appropriately to be con-
sidered are the life of the part replaced in relation to the useful life of the whole combina-
tion.") with id. at 357 (Black J., concurring) ("[T]here should be no attempt to decide
whether there is a making by comparing the time that the different elements of such a
patent normally will exist if let alone.").
247. Micromatic Hone Corp. v. Mid-West Abrasive Co., 177 F.2d 934, 937 (6th Cir.
1949) (stating the patentee's contention that "the cost of the metal backing member is
materially less than the cost of the stone").
248. Id.
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not follow that the [useful] life of the metal stone holder is
the same as the life of the abrasive stone. 24 9
Another example of this dilemma is Landis Machine Co. v. Chaso
Tool Co.2 "0 The patented combination concerned die heads fitted
with "chasers," which were cutters for cutting threads.25  The defend-
ants sold replacement chasers.2 52 The chasers were relatively inexpen-
sive compared to the cost of the overall combination-about nine
dollars for the chasers compared to between ninety dollars to $350 for
the overall combination, depending on the patentee's prices.25 3
While this factor suggested that replacement of the chasers was per-
missible repair, the evidence also seemed to indicate that customers
replaced the chasers before they were truly worn out; the chasers
could, apparently, be ground and sharpened for additional use. This
fact suggested a finding of reconstruction. 25 4
The court addressed the conflict by discarding the useful life cri-
terion.2 55 The court stated that it was "unimportant that the parts re-
placed would, if properly used, last as long as the patented heads."25 6
Instead, the court focused not only on the relatively low cost of the
replaced component, but also on the patentee's own business prac-
tices. 257 The patentee had adopted the age-old tactic of selling the die
heads for a reduced price, hoping to reap a profit by controlling the
market for replacement chasers. 25 8 This practice, according to both
the district court and the circuit court, confirmed that the patentee
intended the chasers to be "perishable," and justified the conclusion
of permissible repair.259
Another more serious problem that has arisen in a number of
cases concerns the fact that, like the perishability standard, the useful
life/cost standard has proved underinclusive. This problem arises in
cases in which the replaced component has not reached the end of its
useful life when it is replaced (which suggests reconstruction), yet the
court seeks a way to justify the replacement activity as permissible re-
pair. For example, early courts had difficulty determining whether a
249. Id.
250. 141 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1944).
251. Id. at 802.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 803.
254. Id. at 804.
255. Id.
256. Id.





component that was broken through careless handling (as distinct
from becoming worn in the course of careful use) had reached the
end of its useful life, so that replacement would be justified as permis-
sible repair.26 °
Another controversial example concerns replacement activities in
which components of the patented device are modified for purposes
of achieving improved performance, even where those components
are not necessarily spent. This scenario arose in an early case involv-
ing a patented candy wrapping machine whose main components
were a cutter table and a wrapping wheel.261 The defendant modified
a patented machine so that it could wrap candy of a different size,
which necessitated changes to the sizes of the pockets in the wrapping
wheel and the arrangement of the cutting knives on the cutting table,
among others.262 Obviously, useful life remained in the components
of the patented device, but the court nevertheless found
263reconstruction.
The Supreme Court took a different approach in Wilbur-Ellis Co.
v. Kuther2 64 The defendant purchased secondhand some corroded,
inoperable fish canning machines that had been designed to pack
one-pound cans, but then cleaned and modified them to handle
smaller cans.2 65 The modifications entailed grinding down certain
components and fitting inserts to others, thus affecting six of the
thirty-five components of the machine.266 The appellate court found
reconstruction under the authority of George Close,267 but the Supreme
Court reversed. 68 In a remarkably opaque opinion that seems to rest
on a notion of component inventiveness, 269 the Court refused to craft
an absolute rule that improvements to purchased patented goods con-
260. See, e.g., Harris Calorific Co. v. Marra, 95 F.2d 870, 871 (3d Cir. 1938) (finding that
components "may be deemed perishable through use," whether the use is "careful and
skillful" or "rough"). See supra notes 211-212 and accompanying text.
261. Ideal Wrapping Mach. Co. v. George Close Co., 23 F.2d 848, 849 (D. Mass.), affd,
29 F.2d 533 (1st Cir. 1928).
262. Id.
263. See id. at 850 (employing the identity of machine standard); see also Miller Hatcher-
ies, Inc. v. Buckeye Incubator Co., 41 F.2d 619, 622 (8th Cir. 1930) (stating that modifica-
tions to incubator trays to enable them to increase their capacities constituted
reconstruction because they altered the identity of the machine).
264. 377 U.S. 422 (1964).
265. Id. at 423.
266. Id; see also Leuschner v. Kuther, 314 F.2d 71, 72-73 (9th Cir. 1963) (discussing the
facts of the case at the appellate level), rev'd sub nom. Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther, 377 U.S.
422 (1964).
267. Leuschner, 314 F.2d at 74.
268. Wilbur-Ellis, 377 U.S. at 425.
269. See supra Part II.B (discussing component inventiveness).
[VOL. 58:423
A TALE OF THE APOCRYPHAL AXE
stitute reconstruction. 2 70 The Court also employed the useful life con-
cept. The machines at issue "had years of usefulness remaining
though they needed cleaning and repair."2 71 The Court refrained
from characterizing the defendant's activities as true repair, but in-
stead stated that "in adapting the old machines to a related use [they]
were doing more than repair in the customary sense; but what they
did was kin to repair for it bore on the useful capacity of the old com-
bination, on which the royalty had been paid."2 72
On an intuitive level, the finding in Wilbur-Ellis of permissible re-
pair seems correct, yet this case demonstrates that the notion of useful
life is not as predictable as it would initially appear to be. Subsequent
decisions building on Wilbur-Ellis are to the same effect. For example,
in the Federal Circuit's recent decision of Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-
0-Type Stencil Manufacturing Co., 2 7 3 the court relied upon the reason-
ing in Wilbur-Ellis to conclude that defendant's modifications to the
plaintiff's patented ink cartridges constituted permissible repair. 274
The defendant purchased unused, filled ink cartridges from the pat-
entee, modified a cap on the cartridge so that the cartridge would be
refillable by end users, and sold the cartridges as "refillable" car-
tridges. 275 Here again, the case is difficult when evaluated under the
useful life criterion. On the one hand, when the ink is exhausted, the
cartridge is rendered nonfunctional for its intended purposes. On
the other hand, useful life remains in the cartridge itself. The court
determined that useful life was defined by the life of the entirety of
the cartridge, not merely by the duration of the ink supply,276 on the
basis of Wilbur-Ellis, in which the purchase price of the patented item
included a royalty payment intended to extend for the full useful life
277
of the entire patented combination. It is worth asking, however,
whether the court really reached this result by strict consideration of
useful life. It seems at least equally plausible that the court was really
analyzing the parties' expectations, although it stoutly denied that the
patentee's intentions informed the analysis. 271
270. Wilbur-Ellis, 377 U.S. at 425.
271. Id. at 424.
272. Id. at 425.
273. 123 F.3d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1304 (1998).
274. Id. at 1452-53.
275. Id. at 1448.
276. Id. at 1453.
277. Id. at 1452 (citing Wilbur Ellis Co., 377 U.S. 422).
278. See infra Part III (exploring the role of intent in repair-reconstruction analysis in
this case and others); see also Electric Auto-Lite Co. v. P. & D. Mfg. Co., 109 F.2d 566, 567
(2d Cir. 1940) (per curiarn) (linking useful life to intent by stating that "[t] he theory on
which the repair of a patented article is allowed at all is that the patentee intends the buyer
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In a third set of recent cases, courts have seriously mangled the
concept of useful life by turning to a notion of "effective spentness" to
explain why the replacement of a part that retains additional useful
life is nevertheless permissible repair. In Everpure, Inc. v. Cuno, Inc.,27 9
the claims were directed to a filter assembly comprised of a head and
a filter cartridge, which featured a neck designed for insertion into
the head.28" A filter was sealed into the cartridge. 281 The defendant,
Cuno, sold cartridges fitted with filters, and also sold an adapter that
would allow purchasers of Cuno cartridges to attach them to Everpure
heads. 28
2
Analyzed by resort to a device-oriented standard such as compo-
nent useful life, this case presents difficulties on multiple fronts. The
useful life of the filter is relatively short, but the useful life of the car-
tridge itself is much longer. Accordingly, the useful life standard can-
not resolve the repair-reconstruction problem. Moreover, the adapter
would seem to defy analysis altogether under the useful life standard.
Seeming to understand this dilemma, the court turned unhesitat-
ingly to a consideration of the patentee's business practices, just as the
Landis Machine court had done.283 Rather than attempt to ascribe a
useful life or a degree of perishability to the composite filter-and-car-
tridge structure, the court considered the design as indicative of the
patentee's deliberate business decision to force its customers to re-
place the entire cartridge, including the filter, rather than the filter
alone. 284 This theory was confirmed by the patentee's instruction to
customers to "[s] ervice with a new cartridge ... at least once a year,"
which accompanied the directions for changing the cartridge.
285
The court could have advanced matters by pointing out its need
to depart from the useful life standard to render its decision. Instead,
the court framed its holding in the language of component spentness:
"Thus Everpure has designed and conducts a business scenario in
which the entire cartridge, including its sealed-in neck and filter, is
to have a longer use of it than the life of the shortest-lived part" (citing Wilson v. Simpson,
50 U.S. (9 How.) 109, 126 (1850); Heyer v. Duplicator Mfg. Co., 263 U.S. 100 (1923))).
279. 875 F.2d 300 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
280. Id. at 301; see id. at 304-05 (Newman, J., dissenting) (reciting claim four of the
patent-in-suit).
281. Everpure, 875 F.2d at 301.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 303; see supra notes 257-259 and accompanying text (discussing the Landis
Machine court's attention to the patentee's business practices).
284. Everpure, 875 F.2d at 303 (stating that Everpure "is 'hoist on its own petard,'" be-
cause "Everpure and Everpure alone made the business decision to sell disposable car-
tridges and to render its filter irreplaceable without replacement of the entire cartridge").
285. Id.
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spent when the filter wears out. '28 6 Instead of admitting the limita-
tions of the spentness rubric, the court extended it beyond any refer-
ence to physical facts. 28 7
Later cases have continued to cling to the spentness rhetoric, fur-
ther extending this notion of "effective" spentness. These cases con-
cerned medical devices that included components subject to
contamination in ordinary use. In Sage Products,288 the claims were
directed to a "sharps" disposal system that included an outer enclo-
sure and a removable inner container for receiving sharp instruments
used in medical procedures. 289 There was abundant evidence that the
patentee encouraged customers to dispose of the inner container
when it became filled with sharps: the patent specification as well as
the patentee's sales literature recommended disposal;29 ° the inner
container itself was marked with a warning;291' and the patentee had
evidently refused to deal with hospitals suspected of having reused the
containers.29
2
An analysis in terms of component spentness-and particularly in
terms of component useful life-would seem to lead straightforwardly
to a conclusion that the replacement of the inner container consti-
tuted permissible repair. The patentee's own statements clearly indi-
cated that the patentee believed that the inner container's useful life
would extend only until the container was filled, while the outer
container could last indefinitely.293
Yet the useful life standard left open another avenue of attack for
the patentee. Sage Products pointed out that the useful life of the
inner container did not end when the container was full of sharps
because it was physically possible (although apparently difficult and
presumably risky) to clean and reuse the inner container. 294 This
seems a plausible argument, and illustrates once again how easily the
useful life standard can be manipulated, yielding entirely different
286. Id.
287. See id. at 305-06 (Newman, J., dissenting) (rejecting any notion of nonphysical "ef-
fective" spentness and arguing that replacement of unworn elements amounted to imper-
missible reconstruction).
288. Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 45 F.3d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
289. Id. at 1576-77.
290. Id. at 1577.
291. Id. The warning declared: "BIOHAZARD-SINGLE USE ONLY." Id.; see supra
note 224 and accompanying text (discussing Cotton-Tie, which involved a similar label on
the patented goods at issue in which the Court concluded that the defendant recon-
structed the patented goods).
292. Sage Products, 45 F.3d at 1577.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1578.
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outcomes depending upon whether the court chooses to characterize
useful life in terms of safe practices of physical capacity.
Unfortunately, the court persisted in attempting to adapt the
component spentness rationale. The court dismissed as insignificant
the fact that it might be physically possible to clean and reuse the
inner container; prudence (and the patentee's own admonitions)
counseled otherwise. 295 To square this prudential concern with the
notion of component spentness, the court reached for a notion of
"effective" spentness: "This court has never said that an element is
spent only when it is impossible to reuse it. Like the district court, we
believe that when it is neither practical nor feasible to continue using
an element that is intended to be replaced, that element is effectively
spent."
2 96
"Effective" spentness reared its head again in a case factually simi-
lar to Sage Products. In Kendall Co. v. Progressive Medical Technology,
Inc.,297 the claims concerned a medical device used for applying pres-
sure to a patient's limbs.298 The device included a pump, pressure
sleeves (designed to be wrapped around the patient's limbs), and
tubes connecting the pump and the sleeves.299 The patentee in-
structed users, through a warning label on its packaging,300 against
reusing the sleeves, because the sleeves could become contaminated
through direct contact with the patient's skin.30 1 The patentee ob-
jected to the defendants' sale of replacement sleeves on the ground
that it was physically possible to use the sleeves for about three years
or more before they became worn out.
3 0 2
Unfortunately, rather than capitalize on the opportunity to ex-
plain the limitations of the component spentness approach to permis-
sible repair, the court simply viewed this case as a rerun of Sage
Products.30 3 Indeed, perhaps without realizing it, the court spoke in
295. Id. ("It might be prudent to replace an expendable element before it has been
completely exhausted.").
296. Id. (citing Everpure, Inc. v. Guno, Inc., 875 F.2d 300, 303 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
297. 85 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
298. Id. at 1571.
299. Id. at 1571-72.
300. Like the label at issue in Sage Products, this label warned: "FOR SINGLE PATIENT
USE ONLY. DO NOT REUSE." Id. at 1572.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Although the patentee attempted to distinguish Sage Products by emphasizing that
the patent specification in that case had expressly instructed users to dispose of the inner
container, while its own patent specification was silent on whether disposing of the sleeve
after a single use was prudent, the court rejected this hair-splitting distinction: "A pur-
chaser may repair or replace any unpatented component that wears out or otherwise be-
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terms that seem impossible to square with a notion of component
spentness:
[A]s long as reconstruction does not occur or a contract is
not violated, nothing in the law prevents a purchaser of a
device from prematurely repairing it or replacing an unpat-
ented component. Premature repair is the business of the
purchaser of the product, who owns it, rather than the pat-
entee, who sold it.3 ° 4
The lesson to be drawn from these cases is that the useful life
criterion, like other spentness criteria, seems most productive when it
serves the modest role of indicating the patentee's and purchaser's
intentions. In retrospect, the underlying concern with reasonable ex-
pectations can be glimpsed in a number of the more satisfactory use-
ful life cases. For example, in Heyer v. Duplicator Manufacturing Co.,305
Justice Holmes made this plain: "The owner when he bought one of
these machines had a right to suppose that he was free to maintain it
in use, without the further consent of the seller, for more than the
sixty days in which the present gelatine might be used up." ' 6 Justice
Holmes seemed to recognize that his analysis differed fundamentally
from an assessment of inherent physical and functional characteristics
of a patented device. His analysis was a filter for intent-an analysis
that sounded, perhaps, in contract. As Justice Holmes stated, "We
have only to establish the construction of a bargain on principles of com-
mon sense applied to the specific facts." °7
Other courts that have applied Heyer seemed to understand that
its analysis really centered on intent and only indirecdy dealt with the
characteristics of the device.3" 8 In ElDorado Foundry, Machine & Supply
Co. v. luid Packed Pump Co., 309 the patent claimed a pump for use in
connection with an oil rig, and the defendant supplied certain re-
comes 'spent,' whether or not the patentee believed at the time the patent application was
filed that it would be necessary to do so." Id. at 1575.
304. Id. It is difficult to know what to make of this announcement because it presup-
poses the conclusion that "reconstruction does not occur."
305. 263 U.S. 100 (1923); see supra notes 236-241 and accompanying text.
306. Heyer, 263 U.S. at 101-02.
307. Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
308. At least one case that preceded Heyer similarly concentrated on intent. See Farring-
ton v. Board of Water Comm'rs, 8 F. Cas. 1086, 1088 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1870) (No. 4687)
(arguing that, under Simpson, permissible repair depends on whether the parts were tem-
porary in relation to the whole machine, and that this, in turn, requires that the nature of
the parts "must have been so understood by the inventor in selling and the purchaser in
buying the machine").
309. 81 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1936).
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placement parts for the pump. 3 ° Drawing heavily from Heyer, the El
Dorado court found permissible repair because the parts of the pumps
replaced by the defendant were those that wore out quickly, and be-
cause the patentee contemplated that this would occur."11 The deci-
sion of the Tenth Circuit in Williams v. Hughes Tool Co.312 reflects a
similar interpretation of Heyer.313 Collectively, these cases suggest that
useful life is a helpful factor in distinguishing repair from reconstruc-
tion, especially when it is focused on eliciting the underlying inten-
tions of the parties.
D. The Dominance Test
A final "spentness" approach to the repair-reconstruction dichot-
omy is the "dominance" of components test. The dominance test as it
appears in cases such as Automotive Parts Co. v. Wisconsin Axle Co.314 can
be viewed as an early effort to implement the overall spentness stan-
dard. The dominance test stresses "the relation of the two classes of
parts-those supplied and those remaining in the original construc-
tion-to the patented unit.""1 5 In making this comparison:
if the new parts so dominate the structural substance of the
whole as to justify the conclusion that it has been made
anew, there is a rebuilding or reconstruction; and conversely,
where the original parts, after replacement, are so large a
part of the whole structural substance as to preponderate
over the new, there has not been a reconstruction but only
repair. 31 6
310. Id. at 783-84. The patent included claims to the pump itself and to a plunger subas-
sembly for the pump, but it appeared that the defendant did not supply replacement parts
that would allow reconstruction of the plunger assembly. Id. at 783.
311. Id. at 785-86. The patentee's contemplation of this result was evidenced by state-
ments in the patentee's advertisements, which specified in some detail "[w]hen to
[rieplace [t]ubes." Id.
312. 186 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1950).
313. The court stated:
Where a patented device of long life has among its integrated elements a part
which, as a result of use of the device, quickly wears out and, therefore, is tempo-
rary in duration, and the patentee licenses the use of the device, it will be pre-
sumed that the patentee and the licensee contemplated and intended that such
temporary part would be replaced by the licensee and that replacing it would
constitute permissible repair and not reconstruction amounting to infringement
of the patent.
Id. at 282.
314. 81 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1935).
315. Id. at 127.
316. Id.
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The court recognized that its test would entail more than mere parts
counting, but did not make clear what other considerations (for ex-
ample, the importance of the component in overall combination
functionality, or the relative cost of the component) would be ger-
mane.317 Moreover, because the court remanded the case to be de-
cided under the test it had set forth, it did not have the occasion to
apply this test.3 18
Courts were not quick to embrace the dominance test.3 19 In-
deed, after Aro l's rejection of the multifactor test and apparent rejec-
tion of approaches to repair-reconstruction that focused on individual
components of the overall combination, some courts claimed that the
dominance test had been overruled. For example, in National-Stan-
dard Co. v. UOP, Inc.,32° the defendant sold replacement sieves for
plaintiff's patented "apparatus for classifying fine-grain solids in wet
conditions," used to draw off solid particles from coal slurries.3 21 Af-
ter observing that the sieve was merely "one of three elements in the
patented combination,"322 the court rejected the argument that the
replacement sieve so dominated the overall combination as to justify a
conclusion of reconstruction. 23 Finally, the court noted that Aro I
had rejected similar arguments. 3 24
317. Cf id. (noting that the difficulties of the dominance test spring from "the necessity
of determining which of the two classes of parts, those supplied or the remaining original
parts, dominates the structure as a whole").
318. Id. at 128; see Timken-Detroit Axle Co. v. Automotive Parts Co., 93 F.2d 76, 76 (6th
Cir. 1937) (affirming the district court's finding upon remand of permissible repair on the
ground that the replacement parts at issue (a gear pair and a half-axle) did not so domi-
nate the structure of the overall combination (an axle) as to make it a new structure).
319. Indeed, only a single case preceding the Federal Circuit era can be found in which
a court relied even in part on the dominance test. See Standard Stoker Co. v. Berkley
Mach. Works & Foundry Co., 29 F. Supp. 349, 373-75 (E.D. Va. 1938) (citing Automotive
Parts for the dominance test), aftd, 106 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1939).
320. 616 F.2d 339 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
321. Id. at 339-40.
322. Id. at 340.
323. Id. at 340-41.
324. Id. at 341. The plaintiff in this case, relying on Automotive Parts, had argued that the
sieve was a dominant component. Id. at 340. While this argument seems similar to the
"heart of the invention" test rejected by Aro I, see supra text accompanying note 162, it
differs because the dominance test, presumably, could take into account considerations
such as the number of replaced components (as a percentage of the overall combination)
and their cost and functional importance. See also Porter v. Farmers Supply Serv., Inc., 790
F.2d 882, 886 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (casting doubt on the dominance test in light of Aro 1).
But see Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther, 377 U.S. 422, 424 (1964) (arguably invoking the domi-
nance test by including in its analysis the fact that "six of the 35 elements of the combina-
tion patent were resized or relocated"); Comment, Repair and Reconstruction of Patented
Combinations, 32 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 353, 359 (1965) (suggesting that Aro I might be inter-
preted as adopting a dominance approach).
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Notwithstanding this interpretation of Aro I, subsequent courts,
including the Federal Circuit, have continued to wrestle with the im-
plications of a "dominance" approach to overall spentness. One case
that goes far towards demonstrating the ultimate futility of the domi-
nance analysis is the Court of Claims' decision in General Electric Co. v.
United States. 25 The case involved the refurbishing of patented gun
mounts used on Navy vessels.3 26 The gun mounts were removed from
their vessels and shipped to a Navy-operated replacement facility,
where the components were disassembled and sent to separate work
stations for inspection, cleaning, and replacement, if necessary. 2 v
However, when the components were reassembled, there was no at-
tempt to reunite the original components of any given gun mount,
nor was there any effort to ensure that a given gun mount was re-
turned to the vessel from which it was originally taken. 28
Both the trial judge and the appellate tribunal applied a variety of
spentness analyses, all to little effect.329 The trial judge focused on
useful life, reasoned that the useful life of the gun mounts was volun-
tarily ended-rendering the gun mounts "spent" overall-when the
Navy disassembled the gun mounts, and concluded that the Navy had
engaged in impermissible reconstruction.33 The appellate tribunal
reversed, 3 1 basing its analysis on a variation on the dominance ap-
proach. 33 2 Attempting to determine whether the new components
dominated the original components for any given gun mount would
have been impossible; no individual gun mount maintained its iden-
tity during the process.3 33 Instead, the court sidestepped the riddle of
the apocryphal axe and resorted to averages: On average, of seven-
teen components in the gun mount, the patentee had supplied spare
parts for at least fifteen, suggesting that in any average gun mount, the
325. 572 F.2d 745 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (en banc) (per curiam).
326. Id. at 779-82.
327. Id. at 780. Some of the replacement parts came from gun mounts that had been
scrapped and cannibalized for a spare parts pool. Id.
328. Id.
329. See id. at 781-82 (applying a dominance analysis); General Elec. Co. v. United
States, 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 594, 621 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (employing a useful life analysis), modi-
fied, 572 F.2d 745 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (en banc) (per curiam).
330. General Electric, 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 621.
331. General Electric, 572 F.2d at 786 (dismissing the petition).
332. The court also employed a fractional cost approach. The court attributed signifi-
cance to the fact that the refurbishing activity cost, on average, only about $100,000, while
the value of the overall combination was roughly $1 million. Id. at 782.
333. Id. at 780.
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dominant components would be authorized components from the
patentee, and that the overhauling was a permissible repair.33 4
One might reasonably ask whether parts counting, or even the
contrived average parts counting of the variety employed in General
Electric, is an efficient means for determining the scope of the pur-
chaser's permissible repair right. Dominance as applied in General
Electric is cumbersome and ultimately highly artificial. And to what
end does it really go? If the court is attempting to preserve the pur-
chaser's reasonable expectations in use of the patented goods, does
parts counting really serve this end? Even if it does, are there not
more direct ways to get at the purchaser's reasonable expectations?
These questions remain open in Federal Circuit jurisprudence.
The Federal Circuit relied on General Electric to avoid another poten-
tial confrontation with the apocryphal axe in Dana Corp. v. American
Precision Co.3 5 The patent concerned clutch assemblies, and, as in
General Electric, the replacement activities entailed production line dis-
assembly and rebuilding of used clutches.33 6 The Federal Circuit, like
its predecessor court, rejected the argument that the clutches became
spent upon being disassembled. 3 7
The patentee in Dana also proposed an "economic" approach to
the dominance test. 3 ' This approach called for the court to find
overall spentness "when a user, making an objective economic deci-
sion, would replace the product rather than repair it, because it has
no value to the owner except as scrap."3"9 While the Dana patentee
suggested that the economic analysis would yield more predictable
outcomes in repair-reconstruction cases, the Federal Circuit was not
persuaded to adopt the approach.3 40 First, the court seemed uncon-
vinced that the analysis would indeed enhance predictability. 41 Sec-
334. Id. at 783-84.
335. 827 F.2d 755 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
336. Id. at 756-57.
337. Id. at 760. Although the court did not make it clear, a dominance approach of the
General Electric type apparently would have revealed that in an average rebuilt clutch assem-
bly, only four parts out of many parts were new-a fact similar to those in General Electric.
See id. at 757.
338. Id. at 760.
339. Id. Presumably, this economic evaluation could involve a consideration of the
value of the replaced parts as compared to the value of the overall combination.
340. See id. (acknowledging that this approach was interesting, but rejecting it on the
ground that it entailed as much uncertainty as existing case law).
341. Id. The court stated that truck owners might decide to replace the patented clutch
assembly, rather than repairing it, merely because the replacement might more quickly
enable the truck driver to return to the road. Id. That decision, according to the court,
"rests little, if at all, on the owner's objective view of the defective clutch's condition." Id.But this seems to miss the point of substituting an economic analysis, which is to allow the
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ond, the court seemed to think that the analysis departed from the
"guidelines laid down in Aro I and its progeny," which, of course, the
court considered itself bound to follow.
3 42
The "economic" approach to overall spentness fared no better in
a British case, Solar Thomson Engineering Co. v. Barton.43 The court
expressly rejected proposed alternative tests that would have called for
a comparison of (1) "the relative values of what has been replaced and
the rest of the patented article" or (2) "the relative cost of carrying out
the alleged repair and of making the complete article anew."34  Quite
sensibly, the court reasoned that a purchaser should be entitled to
carry out repair activities whether or not they are economical.3
43 Hav-
ing rejected the proffered test, however, the court could do little more
in formulating its own test than to restate the broad inquiry: "The
cardinal question must be whether what has been done can fairly be
termed a repair, having regard to the nature of the patented
article. "346
The most thorough exploration of the dominance approach-
and, likewise, the most dramatic illustration of the ultimate impracti-
cability of reliance on spentness standards-appears in the district
court to escape the confines of a strictly device-oriented approach to spentness. If both the
patent owner and the customer would reasonably have expected this pattern of replace-
ment, then it presumably would be reflected in the price of the patented product and a
court would be fully justified in concluding that the implied license to repair did not ex-
tend to clutch replacement.
342. Id. It is difficult to see why economic analysis should stand on any shakier ground
than does the parts-counting approach to dominance. Both the economic analysis and the
parts counting are ways to assess overall spentness, just as Aro I requires.
343. [1977] R.P.C. 537, 554-57 (1977).
344. Id. at 555.
345. Id. The court also rejected a component importance criterion, stating that the
purchaser should have the right to repair whether or not the replaced part "is crucial to
the function of the patented article." Id.
346. Id. Yet another proposal that is based upon an economic calculation-although
not one devoted to a notion of component dominance-would provide that a replacement
activity constitutes reconstruction only "when the patentee could reasonably have made
the sale of a whole unit if no parts were available." Comment, Combination Patents: The
Right to Prohibit Sales of Replacement Parts, 70 YALE L.J. 649, 660 (1965). This reasoning is
derived from a consideration of Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661
(1944), and the language of 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (the patent misuse provision), and their
effect on the patentee's ability to control the replacement part market through express
license restrictions. Comment, supra, at 658-60. But this preoccupation with Mid-Continent
and patent misuse in the repair-reconstruction context seems a bit like allowing the tail to
wag the dog. This test, like so many others used in this area, works best if considered
within the context of the parties' probable intentions. If the purchaser would reasonably
purchase a new unit rather than attempt to repair the old when a component breaks or
wears out, then the purchase price of the original goods presumably reflected that under-
standing, and the patentee will be undercompensated if the purchaser is entitled to extend
the life of the original goods without payment to the patentee.
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court and Federal Circuit decisions in FMC Corp. v. Up-Right, Inc.347
FMC, which held a patent on a grape picking head, sued Up-Right,
which sold a so-called "Rotary Pulsator" grape picking head in compe-
tition with FMC.348 In prior litigation, FMC prevailed and the parties
settled.349 Consistent with the settlement agreement, Up-Right ceased
its sales of Rotary Pulsator heads, but Up-Right continued to sell re-
placement parts to customers who previously had purchased Rotary
Pulsator heads.35° FMC alleged that the customers were engaging in
impermissible reconstruction; Up-Right countered that the customers
were permissibly repairing. 351
Reviewing the law of repair and reconstruction through Dana,352
the FMC district court declared that Dana had rejected the "economic
analysis" for overall spentness and had commanded instead that the
dominance test be used. 53
The patent owner FMC recognized that if the court applied the
dominance test on a straightforward parts-counting basis, its case for
dominance would be weak, because Up-Right had never replaced a
majority of the parts in any given head in the course of any individual
servicing.3 4 Attempting to circumvent this problem, FMC argued
that the court was entitled to consider the aggregation of replacement
activities occurring over time for each Rotary Pulsator head. 55 The
facts showed that, as the customer periodically replaced parts, the to-
tal number of replacement parts would increase relative to the total
number of parts, so that eventually the number of replacement parts
347. 21 F.3d 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1994); 816 F. Supp. 1455 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
348. FMC, 816 F. Supp. at 1457.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 1458.
351. Id.
352. Dana Corp. v. American Precision Co., 827 F.2d 755 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
353. FMC, 816 F. Supp. at 1463. The court noted:
Dana seems to hold that the "spentness" of a product is to be determined by
"examination of its physical characteristics," rather than consideration of the
owner's subjective evaluation of value.
Thus, determination of whether the original patented combination has be-
come spent must be made by reference to the physical condition of the combina-
tion taken as a whole. This was the approach of the court in Automotive Parts Go.
v. Wsconsin Axle Co....
Id. While the District Court's characterization of Dana may be sound, it is not at all clear
that the Dana court accepted the Automotive Parts dominance test. See Dana, 827 F.2d at
758-60 (omitting any reference to Automotive Parts or the test articulated therein).




would exceed fifty percent in satisfaction of the dominance
criterion. 56
The argument exposes a fundamental weakness in the domi-
nance approach to overall spentness. As the district court recognized,
if the dominance approach ignored the aggregated effect of sequen-
tial replacement activities, an owner could extend the life of a pat-
ented combination indefinitely without ever "reconstructing" the
combination; he would need merely to be certain that no more than
half the parts were replaced during any given servicing.
357 Every part
in the device ultimately could be replaced without a finding of recon-
struction. This presented the philosophical riddle of the apocryphal
axe: "At some point, the overhauled device will resemble the apocry-
phal axe, of which the owner brags: 'This is my great-grandfather's
original axe, although the handle has been replaced five times, and
the head twice."'358
Despite this problem, Aro I seems to command expressly that the
overall spentness analysis ignore the aggregated effect of sequential
replacement activities. 3 9 The FMC district court found that, despite
the apparent command from Aro I, there would be some point in time
where sequential replacement activities would rise to the level of re-
construction.3 60 However, the FMC court found it unnecessary on the
facts before it to determine exactly at which point in time that would
occur, because Up-Right's replacement activities did not even meet
the minimum threshold at which "the invention as a whole . . . at
some specified time [has] outlived its usefulness and [is] ready for the
scrapheap."3 61 Although the FMC court did not reach the issue of
whether replacement activities aggregated over time would constitute
reconstruction,36 2 it nevertheless provided a thoughtful analysis of this
position out of "an excess of caution."3
6 3
356. Id. at 1464-65.
357. Id. at 1464.
358. Id. at 1464 n.15.
359. See id. at 1464 (stating that "'[m]ere replacement of individual unpatented parts,
one at a time, whether of the same part repeatedly or different parts successively, is no
more than the lawful right of the owner to repair his property'" (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961))). See supra note 129 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this language in context in Aro I.
360. See FMC, 816 F. Supp. at 1464 (observing that "[tihere is considerable intuitive
appeal to the argument that, at some point, successive replacement of every part in a de-
vice will result in the creation of a new device for purposes of infringement").
361. Id. In arriving at this conclusion, the court seemed to be guided both by the small
number of replaced parts relative to the total number of parts, and by the low replacement
parts cost (about $900 annually) relative to the cost of the head ($30,000). Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1465.
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Here again, the analysis demonstrates the ultimate futility of a
device-oriented, dominance approach to overall spentness. First, as
the district court clearly appreciated, a pure parts-counting approach,
in which anything that is identifiable as an individual "part" is given
equal weight with any other identifiable "part," can too easily be
manipulated to achieve untoward results. For example, FMC sought
to count two rails on the picking heads as two parts, while the entire
drive means of the picking head as only one.3 64 This would be much
like asserting that an improved six-cylinder engine was composed of
seven parts-the engine and six spark plugs, so that replacement of all
of the spark plugs would be considered replacement of a majority of
the parts of the combination, and would constitute reconstruction.365
Second, even an approach that seeks to incorporate component
value (relative to the overall value of the combination) presents diffi-
cult choices. Should component value be based upon cost or retail
price?366 If these methods yield different results, what is the basis for
choosing between them? The question is difficult to resolve precisely
because the dominance inquiry, elaborated at this level, seems com-
pletely cut loose from its foundation. The problem is that the domi-
nance inquiry encourages courts to think of the repair-reconstruction
problem in terms of spentness rhetoric without pausing to consider
how and whether that rhetoric is connected to the fundamental un-
derlying expectations of the parties.3 67
364. Id.
365. Id. There are other examples of the potential absurdity of the parts-counting ap-
proach to overall spenmess. See Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Hesser, 131 F.2d 406,
410 (6th Cir. 1942) (noting that it would be "a fruitless task to determine when, in the
replacement of useless parts in a given [patented combination], the new would dominate
the old" because "some of the replaced units would themselves need replacing before
other original units failed" and because "considerations of quantities, relative weights, and
costs, are of little aid on the question of domination"); Morrin v. Robert White Eng'g
Works, 143 F. 519, 520 (2d Cir. 1905) (arguing that the replacement of a single generating
tube within a steam generator would constitute repair, and the replacement of an entire
series of tubes would constitute reconstruction, but that "[b] etween these two extremes lies
a debatable ground, the precise limits of which cannot be determined in advance").
366. See FMC, 816 F. Supp. at 1465-66 (rejecting the patentee's computation of the per-
centage value of replaced parts as 97%, recalculating this percentage as less than 50% on
both the cost and retail bases, yet concluding that even these recalculations overstate the
percentage by failing to consider "the economics of scale in producing parts for initial
manufacture, and the increased overhead attendant with inventorying and selling individ-
ual parts").
367. The district court in FMC also considered a "hybrid" approach to the component
value question in which certain parts were chosen as "integral," and a percentage value of
replaced integral parts was computed. Id. at 1466-67. It is difficult to understand how this
approach could square with Aro 's proscription against considering the "heart of the in-
vention." See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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Reviewing the district court's exhaustive analysis, the Federal Cir-
cuit confirmed that the lower court need not have reached the ques-
tion of the aggregation of sequential replacement activities.36 s The
determination that no single instance of replacement itself consti-
tuted reconstruction was sufficient to resolve the case in favor of the
defendants on the authority of Aro I's express language. 69 Moreover,
a dominance test that did take into account the aggregate effect of
sequential replacement would not only contravene Aro I, but would
also be "unworkable from a practical standpoint" because the owner
of the patented product would need to have a precise record of the
product's repairs in order to know when the purchaser's activities had
exceeded the fifty percent threshold. 370 Finally, the court echoed
Dana's rejection of an "economic" approach to overall spentness.371
The Federal Circuit's opinion in FMC leaves the dominance anal-
ysis in an intolerable state. 2 Despite the mandate from Aro Ito ana-
lyze overall spentness, the Federal Circuit has rejected not only the
economic analysis proffered in Dana, but also the parts-counting dom-
inance analysis of cases such as Automotive Parts.373 While the court in
FMC takes refuge in the oft-repeated statement that the repair-recon-
368. FMC Corp. v. Up-Right, Inc., 21 F.3d 1073, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
369. See id. at 1077 n.6 (defining a "single instance of repair" as the replacement of "one
or more parts" carried out "at the same time as part of the same servicing"); id. at 1077
(noting that, in light of the rule that "'[m] ere replacement of individual unpatented parts, one at
a time ... is no more than the lawful right of the owner to repair his property,'" this case did not
present the "difficult issue of how much repair to a grape harvester made altogether at any
single point in time would have risen to the level of reconstruction of a 'spent' grape
harvester" (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346
(1961))).
370. Id. at 1078 n.7.
371. See id. at 1078 n.8 (counseling that "caution should be exercised in any analysis
involving placing values, economic or otherwise, on the elements of a patented combina-
tion" (citing Dana Corp. v. American Precision Co. Inc., 827 F.2d 755, 760 (Fed. Cir.
1987))).
372. At least one commentator reviewing FMC has proposed an alternative approach.
See Thomas A. Polcyn, Note, FMC Corporation v. Up-Right, Inc.: Sequential Replacement of
Parts Does Not Turn Permissible Repairs into Impermissible Reconstruction, 14 ST. Louis UNIV.
PUB. L. REv. 269, 286 (1994) (proposing a test that would consider whether, "butfora series
of replacements, the entity viewed as a whole would have become spent," and measuring
spentness by the "conventional useful life" of the patented device). While the author cor-
rectly points out that this test might be free of the "accounting imponderables" that
plagued the court in the FMC case, id. at 287, the test restates the overall spentness stan-
dard in terms of "conventional useful life," without giving any guidelines as to how conven-
tional useful life would be calculated. In addition, the infirmities of the useful life
standard are significant. See supra Part II.C.2. A more attractive proposal would identify
conventional useful life as a factor that might have informed the reasonable expectations
of the patentee or the purchaser at the time of purchase. See infra note 402 and accompa-
nying text.
373. See supra notes 370-371 and accompanying text.
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struction problem must be resolved on a case by case basis, this gives
scant comfort, especially because FMC sidestepped the difficult ques-
tion of sequential replacement.
It should be evident that the riddle of the apocryphal axe will
inevitably arise in sequential replacement cases like FMC, so long as
the analysis revolves around spentness notions. The FMC case thus
presented the perfect vehicle for challenging the assumption that
spentness should be the dominant rubric for repair-reconstruction.
FMC aptly encapsulated the infirmities lying beneath the surface of
many of the various types of spentness cases. It is unfortunate that the
Federal Circuit allowed the opportunity to pass without giving serious
consideration to an alternative model for repair-reconstruction that
does not commit itself so thoroughly to the peculiarities of particular
patented devices and the attendant obstacles posed by the "apocry-
phal axe."
III. MIRACLE PLUGS, RUBBER RIVET RELOADS, AND THE ROLE OF
INTENT IN THE REPAIR-RECONSTRUCTION ANALYSIS
This Article has suggested that the major failing of the spentness
rhetoric employed to distinguish repair from reconstruction is that it
encourages courts to consider the physical qualities of the subject de-
vices in a vacuum, rather than considering those qualities as a proxy
for the underlying expectations of the patent owner and purchaser.
That the expectations of the parties are fundamental to the correct
resolution of the repair-reconstruction problem is a notion that is de-
veloped in the remaining parts of this Article. In this part, the Article
considers the role intent has played in the repair-reconstruction cases
to date.
Wilson v. Simpson unquestionably left open the possibility that
courts should consider the expectations of both the patentee and the
purchaser in distinguishing repair from reconstruction. 74 Of course,
this could also be said for a multitude of other potential considera-
tions.3 75 In any event, early courts routinely made reference to the
intent of the patentee and the purchaser. Typically, courts recited the
"reasonable intention of the parties" as one factor in a multifactor
approach to repair-reconstruction,3 71 or made some reference to
whether the replacement activity comported with the "implied under-
374. See Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109, 125 (1850) (noting that the law per-
mits replacement of certain parts that "the inventor contemplated would have to be fre-
quently replaced").
375. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the ambivalence of Simpson).
376. Goodyear Shoe Mach. Co. v. Jackson, 112 F. 146, 150 (1st Cir. 1901).
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standing" of the parties8 77 or was "contemplated by the patentee and
purchaser and user. '3 7' The Supreme Court itself has spoken of the
repair-reconstruction distinction in terms of establishing "the con-
struction of a bargain.
3 79
Aro I, with its rejection of a multifactor approach and its apparent
adoption of an overall spentness standard, created confusion concern-
ing the role of intent in the repair-reconstruction analysis. The
Court's opinion did not address the role of intent specifically, butJus-
tice Black insisted that "[d]eciding whether a patented article is
'made' does not depend on ... what the patentee's or a purchaser's
intentions were." 8 0 Indeed, Justice Black was convinced that "the
scope of a patent should never depend upon a psychoanalysis of the
patentee's or purchaser's intentions, a test which can only confound
confusion."3 1 Yet Justice Brennan, concurring in the result, was
equally convinced that the appropriate factors to be considered in-
clude "the common sense understanding and intention of the patent
owner and the buyer of the combination as to its perishable
components."3
82
377. Shickle, Harrison & Howard Iron Co. v. St. Louis Car-Coupler Co., 77 F. 739, 742
(8th Cir. 1896); see also Electric Auto-Lite Co. v. P. & D. Mfg. Co., 78 F.2d 700, 704 (2d Cir.
1935) ("In selling its ignition apparatus, the plaintiff did so expecting the car owner to
have service during the life of the car and upon the implied understanding that the car
owner is entitled to repair the same by replacing parts."); Ideal Wrapping Mach. Co. v.
George Close Co., 23 F.2d 848, 851-52 (D. Mass.) (noting the absence of any "implied
representation" that the patented device could be modified to wrap different size prod-
ucts), affd, 29 F.2d 533 (1st Cir. 1928).
Courts typically have intertwined notions of intent with device-centered rhetoric. See
Electric Auto-Lite, 78 F.2d at 704 ("Indeed, the ignition apparatus is so designed and built as
to make it possible to quickly and simply detach, for replacement purposes, the parts re-
ferred to and thus to meet the demands of wear or destruction."); F.F. Slocomb & Co. v.
A.C. Layman Mach. Co., 227 F. 94, 99-100 (D. Del. 1915) (carrying out the repair-recon-
struction analysis "in view of the character of the repair parts and of the attitude of the
parties toward them," and noting that the replaced parts were "intended to be replaced
from time to time"), affd, 230 F. 1021 (3d Cir. 1916); supranotes 306, 308, 311 and accom-
panying text.
378. Wagner Typewriter Co. v. F.S. Webster Co., 144 F. 405, 416 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906). In
addition to inferring intent from the design features of the patented devices, courts have
also found the patentee's sales materials to be a fruitful source of evidence on intent. See
El Dorado Foundry, Mach. & Supply Co. v. Fluid Packed Pump Co., 81 F.2d 782, 786 (8th
Cir. 1936) ("That the replacement of worn tubes is regarded by the [patentees] as a repair
only is shown by the statement in their catalogue . . . ."); Morrin v. Robert White Eng'g
Works, 143 F. 519, 520-21 (2d Cir. 1905) (noting that "[tihe necessity for repairs and the
right to make them is recognized in the [licensee's] catalogue").
379. Heyer v. Duplicator Mfg. Co., 263 U.S. 100, 102 (1923).
380. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 354 (1961)
(Black, J., concurring).
381. Id. at 355.
382. Id. at 364 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Two appellate decisions delivered in short succession after Aro I
illustrate quite plainly that courts took no clear signal from Aro I on
the proper role of intent. In Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhil 3a3 the paten-
tee, Fromberg, sold a tire repair device comprised of a hollow metal
tube and a cylindrical rubber plug that could be discharged from the
tube into a hole in a punctured tire, leaving an empty metal tube
when the operation was completed. 3 4 The defendant sold the "Mira-
cle Plug," a tapered rubber plug sized to fit into an empty Fromberg
tube.3 8
5
In analyzing whether defendant's customers were repairing or re-
constructing the Fromberg combination, the court acknowledged the
command from Aro I that the inquiry focus on overall spentness.3 86
Although this command seemed to make it "essential" for the court
"to examine the Fromberg device to determine its function and pur-
pose," the court moved directly to the proposition that the examina-
tion of the device was merely a proxy for intent: "The principal point
of this inquiry is whether, when sold by the Patentee, it is reasonably
contemplated that the device will be repeatedly used."3 87 The court,
with little analysis, concluded that the device was designed, manufac-
tured, sold, and used as a "unit" having "a single-shot function and
purpose for a one-time use"; once the rubber plug was injected into
the tire, the plug could not be used again, "[n] or is it expected that
the metal tube will be."388 In the court's view, this brought the de-
fendant's activities squarely within the realm of reconstruction. 389
A panel of the Ninth Circuit flatly disagreed with this analysis in a
case involving the same patent, Fromberg, Inc. v. Gross Manufacturing
Co. 319 In this case, the defendant purchased a complete Fromberg
tube-and-plug device, sold it in a package with rubber plugs made by
defendants, and specifically identified the kit as the "Rubber Rivet
Reloads for use with Fromberg Cartridges." 91 The court affirmed a
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 9 2
383. 315 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1963).
384. Id. at 410.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 412.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 413.
389. Id.
390. 328 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1964).




The court made it clear that it viewed Aro I as treating the intent
factor the same way that it had treated the "heart of the invention"
factor:
We do not see how it can be maintained, under the Aro deci-
sion, that the intent or understanding of the patentee or li-
censee, or the "essence" or "heart" of the combination, is any
longer controlling, at least in a case such as this, where one
element of the combination is necessarily removed and fi-
nally used, while the other remains and is capable of further
use.
39 3
Thus, contrary to the Fifth Circuit's consideration of whether the pat-
entee had "expected" that the tube would be reused, the Ninth Cir-
cuit refused "to probe the mind of [the] patentee in order to know
whether he is infringing. "3 ' But the Ninth Circuit's analysis belies
this refusal to consider intent, because the patentee's intent, as mani-
fested in the design of the article in question, clearly is material to the
outcome of the case:
Viewing the matter objectively, that is, looking at the patent
and the patented combination without adding an assump-
tion as to what may be in the mind of the patentee, we find
nothing to indicate such an expectation [that the metal tube
will be used only once].... [The tube] is intended to be,
and is, removed from the tire, and is then capable of being
reused.
3 95
Plainly, the court here wanted it both ways. Subjective intent as evi-
denced directly-through the patentee's own assertions, for exam-
ple-was not material, but the patentee's subjective intent as
manifested in the design of the article was dispositive.396 This is noth-
ing more than appellate court prejudgment of the patentee's credibil-
ity; the appellate court seemed to believe that the patentee's
assertions as to his intent were per se incredible and so should be
accorded no weight. This is troubling; either intent, however evi-
393. Id. at 808.
394. Id. at 809 (stating that "neither the desire nor the hope of the patentee in this
regard either is or ought to be material, much less controlling").
395. Id. The court seemed to suggest that its analysis differed from the Fifth Circuit's
analysis because that court included what was in the mind of the patentee, along with what
was manifested by the design of the patented combination, while the Ninth Circuit's analy-
sis included only the latter. It seems equally probable, however, that the Ninth Circuit
simply disagreed about what could be inferred from the design of the patented
combination.
396. See id. (holding that the patentee's mental desire or hope is immaterial, and then
finding nothing to indicate such an intent in the patent or the patented combination).
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denced, is relevant or it is not. The relative weight to be given to the
evidence on intent is a matter for the trial court.
In some of its decisions the Federal Circuit has returned to pre-
Aro Iusages of the patentee's intent in the repair-reconstruction analy-
sis. For example, in Dana, the court found permissible repair, point-
ing out that "Dana intends that its clutches be repairable; it sells
repair parts and publishes a repair manual."397 Similarly, the court's
decision in Everpure can perhaps best be explained as a consideration
of device structure as a proxy for intent, consistent with early cases.398
The Federal Circuit's most recent decisions, however, inexplica-
bly diverge on the issue of the role of the patentee's intent, and will
lead to further confusion on the point.399 In Aktiebolag, the Federal
Circuit proposed a multifactor test for repair-reconstruction, includ-
ing as one of the factors "objective evidence of the intent of the paten-
tee."400 The court analyzed this factor by resorting to traditional
sources of circumstantial evidence of the patentee's intent:
[The patentee] did not manufacture or sell replacement
drill tips. It did not publish instructions on how to retip its
patented drills or suggest that the drills could or should be
retipped.... There is, therefore, no objective evidence that
[the patentee's] drill tip was intended to be a replaceable
part.4
0 1
The court emphasized that, while the repair-reconstruction analysis
did not turn on the patentee's intent alone, "the fact that no replace-
ment drill tips have ever been made or sold by the patentee is consis-
tent with the conclusion that replacement of the carbide tip is not a
397. Dana Corp. v. American Precision Co., 827 F.2d 755, 759 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also
Kendall Co. v. Progressive Med. Tech., Inc., 85 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (inferring
patentee's intent from product labeling); Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 45 F.3d
1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (inferring patentee's intent from product labeling and state-
ments in patent specification concerning disposability of component); R2 Med. Sys., Inc. v.
Katecho, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 1397, 1443 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (arguing that "[b]ecause these
cable systems are intended to endure beyond a single use of the electrode, the structure of
the electrodes and cable systems imply [the patentee's] intent that its customers will regu-
larly replace these electrodes in normal use of the machine").
398. See Everpure, Inc. v. Cuno, Inc., 875 F.2d 300, 303 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (suggesting that
the fact that the patentee had sealed the filter into the filter cartridge was indicative of the
patentee's intent that purchasers who replace the filter also replace the cartridge).
399. The Federal Circuit has not spoken on the reasonable expectations of the pur-
chaser, creating the potential for additional confusion here as well.
400. Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co., 121 F.3d 669, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1337 (1998).
401. Id. at 674. The court distinguished this case from Sage Products and Kendall by not-
ing the evidence of intent contained in those cases. Id.
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permissible repair. "402 Surprisingly, the court made no effort to ex-
plain how its consideration of "objective evidence of intent" squared
with Aro I. Of course, as already noted, the court likewise made no
effort to explain why it was articulating the very multifactor approach
that Aro I had explicitly denigrated.4"'
Worse still, less than a week after Aktiebolag, in a decision that
included two panel members who also had sat on the Aktiebolag panel,
the court took an entirely different approach regarding intent. In
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Manufacturing Corp.,4 °4 the
patentee Hewlett-Packard argued expressly for adoption of an "intent-
of-the-patentee" analysis, and cited traditional forms of objective evi-
dence of its intent: its package insert suggested discarding empty car-
tridges (rather than refilling them with ink), and it did not sell
refillable cartridges or ink refills for empty cartridges.405 But in ad-
dressing the patentee's argument that the evidence of intent was rele-
vant on the authority of Simpson, the court refused to permit any
deviation from a purely device-oriented spentness rhetoric:
HP has misread Wilson. Although at times speaking in terms
of the intention of the inventor, the Court focused on the
nature of the device sold, and specifically on the fact that the
machine was designed such that one group of components,
the knives, would wear out long before the remaining com-
ponents ... 406
While this passage appears wholly to reject the relevance of intent, this
rejection is belied by other parts of the court's opinion. Attempting
to harmonize its result with Cotton-Tie and Mallinckrodt, both of which
involved express label restrictions on reuse of the patented prod-
uct,4 0 7 the Hewlett-Packard court declared that evidence of intent mani-
fested in acts of contractual significance would be relevant to the
repair-reconstruction question, while lesser evidence would not be
relevant:
402. Id. Consistent with pre-Aro Icases, the court tied other factors to intent in its analy-
sis, such as the useful life of the replaced part. See id. (noting that the drill tip "was not
intended or expected to have a life of temporary duration in comparison to the drill
shank").
403. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
404. 123 F.3d 1445, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1304 (1998).
405. Id. at 1453.
406. Id.
407. Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89, 91 (1882) (noting that the words "Li-
censed to use only once" were stamped into each metal buckle); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc. 976 F.2d 700, 702 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (observing that the phrase "Single Use
Only" was inscribed on each device, and that a package insert provided with each unit
stated "For Single Patient Use Only").
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[A]bsent a restriction having contractual significance, a
purchase carries with it the right to modify as long as recon-
struction of a spent product does not occur.... The ques-
tion is not whether the patentee at the time of sale intended
to limit a purchaser's right to modify the product .... [A]
seller's intent, unless embodied in an enforceable contract,
does not create a limitation on the right of a purchaser to
use, sell, or modify a patented product as long as a recon-
struction of the patented combination is avoided. A noncon-
tractual intention is simply the seller's hope or wish, rather
than an enforceable restriction.4 °s
This passage indicated that the court's quarrel was with the manner in
which the patentee's intent was evidenced, not with the use of intent
per se. This is but another example of the court losing its way in a
repair-reconstruction decision for lack of an adequate organizing
principle. The fact that circumstantial evidence is a less persuasive
indicator of intent does not explain why it should be impermissible to
resort to such evidence. After all, if the repair-reconstruction prob-
lem is about defining the scope of an implied license, a proposition
developed in the remaining parts of the Article, it is highly problem-
atic to suggest that only express statements of contractual significance
can bear on that scope.
Perhaps the court was also reacting against the possibility that the
patentee's expectations alone would determine the outcome of a re-
pair-reconstruction analysis." 9 But this fear need not be addressed by
throwing out all evidence of intent. Instead, the court should have
recognized that its task was to balance the reasonable expectations of
both the patentee and the purchaser of the patented goods. Viewed in
this manner, it would be correct to say that evidence of the patentee's
unilateral intentions should not alone govern the analysis, but incor-
rect to say that evidence of the patentee's unilateral expectations must
be discarded.
In any event, it is critical to recognize that the exhaustion model
does not facilitate analysis of the repair-reconstruction problem in
terms of parties' expectations. An implied license model would be
more productive for these purposes.
408. Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d at 1453; cf Farley, supra note 18, at 153-56 (arguing that
Simpson and some other repair-reconstruction cases prior to Aro Igive some significance to
intent factors, particularly the intent of the patentee).
409. See Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d at 1453 (arguing that the patentee's "unilateral inten-
tions" cannot change the fact that it sold the cartridge at issue without restriction and that
the cartridge had a useful life longer than the supply of ink that it contained).
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IV. REPAIR AND RECONSTRUCTION RECONCEPTUALIZED AS A
DETERMINATION OF IMPLIED LICENSE SCOPE
An "exhaustion of rights" model for the repair-reconstruction
problem has historical basis, but presents a major difficulty because it
thrusts the analysis towards device-oriented rhetoric and leaves the
role of intent unclear. This is only to be expected because the exhaus-
tion model focuses on whether a party's activities amount to imper-
missible making as opposed to permissible using, usually framed in
terms of whether the device is "spent" before the replacement activi-
ties occur. In this context, the use of spentness rationales seems logi-
cal, even though it may be ill-advised.
What are the alternative models, if exhaustion has been demon-
strated to be unsatisfactory? Three deserve mention, but only one-
the implied license model-really presents a fundamentally different
rubric from which to draw guidelines for determining what constitutes
a repair or a reconstruction.
First, of course, one might simply eliminate the notion of recon-
struction altogether. One commentator suggested this approach in
the wake of Aro L.410 Under this proposal, only replacement of all of
the elements would trigger liability; anything less would constitute
permissible repair.4 11 According to the commentator, "standard eco-
nomic assumptions" may establish that the patentee is actually better
off without the concept of reconstruction.4 1
Whatever the force of economic arguments, expunging recon-
struction would not necessarily eliminate the difficult cases. For ex-
ample, sequential replacement practices might still pose a challenge.
Where a purchaser replaced each component but the last screw or
bolt on one day, and added the screw or bolt on the next, would this
avoid liability? That is, does the standard require replacement of all
components at one time before liability is triggered?
Second, one might explore an approach that is embodied in the
Community Patent Convention (CPC). The CPC,4 13 which has, of
course, not yet come into force, defines direct infringement (Article
25)414 and indirect infringement (Article 26) 4 '5 in terms roughly simi-
410. Comment, supra note 324, at 353-54.
411. Id. at 363.
412. Id. at 364.
413. Agreement Relating to Community Patents, Dec. 15, 1989, 1989 0J. (L 401) 1. For
the complete text of the Community Patent Convention, see GERALD PATERSON, THE EURO-
PEAN PATENT SYSTEM: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT CoNvENTION app.
19 at 714-76 (1992).
414. Article 25 ("Prohibition of direct use of the invention") provides in relevant part:
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lar to corresponding provisions in U.S. patent law.416 CPC Article 28
incorporates an exhaustion by sale principle, again roughly equivalent
to the exhaustion doctrine of U.S. law.41 7 Commentary on these pro-
visions, however, suggests that they seek to define infringement "ex-
haustively."41 Accordingly, because the right to repair is not expressly
prohibited, it is absolutely protected.419 It could be said, then, that
the "right" to repair under the CPC is not akin to an implied license
interest, and in fact not akin to a license interest at all, because it
cannot be limited even by a patentee's express statement at the point
of sale.42°
At first glance, this model seems to diverge conceptually from the
repair-reconstruction framework prevalent in U.S. law. Yet, in applica-
tion, it seems doubtful that the differences would be very significant.
A Community patent shall confer on its proprietor the right to prevent all third
parties not having his consent:
(a) from making, offering, putting on the market or using a product which is the
subject-matter of the patent, or importing or stocking the product for these
purposes....
Agreement Relating to Community Patents, supra note 413, at 14.
415. Article 26 ("Prohibition of indirect use of the invention") provides in relevant part:
1. A Community patent shall also confer on its proprietor the right to prevent all
third parties not having his consent from supplying or offering to supply within
the territories of the Contracting States a person, other than a party entitled to
exploit the patented invention, with means, relating to an essential element of
that invention, for putting it into effect therein, when the third party knows, or it
is obvious in the circumstances, that these means are suitable and intended for
putting that invention into effect.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the means are staple commercial products,
except when the third party induces the person supplied to commit acts prohib-
ited by Article 25....
Id. at 14-15.
416. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a)-(c) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
417. Article 28 ("Exhaustion of the rights conferred by the Community patent") pro-
vides that:
The rights conferred by a Community patent shall not extend to acts concerning
a product covered by that patent which are done within the territories of the
Contracting States after that product has been put on the market in one of these
States by the proprietor of the patent or with his express consent, unless there are
grounds which, under Community law, would justify the extension to such acts of
the rights conferred by the patent.
Agreement Relating to Community Patents, supra note 413, at 15.
418. AmiRAM BENYAMINI, PATENT INFRINGEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 58-59(Studies in Industrial Property and Copyright Law, Vol. 13, Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard
Schricker eds., 1993). By defining infringement exhaustively, the drafters of the CPC
hoped to preclude national courts from developing national standards that might expand
or contract the scope of the Community patent grant. Id. at 60. No correlative need for
such an aggressive use of patent exhaustion principles is present in U.S. law.
419. Id. at 104-05.
420. Id. at 105.
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CPC Article 25 prevents the unauthorized "making" of a claimed in-
vention, so a court faced with an allegation that a defendant's replace-
ment activities infringe the patent must still determine whether those
activities constitute a new "making" or something less. Carrying out
this exercise would seem to be very much like applying the unadorned
exhaustion standard of Aro L Indeed, one commentator suggests that
courts might, for example, resort to a dominance test to decide the
question.4 2
1
A recent case from the U.K. Patents County Court provides an
illustration of the point that decisions under the CPC model are still
likely to turn on common law conceptions of repair and reconstruc-
tion. In Hazel Grove (Superleague) Ltd. v. Euro-League Leasure Products
Ltd.,4 2 2 the patentee held patents on pool tables, and the defendant
refurbished and resold pool tables that had originally been purchased
from the patentee. 42' The court determined that it must begin its
analysis by reference to CPC principles, explaining that the infringe-
ment provision in the Patents Act 1977 had been designed to corre-
spond to Articles 25 through 28 of the Community Patents
Convention.424
Considering these principles, the court declared that "the con-
cept of an 'implied license' to repair is alien to the CPC, because it is
based upon the idea that a purchaser needs a licence to repair a pat-
ented product and that the patentee may restrict that right."
425 That
is, because there are no rights to prohibit an activity that is less than a
"making," there are no such rights to be exhausted upon sale.4 26
Yet, having reached this conclusion, the court in Hazel Grove im-
mediately turned back to the common law standards for repair and
reconstruction to analyze whether the defendants had engaged in a
"making."427 Referring to British and German authority, the court
found that the defendant's activities indeed constituted impermissible
new "making. '4 28 It is difficult to see how the analysis would have dif-
fered at all had the court merely proceeded to apply the traditional
repair-reconstruction analysis.
Implied license, a third alternative model for the repair-recon-
struction analysis, deserves more attention. In one sense, this is the
421. Id. at 112-14.
422. [1995] R.P.C. 529 (Patents County Ct.) (1995).
423. Id. at 531.
424. Id. at 537.
425. Id. at 539 (citing BENYAMINI, supra note 418, at 105).
426. Id.
427. Id. at 541-42.
428. Id. at 541-43.
[VOL. 58:423494
1999] A TALE OF THE APOCRYPHAL AXE
least radical of the three alternatives. The principle, of course, is that
upon the unconditional, authorized sale of patented goods, the pur-
chaser takes a license to use (and resell) the goods. Because the li-
cense is not formalized in any express written agreement, it can be
referred to as an implied license.
A number of repair-reconstruction cases refer to the concept of
an implied license.4 29 In most, if not all, of these cases, the courts
employed the implied license more as a convenient label than as a
serious analytical tool, and there is no dramatic distinction between
these cases and those employing the model of exhaustion.
If we are to take the implied license more seriously as a model for
analyzing the repair-reconstruction problem, some additional preci-
sion is needed. The repair-reconstruction problem is a particular type
of implied license problem. Fundamentally, it is a problem of the
scope of an implied license: deciding that an activity constitutes "re-
pair" is simply deciding that it falls within the scope of the purchaser's
implied license, while deciding that an activity constitutes "reconstruc-
tion" is, of course, determining that the activity falls outside the prop-
erly defined scope of the license. The repair-reconstruction inquiry
has, upon occasion, been framed in this manner by scholars43 ° and,
albeit rarely, by judges.431
429. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 1445,1451 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("The question before us is whether this modification is authorized,
or whether it exceeds the scope of the implied license granted to ROT and subsequent
purchasers by the sale of the inkjet cartridges."), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1304 (1998); Aktie-bolag v. E.J. Co., 121 F.3d 669, 672 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (reasoning that "when [patentee] sold
its patented drills to its customers, it granted them an implied license to use the drill for its
useful life ... and the implied license to use includes the right to repair the patented drill"(citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 484 (1964); Stan-dard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1991))),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1337 (1998); Green v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 132 F.2d 312,314 (6th Cir. 1942) (noting that "the license implied from sale in the usual channels of
trade does not apply to a sale of an article to be scrapped" (citing Cotton-Tie Co. v. Sim-
mons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882); Tindel-Morris Co. v. Chester Forging & Eng'g Co., 163 F. 304(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1908))); Pettibone Corp. v. Fargo Mach. & Tool Co., 447 F. Supp. 1278, 1281(E.D. Mich. 1978) ("[T]he purchaser is granted an implied license to use the purchased
patented machine. The right to use encompasses repair but not reconstruction of the
machine . . . ."); National Malleable Casting Co. v. American Steel Foundries, 182 F. 626,
640 (C.C.D.N.J. 1910) (referring to an "implied license to make repairs").
430. See Oddi, supra note 3, at 102-05 (discussing Aro I as a "scope of implied license"
case); see also Gregory M. Luck, The Implied License: An Evolving Defense to Patent Infringement,
16 I.P.L. NEWSLE TER 3, 29 (Fall 1997) (observing that the "scope of the implied license is
oftentimes the dominant issue in cases dealing with repair versus reconstruction").
431. See, e.g., Electric Auto-Lite Co. v. P. & D. Mfg. Co., 109 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1940) (per
curiam). The court stated:
While in the nature of things there can be no rule as to where repair ends and
reconstruction begins, clearly the implied license must be understood to cover a
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What are the benefits of reconceptualizing the repair-reconstruc-
tion problem as an inquiry into the scope of an implied license? One
major benefit is that, unlike the exhaustion model, the implied li-
cense model does not impel us towards spentness rationales and the
complexity of device-oriented rhetoric. Instead, the implied license
model gives a prominent role to the expectations of the parties.
Problems, of course, remain. Determining the scope of an im-
plied license is no easy work. At first glance, in fact, it may seem no
easier than determining the "spentness" of a component or a
combination.
However, a second major benefit of the implied license model is
that it is not unique to the repair-reconstruction problem, or even
unique to patent law. Courts and commentators have confronted
questions of implied license scope in a wide array of contexts. In the
next three subparts, this Article considers teachings from these other
contexts, the extent to which they reinforce what we already know to
be true of the repair-reconstruction problem, and the extent to which
they can be injected into the repair-reconstruction analysis by analogy.
If the repair-reconstruction analysis can be enhanced by this exercise
in cross-fertilization, then the shift to a rigorous notion of implied
license scope is easily justified.
This Article considers analogies from three areas: first, cases and
commentary on implied license scope in other intellectual property
settings; second, implied license scope as developed in the law of servi-
tudes in real property; and third, implied license scope as developed
in the law of contracts.
A. Implied License Scope in Intellectual Property Cases
A number of patent cases explore the issue of implied license
scope.432 A series of cases involve the sale of unpatented goods which
reasonable enjoyment of the privilege; and if it is cheaper to insert a new part
than to cobble the old one back into service, the license covers just that; if it did
not, the very presupposition on which it rests would be falsified.
Id. at 567.
432. In addition to the cases discussed specifically in the text, other patent cases in
which the implied license is employed involve certain types of involuntary sales and dis-
putes over damages liability where the infringer has already satisfied a judgment for past
damages. See, e.g., Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 114 (1922) (finding that the
sale of spare parts "made with full knowledge of all relevant facts" where there was no
implied license violated a court-ordered injunction); McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67
F.3d 917, 920-22 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding that an implied license arose upon a sale pursu-
ant to a Texas commercial code provision that allowed the seller to sell specially ordered
goods upon the buyer's refusal to pay); King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 814 F.2d
1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that upon satisfying ajudgment for previously infring-
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are components of a patented combination or are used to practice a
patented process. For example, in Edison Electric Light Co. v. Peninsular
Light, Power & Heat Co.,433 Edison Electric held certain exclusive rights
in Edison patents concerning methods for distributing electricity.
Edison had installed a wiring system in the Livingston Hotel in Grand
Rapids, Michigan, and had supplied electricity to the hotel.43 4 This
wiring system was connected to transformers in accordance with a pat-
ented method owned by Edison.435 When the hotel decided to switch
to another electricity provider (Peninsular), Edison Electric sued Pe-
ninsular for contributory infringement.436
Based upon well-established exhaustion principles, it could not
seriously be questioned that a license to use the patented method
should be implied in favor of the hotel based upon its purchase of the
wiring system designed to carry out the patented method. 4 7 The
question was whether the scope of the implied license was limited to
the provision of electricity from Edison Electric.438 Significantly, in
articulating a general rule for analyzing implied license scope, the
court did not constrain itself to a consideration of the physical quali-
ties of the patented combination at issue. Instead, it was "evident" to
the court that: "[T]he extent of an implied license must depend
upon the peculiar facts of each case. The question in each case is
whether or not the circumstances are such as to estop the vendor
from asserting infringement."43 9  In the court's view, the circum-
stances clearly indicated that Edison Electric intended for the hotel to
have the benefits of the Edison distribution system, and the hotel
clearly understood that it would be free to secure electricity from any
source." 0 Accordingly, the implied license was sufficient in scope to
ing the sales of machines, the defendant received an implied license extending throughout
the useful life of the machines); Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813)(No. 12,391) (finding that an implied license arose upon sheriff's sale).
433. 101 F. 831 (6th Cir. 1900).
434. Id. at 831-32.
435. Id. at 833.
436. Id. at 832.
437. See id. at 835 (noting the general rule "that if a patentee make a structure embody-
ing his invention, and unconditionally make a sale of it, the buyer acquires the right to use
the machine without restrictions, and, when such machine is.. . unconditionally sold, no
restriction upon its use will be implied in favor of the patentee" (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F.
288, 290 (6th Cir. 1896))).
438. Id. at 837.
439. Id. at 836.
440. Id. at 836-37.
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protect the hotel (and its new supplier of electricity) from infringe-
ment liability." 1
A recent Federal Circuit case, Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal
Equipment Innovations, Inc.,442 endorses a totality of the circumstances
approach to determining the scope of an implied license, including
the reasonable expectations of the patentee and purchaser. Plaintiff
Carborundum owned a patent on an apparatus for melting scrap
metal, one component of which was a pump specifically designed for
conveying molten metal.443 Carborundum sold only the pump, not
the entire apparatus.444 When defendant Molten Metal also began
selling molten metal pumps to Carborundum customers, Carborun-
dum sued.445
As in Edison Electric, the existence of an implied license in this
case could not reasonably be disputed: Under exhaustion principles,
the purchasers of the Carborundum pump acquired a license to com-
bine the pump with other elements to form the patented appara-
tus. 4 4 6 The only question concerned the scope of this implied license.
The patentee argued that the implied license extended only for the
life of the purchased pump, while the defendant argued that the im-
plied license extended without restriction, for the entire term of the
patent.
44 7
The court turned to a flexible all-circumstances approach:
We must further look to the circumstances of the sale to de-
termine the scope of the implied license. This determina-
tion must be based on what the parties reasonably intended
as to the scope of the implied license based on the circum-
stances of the sale. One party's unilateral expectations as to
the scope of the implied license are irrelevant. 44
Based upon the circumstances, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
implied license extended only for the life of the pump, and the court
hinted that this conclusion would be the typical outcome.449
441. Id.
442. 72 F.3d 872 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
443. Id. at 875-76.
444. Id. at 876.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 879.
447. Id. at 878-79.
448. Id. at 878 (citations omitted).
449. See id. at 879 ("Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, an implied license aris-
ing from sale of a component to be used in a patented combination extends only for the
life of the component whose sale and purchase created the license.").
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Courts have also confronted implied license scope in a variety of
patent cases involving litigation over the "shop right," under which an
employer receives a royalty-free, nonexclusive license to use its em-
ployees' inventions where, for example, the employee has developed
the invention during work hours, using the employer's facilities.4 50 In
many of these cases, it was relatively free from doubt that the em-
ployer had some right of use in the employee's inventions, but ques-
tions arose as to the duration of the use right, or whether it extended
to improvements. 451
Courts adjudicating implied license scope in this context again
have been disinclined to rest the inquiry on a constrained set of con-
siderations. 452 They consider all circumstances, with a particular em-
phasis on the reasonable intentions of the parties. 453 A statement
from an early Sixth Circuit decision is typical:
The duration and scope of a license must depend upon the
nature of the invention and the circumstances out of which
an implied license is presumed, and both must at last de-
pend upon the intention of the parties.45 4
450. See, e.g., Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1996)("[Ain employer may obtain a shop right in employee inventions where it has contributed
to the development of the invention." (citation omitted)); McElmurray v. Arkansas Power
& Light Co., 995 F.2d 1576, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (discussing both the basis and appli-
cation of the "shop right" between employer and employee). For the common law origins
of the shop right, see, for example, United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178,
180, amended by 289 U.S. 706 (1933); Gillv. United States, 160 U.S. 426, 435 (1896); Solomons
v. United States, 137 U.S. 342, 346 (1890); McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 210-
11 (1843).
451. See, e.g., Teets, 83 F.3d at 409 (finding an implied-in-fact contract for an employee to
assign patent rights to an employer because the latter had designated the employee to
work on a business related "problem [that] entailed invention").
452. See id. at 407-09 (considering the factual and contractual aspects of the employ-
ment relationship in order to determine ownership of patent).
453. See id.
454. Withington-Cooley Mfg. Co. v. Kinney, 68 F. 500, 506 (6th Cir. 1895); see also Finley
v. Asphalt Paving Co., 69 F.2d 498, 506 (8th Cir. 1934) (noting that "the scope of an im-
plied license depends upon the circumstances which created it, and it rests ultimately upon
the intention of the parties" (citing Neon Signal Devices, Inc. v. Alpha-Claude Neon Corp.,
54 F.2d 793, 794 (W.D. Pa. 1931))); Barber v. National Carbon Co., 129 F. 370, 374 (6th
Cir. 1904) (noting that "[t ] he duration and scope of a license must depend on the nature
of the invention, and the circumstances out of which an implied license must be pre-
sumed, and both must depend on the intention of the parties" (quoting Withington-Cooley,
68 F. at 506)); Neon Signal Devices, 54 F.2d at 794 ("Naturally, the scope of an implied
license depends upon the circumstances which created it, and it rests ultimately upon the
intention of the parties." (citing Withington-Cooley, 68 F. at 500; Tin Decorating Co. v. Metal
Package Corp., 29 F.2d 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1928))); Tin Decorating Co., 29 F.2d at 1007 ("[T]he
scope of an implied license is to be determined by the circumstances out of which it arises,
including the relation and conduct of the parties... and all the other circumstances upon
which agreement may be implied or estoppel enforced."), aff'd, 37 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1930);
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A number of copyright cases also deal with questions of implied
license scope,455 particularly where authors or artists have created
copyrightable works at another's request and have delivered the fin-
ished product without providing for any formal, written agreement
respecting copyright ownership or other allocation of rights in the
copyrightable works.456 None of these cases imposes an artificial re-
striction on the nature of the evidence that might be received to de-
termine the scope of the implied license. In at least one case, the
court, "not see[ing] how it [could] be argued that only the existence
and not the scope of a license can be proved by parol evidence,"
found a genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judg-
ment on the question of implied license scope.45 v Another court
more clearly embraced an all-circumstances approach, ruling that
"[t]he existence and scope of... an implied license depends upon
McKinnon Chain Co. v. American Chain Co., 259 F. 873, 878 (M.D. Pa. 1919) (quoting
Withington-Cooley with approval), affd, 268 F. 353 (3d Cir. 1920). See generally 6 ERNEST
BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, WALKER ON PATENTS § 20:14 (3d ed. 1987) ("The scope of an
implied license depends upon the circumstances which created it, and it rests ultimately
upon the intentions of the parties.").
Professor Robinson's treatise was highly influential in the adoption of the all-circum-
stances approach to implied license scope in shop rights cases. 2 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON,
ROBINSON ON PATENTS § 809, at 588-89 (1890) (stating that the scope of implied license "is
determined by the circumstances out of which it has arisen"). Robinson himself relied
upon an early shop rights case for the rule. See Montross v. Mabie, 30 F. 234, 237
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887) (reasoning that "[t]he extent of the license is a question of construc-
tion, and, as in the case of other contracts expressed or implied, is to be determined in
accordance with the intention of the parties").
455. As in many other contexts, the implied license in the copyright context is an exclu-
sion from the statute of frauds, based upon the pragmatic consideration that parties often
fail to respect formalities when creating or transferring property interests. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 204(a) (1994) (stating that transfer of ownership in copyright "is not valid unless an
instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and
signed by the owner of the rights conveyed"); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (excluding nonexclu-
sive licenses from the "transfer of copyright ownership"); MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.03[A], at 10-44 (1998) (stating that nonexclusive
license may be implied from conduct). In many respects, these cases are similar to the
"shop right" cases in patent law.
456. See, e.g., Lulirama Ltd. v. Axcess Broad. Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 882 (5th Cir.
1997) (stating that an implied license in advertising jingles included within its scope the
rights to reproduce and make copies, prepare derivative works, distribute copies, and au-
thorize public performance); Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 559 (9th Cir. 1990)
(finding that an implied license that was created when the plaintiff fulfilled a request to
deliver special effects footage was sufficiently broad to cover both the defendant's use of
the footage in a film and the distribution of the film); Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 634 (9th
Cir. 1984) (holding that although an author who incorporated his preexisting articles into
a manuscript as part of a partnership arrangement impliedly licensed the partnership to
use the articles, the implied license did not cover the partnership's uses of the articles in
works other than the manuscript).
457. Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 1983).
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the facts of the individual case," and, in particular, "the conduct of the
parties. 4
58
Courts dealing with determinations of the scope of an implied
license in the patent context, including the repair-reconstruction con-
text, should remain attentive to the development of this issue in copy-
right cases. Implied license issues seem to be arising with increasing
frequency in copyright cases,4" 9 and the trend is very likely to con-
tinue as cases reach the courts concerning copyrightable material that
has been placed on-line.46
458. Herbert v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 299, 310 (1996).
459. See, e.g.,Jacob Maxwell, Inc. v. Veeck, 110 F.3d 749, 753 (l1th Cir. 1997) (conclud-
ing that the owner of a baseball team enjoyed an implied nonexclusive license to play a
promotional song created at his request); I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 778 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding that a construction company enjoyed an "implied nonexclusive license to
use [an architect's] schematic design drawings" created at the company's request).
460. A number of commentators have suggested that the culture of the world wide web
makes it reasonable to suppose that authors who place their copyrightable works on-line
without restriction have granted an implied license to users to access their work, at least for
noncommercial purposes. See Allen R. Grogan, Implied Licensing Issues in the Online World,
14 COMPUTER LAw., Aug. 1997, at 1, 2 ("Given the inherent characteristics of the World
Wide Web, it could be argued that the very act of placing materials on a Web site manifests
an intention that others be able, at a minimum, to access and display the work on their
computer screens."); see also Martin J. Elgison & James M. Jordan III, Trademark Cases Arisefrom Meta-Tags, Frames, NAT'L. L.J., Oct. 20, 1997, at C6 ("Some argue that because links are
such an inherent part of the Web, anyone choosing to operate a Web site has given an
'implied license' for others to link to it. . . ."); Richard S. Vermut, File Caching on the
Internet: Technical Infringement or Safeguard for Efficient Network Operation?, 4 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 273, 345-49 (1997) (analyzing whether file caches may be protected by an implied li-
cense arising when an author places a copyrighted work on-line).
For additional discussion on the implied license as it may arise in the context of intel-
lectual property rights in digital media, see BRUCE A. LEHMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INF RASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF
THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 129 n.424 (1995) (suggesting that
an implied license may arise when a copyrighted work is posted to a newsgroup, but might
not extend to activities such as distributing copies of the work to other newsgroups); Eric
Schlachter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why Copyright Law Could Be
Unimportant on the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15, 46 (1997) (discussing the argument
that uploading a copyrighted work onto the Internet might grant.an implied license to
provide hypertext links to the work); John C. Yates & Michael R. Greenlee, Intellectual Prop-
erty on the Internet: Balance of Interests Between The Cybernauts and the Bureaucrats, 8 J. PROPRIE-
TARY RTs., July 1996, at 8, 10 (arguing that unless implied license or fair use is a defense,
forwarding copyrighted works via e-mail could be copyright infringement); see also Jon
Bing, Re: Re: WWW-Implied Licenset [sic] (visited Jan. 11, 1999) <http://www.cni.org/
Hforums/cni-copyright/1995-03/0260.html> (beginning a threaded discussion on the
topic).
However, as Grogan points out, critical issues as to the proper scope of the implied
license remain. See Grogan, supra, at 3 ("But it may be more difficult to determine
whether, based on all of the facts and circumstances, a broader license should be implied,
such as a license permitting permanent copies to be stored on a hard disk or distributed to
third parties."). The scope issue will presumably be decided by reference to the existing
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The general jurisprudence on implied license scope in patent
and copyright cases provides at least two important insights for courts
considering the repair-reconstruction problem. First, there is ample
support for the proposition that implied license scope in general is
determined by considering the reasonable expectations of the parties
in view of all of the circumstances, including the parties' conduct.
The repair-reconstruction problem, a type of implied license scope
determination, should be analyzed in the same general way. The Fed-
eral Circuit should take the lead in pointing out this connection.
Applying a flexible, all-circumstances approach to repair-recon-
struction would have important implications, not the least of which
concerns the continuing viability of Aro I. An all-circumstances ap-
proach would diverge from the reasoning of Aro I, although arguably
not the holding of Aro I if the case is read strictly.4 ' Yet the Federal
Circuit, as has been demonstrated, apparently considers itself free to
apply such an approach notwithstanding Aro 1.412 The Federal Circuit
should, at a minimum, make clear either that Aro I does not absolutely
forbid the all-circumstances approach, or that after nearly forty years
of experience with Aro I, in which courts have inevitably resorted to
multiple-factor approaches, the Supreme Court would not be likely to
follow Aro !'s reasoning should the issue be presented to the Court
today.
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has not made the connection
between the general jurisprudence on implied license scope and its
repair-reconstruction jurisprudence. The court missed a golden op-
portunity to make such a connection in the recent Hewlett-Packard de-
cision.46 Attempting to avoid a rule whereby the patentee's unilateral
intentions could dominate the repair-reconstruction analysis, the
court seemed to throw away intent altogether as a consideration.464
law on implied license scope in copyright, using an all-circumstances approach. See id. at 2
(citing traditional copyright cases for the all-circumstances rule).
Notions of customary practices on the internet will unquestionably be important as
courts consider implied license scope in this context. Courts might be well-advised to con-
sider UCC concepts of trade usage in this connection. See generally infra Part IV.C.
461. A strict reading of Aro I might lead one to conclude that, while the Court adopted
the overall spentness standard as its holding, it limited its denigration of the multifactor
approach to dicta. See supra notes 102-130 and accompanying text (discussing Aro 1).
462. See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text (discussing the multiple-factor ap-
proach employed by the Federal Circuit panel in Aktiebolag).
463. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 1445 (Fed.
Cir. 1997), ceri. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1304 (1998); supra notes 273-278 and accompanying text
(discussing this case).
464. See Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d at 1453 (asserting that "HP's unilateral intentions" can-
not control, and noting that "HP fails to recognize the distinction between what it in-
tended to be the life of the cartridge . . . and its actual useful life").
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Instead, the court could have made clear, as it had in Carborundum,
that while the patentee's unilateral intentions as to implied license
scope are not determinative, the balance of the parties' reasonable
expectations, set in the context of all the circumstances surrounding
the sales transaction, are determinative.4"5 Had it chosen this analysis,
the court could have arrived at the same result while harmonizing its
implied license and repair-reconstruction cases.
Another important insight from the implied license jurispru-
dence is that if an all-circumstances approach is employed to deter-
mine implied license scope, the analysis will inevitably include
consideration of how the implied license was created. The implied
license jurisprudence suggests that the issue of implied license scope
in general cannot be entirely disentangled from the issue of implied
license creation, and, unfortunately, the case law on implied license
creation is in considerable ferment. Some cases apply an equitable
estoppel approach (also referred to as "estoppel in pais") to implied
license creation, based on representations by the patentee on which
another relied to his or her detriment.4 6 Proof of reliance tends to
be the major issue in these cases.4 6 7
465. Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872, 878 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (stating that while "[o]ne party's unilateral expectations as to the scope of the
implied license are irrelevant," the scope of an implied license "must be based on what the
parties reasonably intended... based on the circumstances of the sale").
466. Recently, the Federal Circuit has added an important gloss to these decisions by
asserting that no "formal finding" of equitable estoppel is necessary to the creation of an
implied license. See Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1581
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (observing that the principles of equitable estoppel should only "serve as
guidelines" for the implied license analysis), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 69 (1997); id. at. 1582
(upholding a defense of implied license as a form of "equitable rather than legal estoppel,
because the license arose from an accord implicit in the entire course of conduct between
the parties").
467. See generally De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 241 (1927)
(stating that any language or conduct of a patent holder from which a person "may prop-
erly infer that the owner consents to his use of the patent.., upon which the other acts,
constitutes a license and a defense to an action for a tort"); Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire
Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 925 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (determining that "[t]he reliance required
to establish equitable estoppel [did not] exist"); Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550,
1559 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that "the relatively few instances where implied licenses have
been found rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel"); St. Joseph Iron Works v. Farmers
Mfg. Co., 106 F.2d 294, 298 (4th Cir. 1939) (reasoning that because plaintiff assigned his
patents he "asserted them to be valid, and he is estopped to deny their validity").
In the particular case of the sale of unpatented equipment that is used to practice a
patented invention, the Federal Circuit has developed a two-part test that appears to spring
from equitable estoppel principles. See Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Komers Unlimited, Inc., 803
F.2d 684, 686-87 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("First, the equipment involved must have no noninfring-
ing uses.... Second, the circumstances of the sale must 'plainly indicate that the grant of
a license should be inferred.'" (citation omitted) (quoting Bandag, 750 F.2d at 925)); see
also Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872, 878 (Fed.
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Other cases insist that the creation of implied licenses is a matter
of legal estoppel.4 68 Explaining the differences, the Court of Claims
noted:
The essence of legal estoppel that can be found in the estop-
pel of the implied license doctrine involves the fact that the
licensor (or assignor) has licensed (or assigned) a definable
property right for valuable consideration, and then has at-
tempted to derogate or detract from that right. The grantor
is estopped from taking back in any extent that for which he
has already received consideration.469
Two points are important here. First, the fact that courts have
used a variety of labels to characterize the nature of the implied li-
cense need not unduly complicate the implied license model for re-
pair-reconstruction. Indeed, as the Federal Circuit has recently
recognized, "[t]hese labels describe not different kinds of licenses,
but rather different categories of conduct which lead to the same con-
clusion: an implied license."47 ° Accordingly, the adoption of an im-
plied license model for repair-reconstruction need not turn into an
endless quest to characterize the inherent nature of the implied
license.
Second, irrespective of whether the implied license to use and
sell patented goods arising upon authorized sale is ultimately labeled
legal estoppel, equitable estoppel, or some other variation, the analy-
sis of the scope of an implied license involves an all-circumstances ap-
proach that focuses on reasonable expectations. In Wang Laboratories,
for example, the court looked to the parties' "entire course of con-
duct" in determining whether an implied license had been created,
and did not suggest that it would apply a more constrained standard
Cir. 1995) (following the Met-Coil test); Devices for Med., Inc. v. Boehl, 822 F.2d 1062, 1068
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (same).
468. See, e.g., AMP Inc. v. United States, 389 F.2d 448, 453 (Ct. Cl. 1968) ("[T~he doc-
trine of implied license does not rest on a theory of estoppel in pais, but rather on a
rationale of legal estoppel. This latter term is merely shorthand for saying that a grantor of
a property right or interest cannot derogate from the right granted by his own subsequent
acts.").
469. Id. at 452; see also Wang Labs., 103 F.3d at 1581 ("Legal estoppel refers to a narrower
category of conduct encompassing scenarios where a patentee has licensed or assigned a
right, received consideration, and then sought to derogate from the right granted." (citing
Spindeffabrik Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert & Salzer Mas-
chinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 1987))); Spindelfabrik, 829
F.2d at 1080 ("The rationale for [legal estoppel] is to estop the grantor from taking back
that for which he received consideration." (citing AMP, 389 F.2d at 452)). "Legal estop-
pel" is also known as estoppel by deed, a common species of which is estoppel by warranty.
See AMP, 389 F.2d at 452 n.5.
470. Wang Labs., 103 F.3d at 1580.
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to adjudicate scope. 471 Similarly, nothing in the implied license cases
resting on legal estoppel suggests that courts will isolate only a single
factor (such as the nature of the patented device) in order to deter-
mine the scope of the license.
B. Implied License Scope from a Property Perspective
The purchaser's implied license to use patented goods has come
to serve a useful social function by formalizing, ex ante, property
rights as between parties to an informal, commonplace transaction in
goods. Similarly, the implied license in real property long has formal-
ized rights connected to land arising from the most mundane of activ-
ities, where the requirements of the traditional categories of
servitudes are not satisfied. Examples of the implied license in land
are plentiful: implied licenses might arise from permission to the
public to enter business premises,472 informal permission to use a
road over another's land,4 73 permission to use railroad rights-of-
way,474 permission to cross navigable waters overlying private lands,475
471. Id. at 1581-82 (citing De Forest Radio Tel. Co., 273 U.S. at 241).
472. See State v. Quinnel, 151 N.W.2d 598, 602 (Minn. 1967) (referring to "the implied
license to enter upon the premises of another for purposes of ordinary business inter-
course with the landowner"); Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 773 P.2d 1294, 1314 (Or. 1989) (re-
ferring to a revocable license to enter a store or restaurant (citing Penn v. Henderson, 146
P.2d 760 (1944))).
473. See, e.g., Hollis v. Tomlinson, 585 So. 2d 862, 865 (Ala. 1991) (characterizing the
defendant's permissive use of a road over plaintiffs land as falling short of an easement);
Pettus v. Keeling, 352 S.E.2d 321, 323 (Va. 1987) (holding that the use of a road across
private land "with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owners" created an easement).
474. Specifically, these cases concern the implied license to use or cross railroad rights-
of-way, an issue that has arisen in cases dealing with the railroad's responsibility of due care
to licensees. See, e.g., Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Zebec, 82 F.2d 961, 964 (7th Cir. 1936) (hold-
ing that "there was an implied license from the railroad company to the public and pedes-
trians to use the track"); Director Gen. of R.Rs. v. Reynolds, 268 F. 948, 950 (6th Cir. 1920)(stating that status as a licensee "depends upon whether there was . . . a customary and
permissive use"); Hodges v. Erie RIR. Co., 257 F. 494, 496 (6th Cir. 1919) (per curiam)(reasoning that "a license to use the pathway over the tracks when not occupied by a train
[did not] include[ ] a license to cross when the pathway was so occupied"); Erie R.R. Co. v.
Burke, 214 F. 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1914) (holding railroad company liable for the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff because "the public had been permitted for years with the acqui-
escence of the railroad company to use the tracks at the place of this accident in the man-
ner this plaintiff used them"); Great N. R& Co. v. Thompson, 199 F. 395, 398 (9th Cir.
1912) (discussing the requirements to qualify as a licensee); Farley v. Cincinnati, H. & D.R.
Co., 108 F. 14, 18 (6th Cir. 1901) (considering "the question of implied license, and the
evidence and use essential to establish such a license").
475. See, e.g., Hilt v. Weber, 233 N.W. 159, 164 (Mich. 1930) (stating that where private
lands "have been encroached upon by the navigable waters of the Great Lakes, until such
owners construct dykes or levees which prevent, there is an implied license to the public to
enter upon and use and navigate such water, and to exercise all the rights incident to
navigation" (quoting Kavanaugh v. Baird, 217 N.W. 2 (Mich. 1928))); Brusco Towboat Co.
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and in other real property contexts. 4 76 The implied license is also of
interest in admiralty cases.477
In the law of real property, the license is an ancient concept that
attempts to define the relationship between a landowner and another
regarding the use of land.4 78 Thus, a discussion of licenses in land fits
alongside a discussion of the law of servitudes generally, which also
defines usufructuary rights in land.479
v. State, 589 P.2d 712, 720 (Or. 1978) (in banc) (stating that the right to use riparian
waters is "derived from a passive or implied license" (citation omitted)).
476. For additional examples illustrating the wide array of cases in which the express or
implied license in land may arise, see JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF
EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND 11.0111], at 5, 6 (rev. ed. 1995).
477. The implied license has routinely been used in the law of admiralty as a label for
the general permission provided to ships to enter friendly ports. See, e.g., Coleman v. Ten-
nessee, 97 U.S. 509, 516 n.1 (1878) (stating that a ship's passage is free from interference
based on an implied license); La Nereyada, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 108, 164 (1823) (asserting
that a vessel was protected by the "implied license under which she entered our waters");
The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 354 (1822) (concluding that the implied
license to use a port does not extend to protect misconduct); The Schooner Exch. v. Mc-
Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 144 (1812) (construing the "implied license ... under
which [a] vessel enters a friendly port ... [to] contain[ ] an exemption from the [local]
jurisdiction").
Daniel Webster argued The Santissima Trinidad, which dealt with the scope of an im-
plied license, and, particularly, an entirely different sort of repair-reconstruction problem.
The Court found that a foreign vessel, even a vessel of war, had an implied license to enter
a U.S. port, but that the license was limited in scope by a repair doctrine. The Santissima
Trinidad, 20 U.S. at 353. Webster argued that the "implied license may extend to a mere
replacement of the original force; but it cannot extend to such an augmentation of the
force as would be inconsistent with the neutral character of the power granting the li-
cense." Id. at 324. Whether this was the inspiration for Webster's repair-reconstruction
arguments in Wilson v. Simpson is open to speculation.
478. 8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 64.02(a) (David A. Thomas ed., 1994) (defining
a license as a "relationship between two or more persons with respect to the use of a tract
of land in which there is nothing more than a revocable privilege by one of them to be
upon the land, which presence would, in the absence of the privilege, be actionable by the
other").
479. Easements, real covenants, and equitable servitudes comprise the traditional cate-
gories of servitudes. See generally ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8
(2d ed. 1993).
Some surprising connections can be found between the law of servitudes and the law
of intellectual property. Several scholars have drawn analogies between the law of servi-
tudes and restrictions based on the post-sale use of subject matter protected by intellectual
property rights, especially in copyright scholarship. See Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Eco-
nomics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1, 53-54 (1997) (exploring connections be-
tween equitable servitudes on chattels and Continental concepts of moral rights in
copyrighted works); Thomas M.S. Hemnes, Restraints on Alienation, Equitable Servitudes, and
the Feudal Nature of Computer Software Licensing, 71 DENV. U. L. REv. 577, 593 (1994) (consid-
ering analogies between equitable servitudes and restrictive terms in software licenses);
John M. Kernochan, The Distribution Right in the United States of America: Review and Reflec-
tions, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1407, 1413-15 (1989) (reviewing the notion of equitable servitudes
on chattels in connection with the first sale doctrine of copyright law); Ken Lovern, Evalu-
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Characterizing the license concept rigorously enough to make it
useful as an analytical tool in law has long been considered a formida-
ble task. Hohfeld, for example, reportedly viewed the term "license"
as "a word of convenient and seductive obscurity" and the law of
licenses as an "intricate and confused subject." '4 s Perhaps attempting
to sidestep the difficulties, the Restatement defines license largely in
terms of what it is not: it is an interest relating to land, where the
interest does not qualify as an easement.481
More straightforwardly, a license is often defined as "permission
to do an act or series of acts on another's land that, absent authoriza-
tion, would constitute trespass." 482 Importantly for purposes of under-
ating Resale Royalties for Used CDs, KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y, Fall 1994, at 113, 116 (analyzing
analogies between equitable servitudes on chattels and the notion of resale royalties on
copyrighted works).
Scholars also have examined the connections between the patent exhaustion doctrine
and equitable servitudes on chattels. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chat-
tels, 41 HARv. L. REv. 945, 999-1005 (1928) [hereinafter Chafee, Equitable Servitudes] (con-
sidering the application of an equitable servitudes theory to patent cases, particularly those
involving restrictions on the use of patented chattels); Bruce D. Gray, Note, Mallinckrodt
Inc. v. Medipart Inc.: Express Limitations on the Use of a Patented Product After Sale, 13 GEo.
MASON L. REV. 803, 820-21 (1991) (analyzing restrictions that impose a negative duty on
the purchaser of patented goods to refrain from specified uses of the goods to equitable
servitudes).
Scholars have persuasively explained in economic terms the law's reluctance to en-
force equitable servitudes in chattels. See Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and
Artists'Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 101-02
(1997) (highlighting problems of notice and impairment of alienability, and pointing out
that the efficiency that may result from large-scale coordination of uses on adjoining par-
cels of real estate may not be achievable for chattels). The value of the equitable servitude
on chattels as an analogy for repair-reconstruction is limited because cases approving of
equitable servitudes in chattels are exceedingly rare. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Music
Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1258 (1956)
[hereinafter Chafee, The Music Goes Round] (noting that "it is an extraordinary thing for
the law to enforce [equitable servitudes] at all").
480. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Faulty Analysis in Easement and License Cases, 27 YALE L.J.
66, 92 (1917).
481. Specifically, the Restatement defines license as an interest in another's land which
(a) entities the owner of the interest to a use of the land, and
(b) arises from the consent of the one whose interest in the land used is affected
thereby, and
(c) is not incident to an estate in the land, and
(d) is not an easement.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY. SERVITUDES § 512 (1944). An introductory note in the Restate-
ment explains that the license is "the residue of those privileges of use of land arising out of
the consent of the possessor of the land which are not included with the definition of
easements." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY- SERVITUDES, PT. II, INTRODUCTORY NOTE (1944).
482. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 476, 1.03[1], at 7 (citation omitted). This definition is
consistent with a famous passage from an early British case:
A... license properly passeth no interest, nor alters or transfers property in any
thing, but only makes an action lawful, which without it had been unlawful. As a
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standing how the implied license model may change courts' approach
to the repair-reconstruction problem, the persistent characteristic of
any definition of a license is consent.
4 81
It is, of course, the scope of the consent that is of concern for
purposes of analogizing to the repair-reconstruction problem. The
Restatement of Property sets forth a general rule for the scope of licenses
in land: "The extent of a license is fixed by the terms of the consent
which creates it."4 84 With regard to implied licenses, because there
are no express terms of consent, courts must determine the scope of
the license:
by holding the licensor responsible to the extent to which he
might reasonably have foreseen reliance upon an appear-
ance of consent indicated by his conduct and by limiting the
privilege of the licensee to such uses as are made in reason-
able reliance upon an appearance of consent by the
licensor.485
This link between an implied license's scope, and the extent of
the licensor's consent, is important for the repair-reconstruction prob-
lem. Courts have clearly been troubled by reliance on intent (particu-
larly the supposed intent of the patentee) in adjudicating repair-
reconstruction disputes; it may simply be too easy, and too tempting,
for the patentee to develop "intentions" post hoc and introduce them
at trial as if they were readily apparent to the patentee and the pur-
chaser at the time of the transaction.
While not entirely obviating the problem, the consent formula-
tion may allow courts in repair-reconstruction cases to establish some
distance from purely subjective intent, while retaining the general ap-
proach of surveying the evidence for manifestations of mutually
agreed-upon expectations. For example, on the licensor's side:
The consent of a licensor may be broader than he intended
because, having appeared to intend more than he did, and
license to go beyond the seas, to hunt in a mans park, to come into his house, are
only actions, which without license, had been unlawful.
Thomas v. Sorrell, 124 Eng. Rep. 1098, 1109 (K.B. 1673). Professor Clark noted that the
case did not deal with a license in land, but rather with "another kind of interest, namely, a
dispensation or patent from the King against the operation of a statute providing a penalty
for selling liquor without license." Charles E. Clark, Licenses in Real Property Law, 21 COLUM.
L. REv. 757, 759 n.8 (1921).
483. See Clark, supra note 482, at 758 (noting that the word "license" has its root in the
Latin licentia, meaning freedom or liberty, and that this origin explains the core of the
current concept-permission or consent).
484. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY- SERVITUDES § 516 (1944).
485. Id. § 516 cmt. b.
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having so acted that he should reasonably have foreseen the
appearance resulting from his consent, he is deemed to have
consented to the extent of the appearance he created.486
Likewise, where the licensee's outward manifestations of consent di-
verge from the licensee's "intent," the manifestations of consent con-
trol.4 87 Effectively, then, the approach calls for an assessment of the
reasonableness of the expectations of the parties to the license
transaction.488
Applying these notions to the repair-reconstruction problem, a
court could eschew notions of the patentee's unilateral intent and in-
stead analyze the reasonableness of the parties' expectations. Specifi-
cally, the court could analyze, for example, the patentee's conduct,
asking whether the patentee could reasonably have foreseen that pur-
chasers would rely upon the appearance of consent which that con-
duct created. Relevant conduct on the part of the patentee could
include the patentee's statements (in the patent specification, in pro-
motional literature, or elsewhere) as well as the patentee's design
choices as embodied in the device at issue.489
Unfortunately, because most licenses in land are terminable at
the licensor's will, the fine points of license scope rarely become the
subject of litigation.490 However, cases analyzing the scope of ease-
ments do arise more frequently. An easement, of course, is a nonpos-
sessory interest in another's land,49' which may be created by express
agreement complying with the local statute of frauds, by implication,
or by prescription.492 In general, easements are distinct from licenses
because the latter are ordinarily terminable at the will of the licen-
sor,49 3 while easements are not.49 4 In a variety of circumstances, how-
486. Id. (emphasis added).
487. Id.
488. See 8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 478, § 64.04(a), at 27 (noting that,
in the absence of agreement, the rights of the licensee become "a question of the reasona-
bleness of the expectations of the parties").
489. By considering the patentee's design choices, this Article is not, of course, sug-gesting a return to the use of spentness rhetoric as an end in itself. Instead, it is suggesting
the use of spentness rhetoric as an indicium of intent. See generally supra Part II.
490. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 476, 11.03, at 9, 10.
491. See GERALD KORNGoLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS, REAL COVE-
NANTS, AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES 5 (1990).
492. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 476, 1.01, at 3.
493. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY-. SERVITUDES § 519(1) (1944) (stating that, with some
exceptions, "a license is terminable at the will of the possessor of the land subject to it").
This is not surprising because licenses are founded upon consent, which in most circum-
stances the licensor can simply withdraw. Viewed in this way, licenses seem quite distinct
from interests in land, and in fact most authorities consider licenses not to rise to the level
of an interest in land. See, e.g., BRUCE & ELY, supra note 476, 11.01, at 2.
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ever, licenses can become "irrevocable"-meaning that they cannot
simply be revoked at the licensor's whim, although they may have a
limited duration.495
The implied license to use a patented item upon authorized sale
has much in common with the "irrevocable" license in land.4" 6 To be
sure, the implied license to repair can be altered or conditioned by
express statements from the patentee. However, where an implied li-
cense to repair springs into existence in the wake of an unconditional
sale of patented goods, the patentee cannot later revoke the license at
his whim. Thus, once created, the implied license to use a patented
item may reasonably be analogized to the irrevocable license in land.
Because it is well established in the law of servitudes that irrevoca-
ble licenses in land are analytically indistinct, in most respects, from
easements,497 guidelines concerning the scope of easements may be
useful in analyzing scope questions concerning irrevocable licenses in
494. See generally CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 479, § 8.12.
495. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY. SERVITUDES §§ 519(3), (4) (stating that a license cou-
pled with an interest may be terminated "only to such an extent as not to prevent the
license from being effective to protect the interest," and explaining that a "licensee ... who
has made expenditures of capital or labor in the exercise of his license in reasonable reli-
ance upon representations by the licensor as to the duration of the license, is privileged to
continue the use permitted . . . to the extent reasonably necessary to realize upon his
expenditures").
496. There may also be some subtle differences. For example, a license in land can
become irrevocable by operation of subsequent events or through payment of considera-
tion, whereas the implied license growing out of the unconditional sale of patented goods
presumably would arise even if no consideration were paid-e.g., the gift of patented
goods presumably would support an implied license to use and resell the goods.
In addition, a number of courts and commentators offer an equitable estoppel ration-
ale as the basis for the irrevocable license. See, e.g., Camp v. Milam, 277 So. 2d 95, 99 (Ala.
1973) (stating that, when the licensee makes expenditures which were contemplated by
the licensor, "for reasons founded upon the equitable principle of estoppel, [the license]
becomes irrevocable and confers upon the licensee a substantive equitable right in the
property"); CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 479, § 8.8, at 456-57 (asserting that estoppel is
one of the theories on which courts have relied in finding licenses irrevocable); 4 RiCHARD
R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.26, at 315 (PatrickJ. Rohan ed., 1998) (noting
that the consent giving rise to the license relationship "becomes irrevocable in equity
whenever the recipient of the consent has executed his part of the transaction by payment,
by taking possession, or by making expenditures in reliance upon the consent"). Accord-
ingly, it is conceivable that a court would rule that a license is revocable notwithstanding
the payment of valuable consideration if the equities ran strongly against the licensee. By
contrast, the implied license to use and resell patented goods has become so entrenched in
U.S. patent jurisprudence that it would be startling for a court to refuse to imply a license
on the basis of equitable considerations. However it may have been viewed by nineteenth
century courts, the implied license as it is used today seems more a creature of law.
497. See 4 POWELL, supra note 496, § 34.26, at 315 (stating that events subsequent to the
formation of the license may transform it into what is effectively an easement enforced in
equity). The irrevocable license may differ from a true easement in its duration. While an
easement may be indefinite, an irrevocable license, under the Restatement approach, en-
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land, and, by extension, the scope of an implied license in repair-re-
construction cases. In particular, the law concerning the scope of the
narrow classes of implied easements498 presents an especially useful
source of rules that could be applied in repair-reconstruction cases.499
dures only so long as is "reasonably necessary [for the licensee] to realize upon his expend-itures." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY. SERVrrUDES § 519(4) (1944).
498. Specifically, easements implied from prior use may provide an analogy. Such ease-
ments, along with easements implied from necessity, and easements created by prescrip-
tion, all may present difficult scope issues. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 479, § 8.9, at457-58 ("Prescriptive and implied servitudes are always likely to present questions of scope
or location, since the events giving rise to them are not communicative acts."). It is, how-
ever, important to note that approaches to scope among this group of easements may vary
slightly depending upon exactly how the easement was created. See Wright v. Horse CreekRanches, 697 P.2d 384, 388 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (stating that "precise delineation of the
means by which a particular easement is acquired is critical to any determination of the
extent to which the owner of the dominant estate is entitled to burden the servient
estate").
499. Easements (and implied licenses) may also arise through custom, a matter of re-
cent scholarly interest. See David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: BeachAccess and Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1375, 1382-1413 (1996) (discussing the appli-
cation of custom in property law); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Com-
merce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711, 714 (1986) (examining "thetheory of 'custom,' where the public asserts ownership of property under some claim so
ancient that it antedates any memory to the contrary"). Perhaps the best example of alicense implied from custom concerns the nature of ranchers' rights to graze cattle onpublic lands in the western United States. As the Supreme Court described it:
At common law the owner was required to confine his live stock, or else was heldliable for any damage done by them upon the land of third persons. That law was
not adapted to the situation of those States where there were great plains and vast
tracts of uninclosed land, suitable for pasture. And so, without passing a statute,
or taking any affirmative action on the subject, the United States suffered its pub-lic domain to be used for such purposes. There thus grew up a sort of implied
license that these lands, thus left open, might be used so long as the Government
did not cancel its tacit consent.
Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 535 (1911) (citing Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 326(1890)); see also United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911). For recent examples ofgrazing rights cases that cite the implied license rubric, see Gardner v. Stager, 892 F. Supp.1301, 1303 (D. Nev. 1995) (noting that the Nevada Supreme Court "has referred to grazing
on public lands as something done under an 'implied license'" (citing Itcaina v. Marble, 55P.2d 625 (Nev. 1936))), affd, 103 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 1996); Hagev. United States, 35 Fed. Cl.147, 166 (1996) (finding that "[p]laintiff's grazing permit has the traditional characteris-tics and language of a revokable license"); Fallini v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 53, 57 (1994)(noting that the practice of grazing on public land became an implied license after years of
use without government objection), vacated, 56 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The impliedlicense has also been used to justify more general claims of access to public lands, e.g., forgeneral recreational purposes. See United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d1277, 1284 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting "a traditional policy for the use of public lands allowing
the public to use lands within the public domain for general recreational purposes without
holding a written, formal permit").
The scope of an implied license arising through custom is presumably dependent
upon the scope of the custom from which the license was created, but the cases do notilluminate this point. Nonetheless, notions of custom as an interpretive device, rather than
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In the case of easements created by necessity, implication, or pre-
scription, because no express document is available for evidencing the
scope of the easement, a court is left to determine the scope "by infer-
ence based primarily upon the circumstances" under which the ease-
ments were created.5 °° In general, courts determining the scope of
these types of easements "are trying to effectuate the unexpressed in-
tent of the parties," while also maintaining enough flexibility to ac-
commodate reasonably foreseeable changes in the nature or intensity
of the easement owner's use of the easement.
50 1
The tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes)
also provides a framework that could prove helpful in repair-recon-
struction cases. The tentative draft establishes general rules for the
interpretation of servitudes, specifying that the intentions of the par-
ties should govern the interpretation of servitudes created by express
agreement, and that the "reasonable expectations" of the parties
should govern agreements created "by implication, necessity, or estop-
pel." '  These reasonable expectations are inferred from the circum-
stances. 03 The tentative draft also suggests that a series of default
as a source of property rights, can be very effective in resolving repair-reconstruction dis-
putes. This is best explored via the concept of trade usage or trade custom in commercial
law. See infra Part IV.C. for a discussion.
500. 4 POWELL, supra note 496, § 34.13, at 196; see also KORNGOLD, supra note 491, § 4.03,
at 117 n.66 (citing cases that support the general view that the scope of implied easements
is determined on the basis of an all-circumstances approach).
501. 4 POWELL, supra note 496, § 34.13, at 197. To focus on a particular example, con-
sider the easement implied from prior use, created when a use exists at a time when a
single parcel is split into multiple parcels. In ascertaining the scope of an easement im-
plied from prior use, courts will generally start from the proposition that the scope of the
easement depends upon the scope of the use in existence at the time when the subject
property was severed into multiple parcels. However, courts may well incorporate addi-
tional uses that were reasonably foreseeable at the time of the severance. See KORNGOLD,
supra note 491, § 4.03, at 118 (stating that "if the parties could reasonably have expected
further development, that expectation will define the future use of an easement implied by
prior use"). Courts are willing to extend the scope of an implied easement to reasonably
foreseeable uses because the law presumes that the parties would have intended the ease-
ment to evolve in accordance with changes brought about as a result of reasonable and
normal development of the property and its surroundings. Id. § 4.09, at 140-41. See gener-
ally RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY- SERVITUDES § 483 cmt. e (1944) (contrasting the interpre-
tation of express easements and those created by implication).
502. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY. SERVITUDES § 4.1 (1) (b) (Tentative Draft No.
4, 1994).
503. See id. cmt. b ("Where there is little or no evidence of the parties' intentions, their
reasonable expectations, inferable from the circumstances, are a proper guide to
interpretation.").
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rules should be used where a dispute remains due to conflicts in the
evidence of reasonable expectations.5" 4
In summary, an analysis of implied license scope from a real
property perspective reinforces lessons from the intellectual propertyjurisprudence concerning the primacy of the parties' intentions.
Moreover, the real property cases avoid the problem of resting im-
plied license scope determinations on the licensor's unilateral, subjec-
tive intentions by formulating the test in terms of reasonable
expectations, and by focusing on the scope of the licensor's apparent
consent.
C. Implied License Scope from a Contract Perspective
Perhaps the most apparent outcome of applying an implied li-
cense model to the repair-reconstruction dichotomy is that repair-re-
construction might be transformed into a contract problem. This
would produce some startling results, including the possibility of
threatening patent law's hegemony over repair-reconstruction, be-
cause a contract is governed by state law. Indeed, the implied license
patent case law includes some casual statements to the effect that im-
plied licenses, like express licenses, are "governed by ordinary princi-
ples of state contract law."50 5
Apart from choice of law complexities, however, the analogy be-
tween the repair-reconstruction problem and implied license scope
from a contract perspective is helpful in a number of ways. First, as
might be expected, the contract jurisprudence can help explain the
role of the parties' reasonable expectations. Second, contract law has
developed a number of strategies to deal with the problem of gaps in
the evidence on expectations and scope of consent. One such strat-
egy, the resort to evidence of trade custom as developed in the Uni-
form Commercial Code, should prove to be especially useful in
resolving repair-reconstruction disputes.
In his treatise, Professor Adelman has laid the groundwork for
understanding the repair-reconstruction problem from a contract per-
504. See id. The series of default rules set forth in the Restatement go to the particulars of
traditional easements and present no particularly interesting analogies for the repair-re-
construction analysis, but the overall scheme of a general expectations-based analysis sup-
plemented by default rules might be an appropriate one to pursue for repair-
reconstruction.
505. McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Ideal
Wrapping Mach. Co. & George Close Co., 23 F.2d 848, 850 (D. Mass.) ("When the owner
of a patent sells a patented machine, he thereby frees it from the control of the patent law;
the results which flow from the sale are dependent on the law of contracts."), aff'd, 29 F.2d
533 (1st Cir. 1928).
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spective. Professor Adelman points out that the "essential economic
function" of the repair-reconstruction dichotomy is to identify "what
most purchasers would put into a contract if they had to formally ne-
gotiate for the purchase of the technology separate from the manufac-
tured product."5 6 Such a "negotiation" might presumably revolve
around the parties' expectations as to factors such as the value of the
replaced components, °7 the useful life of components,
0 8 or even the
expectation that the patented device will be usable only once before
reconditioning will be required, 0 9 ultimately relating, of course, to
the scope of the royalty obligation.510 This perspective is especially
illuminating because it shows that a shift to the implied license model
does not mean that the spentness analysis must be ignored; instead, it
means that the spentness analysis is placed in its proper context as an
indicator of the patentee's and the purchaser's probable expectations.
1. The Implied License as Implied-in-Fact Contract. -If the repair-re-
construction problem, framed as a question of implied license scope,
is to be analyzed as a contract problem, a threshold question is
whether the implied license is an implied-in-fact or an implied-in-law
contract. Opinion is split on whether the implied license arising in
various intellectual property contexts should be treated as an implied-
in-fact or an implied-in-law contract. A number of recent appellate
copyright decisions,511 and some patent cases, 2 have treated implied
licenses as a species of implied-in-fact contract. By contrast, some
506. MARTIN J. ADELMAN, PATENT LAw PERSPEcrIVES § 3.8, at 124 (1995).
507. Professor Adelman suggests, for example, that the parties might bargain for a pro-
vision that establishes a definite royalty on any machine in which the total value of the
replaced parts exceeded the total value of the machine. Id. This is a restatement of the
dominance test in contract terms.
508. Id.
509. In this situation, Professor Adelman proposes that reasonable parties would agree
that reconditioning the machine would always require a royalty payment even where the
reconditioning activities might seem modest. Id.
510. Analyzed in this way, the existing law on repair-reconstruction can be understood
as a rule that "require[s] a manufacturing patentee to collect up front from the purchaser
for all conceivable repairs for the product, even such major ones as replacing an essential
part of the combination even if that part ordinarily outlasts the other parts of the patented
machine." Id.
511. See, e.g., Lulirama, Ltd. v. Axcess Broad. Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 882 (5th Cir.
1997) (finding that "a nonexclusive license supported by consideration is a contract" (cit-
ing Jacob Maxwell, Inc. v. Veeck, 110 F.3d 749, 752-53 (l1th Cir. 1997))); I.A.E., Inc. v.
Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 1996) (asserting that "implied licenses are like implied
contracts"); Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 559 n.7 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Plaintiff cites
no authority for the proposition that an implied license is equitable in nature; it seems to
us to be a creature of law, much like any other implied-in-fact contract."); see also 3 NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 455, § 10.01 [C] [5] & n.73.1, at 20 ("A license is, in legal contempla-
tion, merely an agreement not to sue the licensee for infringement.").
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scholars considering the patent exhaustion problem have assumed
that the implied license to use patented goods upon authorized sale
arises as a license implied in law.51
In traditional doctrine, implied-in-fact contracts and implied-in-
law contracts differ sharply with respect to the role played by the par-
ties' intentions in the formation of the contract. The term "implied-
in-fact" contract "refers to that class of obligations which arises from
mutual agreement and intent to promise, when the agreement and
promise have simply not been expressed in words."514 An implied-in-
fact contract, then, might be considered simply a contract by con-
duct.5 15 However, the conduct, in the context of the surrounding
facts and circumstances (including course of dealing, usage of trade,
or course of performance), must evidence all of the elements of an
express contract. 516 Thus, the facts must at least allow for an infer-
ence of mutuality of intent to contract, including an offer and accept-
ance, and consideration.5 17 The distinction between express and
implied-in-fact contracts involves "no difference in legal effect, but lies
merely in the mode of manifesting assent." 18
By contrast, contracts "implied-in-law" (quasi-contracts) are obli-
gations "imposed by the courts for the purpose of bringing about a
512. See, e.g., Cardiovascular Diagnostics, Inc. v. Boehringer Manheim Corp., 985 F.
Supp. 615, 621 (E.D.N.C. 1997) ("Existing predominantly in the realm of patent law, the
implied license doctrine has evolved as a form of implied-in-fact contract."); Medeco Sec.
Locks, Inc. v. Lock Tech. Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 519, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("Like any
other implied contract, an implied license arises out of the objective conduct of the par-
ties, which a reasonable man would regard as indicating that an agreement has been
reached. It cannot arise out of the unilateral expectations of one party .... .").
513. See, e.g, Oddi, supra note 3, at 120 (stating that "an implied license is... implied in
law and takes effect by operation of law").
514. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 1:5, at 20 (Richard
A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1990); see Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 409
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (concluding that "[t]he test for an implied-in-fact contract... focus[es]
on whether.., the employee received an assignment on this occasion to invent").
515. See Baltimore & Ohio R.R v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597 (1923) (finding that
an implied contract "is inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the parties showing, in light of
the surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding"); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v.
United States, 801 F.2d 1295, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("A contract implied in fact is not
created or evidenced by explicit agreement of the parties, but is inferred as a matter of
reason or justice from the acts or conduct of the parties."); 1 WILLiSTON, supra note 514,
§ 1:5, at 22 ("[A] contract by conduct, that is, one inferred or implied in fact, is yet another
type of contract within our general definition.").
516. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4, cmt. a (1979).
517. SeeYachts Am. Inc. v. United States, 779 F.2d 656, 661 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (asserting
that for a contract to be implied-in-fact, "the legal requisites of an express contract, offer,
acceptance, agreement, consideration, etc., must be provided").
518. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 4, cmt. a (1979).
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just result without reference to the intention of the parties. '5 19 Conse-
quently, quasi-contracts are generally portrayed in modem scholar-
ship as being unlike true contracts in two fundamental ways: They are
public arrangements, not private ones,5 20 and they are created as a
remedy for unjust enrichment.52 1
Plainly, the distinction between implied-in-fact contract and
quasi-contract will be difficult to discern in some cases.5 22 Conduct
that to one person results in unjust enrichment, justifying imposition
of a quasi-contractual obligation, may to another person partially
manifest assent, justifying imposition of an implied-in-fact contract.
5 23
It is telling that at least one scholar has recently cautioned against
drawing fine distinctions between implied-in-fact and implied-in-law
contracts. 524 Reasonable arguments can be made that the implied li-
cense to use patented goods after purchase may be labeled an im-
plied-in-fact or an implied-in-law contract, but the better view is that
the implied license should be treated as one implied-in-fact, as at least
one other commentator has pointed out.
25
2. Trade Usage and Implied License Scope.--One advantage of con-
sidering the repair-reconstruction problem by analogy to implied-in-
fact contracts is that contract jurisprudence provides a well-developed
set of basic rules for filling out the unstated terms of agreements.
One example particularly pertinent to the repair-reconstruction prob-
519. 1 WILLISTON, supra note 514, § 1:6, at 25; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
(1979), § 4, cmt. b (1979) (discussing quasi-contracts).
520. See Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE LJ. 997,
1021 (1985) (distinguishing contracts implied-in-fact and those implied-in-law or quasi-
contracts, which, "in contrast, are 'public'").
521. See id. (stating that quasi-contract is covered in the Restatement of Restitution, not in
the Restatement of Contracts); see also Hercules Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 424 (1996)
(stating that an implied-in-law contract is a "'fiction of law' where 'a promise is imputed to
perform a legal duty, as to repay money obtained by fraud or duress'" (quoting Baltimore
& Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597 (1922))).
522. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19, cmt. a (1979) (stating that "the line
between a contractual claim based on agreement and a quasi-contractual claim based on
unjust enrichment is often indistinct").
523. See Dalton, supra note 520, at 1022 (concluding that "[ t ] he uncertainty of conduct
as evidence of agreement can make it unclear whether a particular relationship should be
considered contractual or quasi-contractual").
524. See id. at 1014-15 (observing an "essential similarity" between the judicial choice to
impose quasi-contractual obligations and the decision that circumstances evidence im-
plied-in-fact contractual obligations).
525. See Scott A. Chambers, Exhaustion Doctrine in Biotechnology, 35 IDEA 298, 311, 322-24
(1995) (assuming that the patent exhaustion doctrine gives rise to an implied-in-law li-
cense and arguing that the license should instead be treated as one implied-in-fact).
Chambers points out simply that transactions in patented goods are so variable that a fac-
tual exploration of the parties' intentions will ordinarily be justified.
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lem is UCC Article 2's "usage of trade" concept.526 The UCC defines
"usage of trade" as "any practice or method of dealing having such
regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an
expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in
question. ' 27 The "usage of trade" provision bears directly on the re-
pair-reconstruction problem because the provision was specifically
designed to determine the scope of a contract5 28 by filling out the
"terms" of a contract created through conduct.5 29
The usage of trade provision instructs us to consider the custom-
ary commercial practices prevalent in a given industry. The Official
Comment to the UCC makes it clear that commercial agreements are
to be interpreted with reference to the commercial context in which
526. Some cases in the repair-reconstruction context and other related contexts make
passing mention of trade custom in their analyses, but none take full advantage of trade
usage principles as developed under the UCC. See, e.g., Landis Mach. Co. v. Chaso Tool
Co., 141 F.2d 800, 803 (6th Cir. 1944) (considering and rejecting plaintiffs argument that
the "general trade practice developed in the industry long before [plaintiff) entered the
field"); Davis Elec. Works v. Edison Elec. Light Co., 60 F. 276, 281 (1st Cir. 1894) (hinting
at a custom analysis by observing that through 13 years of the patent's life and after some
13 million of the patented bulbs had been manufactured by the patentee, no one until
defendant had ever attempted to recondition the bulbs).
Although it is a general exhaustion case rather than a repair-reconstruction case, the
court's opinion in Cream Top Bottle Corp. v. Bailes, 62 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1933), provides
another interesting example. The plaintiff had a patent on a milk bottle, and plaintiffs
distributor had an exclusive arrangement to use the bottles for milk delivery. Id. at 715.
Customary practice in the dairy business at the time was to deliver filled bottles to custom-
ers who would either pay a refundable deposit on the bottles, or, more commonly, would
exchange empty bottles for the filled ones to avoid the need for a deposit. Id. Because of
these exchanges, the patented bottles came into use by others besides the exclusive distrib-
utor, generating an infringement lawsuit. Id. at 715-16. In response to the plaintiffs argu-
ment that the trade customs could not be considered, the court stated:
[T] here is no rule of law requiring the court to close its eyes to what is known to
every one else, including plaintiff, defendants, and all the witnesses, and that is
that the usage of the business in Kansas City is that the housewife is not obligated
to earmark and return the identical bottle; she may return any other sound bottle
or pay five cents. The courts ... not only may but must ascertain how milk bottles
are customarily used in Kansas City ....
Id. at 717-18; cf Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 887 F. Supp. 880, 887-88 (W.D. Va.
1995) (noting that, in determining whether an implied license has been created, standard
industry practice is relevant, but is overridden by parties' express statements to the con-
trary), affd, 133 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 52 (1998).
527. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1995).
528. That is, usage of trade is a matter of contract interpretation, not contract forma-
tion. See IA RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-
205:5, at 308 (3d ed. 1996) ("Usage of trade is employed to interpret a contract but cannot
be employed to show that there was a contract.").
529. See 1 JAMESJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 135 (3d ed.
1988).
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they were created. 53 0 By incorporating a "usage of trade" provision,
the UCC intends to "reject those cases which see evidence of 'custom'
as representing an effort to displace or negate 'established rules of
law.' "531
At the same time, the UCC's "usage of trade" concept seeks to
avoid some of the problems often encountered in efforts to rely upon
custom as law. A trade usage is not subject to any strict requirement
that it be shown to be universally followed. 2 Thus, for example, a
new usage, if regularly observed, can be accepted as a usage of
trade. 53 3
Most importantly, trade usage evidence differs fundamentally
from custom because the latter is informed by the probable intentions
of the parties. As one treatise writer notes:
[A] major difference between common law custom and
the Code's version of trade usage is that the former was re-
garded as an independent source of law, while trade usage
serves only to determine the probable intent of the parties.
As trade usage is evidence only of what the parties had in
mind, the trier of fact may find it unpersuasive. Custom, in
contrast, became a rule of law that could not be so
ignored. 4
This, of course, differs from the property conception of custom as an
independent source of property rights.5" 5
530. U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt., purpose 1.
531. U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt., purpose 4.
532. See, e.g., IA ANDERSON, supra note 528, § 1-205:43, at 325 (citing Ebasco Servs., Inc.
v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 460 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Pa. 1978)).
533. See U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt., purpose 5 (stating that "[ulnder the requirement of sub-
section (2) full recognition is thus available for new usages").
534. 1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERC aL CODE SERIES § 1-205:4 (1998) (cita-
tion omitted). But see IA ANDERSON, supra note 528, § 1-205:40, at 324 (noting that some
courts seem to treat custom and usage of trade as having the same meaning (citing Lip-
schutz v. Gordon Jewelry Corp., 373 F. Supp. 375 (S.D. Tex. 1974))).
535. See State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 594 P.2d 1093, 1101 (Idaho 1979) (defining the
concept of custom in property law as a usage or practice which "by common adoption and
acquiescence, and by long and unvarying habit, has become compulsory, and has acquired
the force of a law"); Joseph H. Levie, Trade Usage and Custom Under the Common Law and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1101, 1102 (1965) (discussing the distinction
between "custom" and "trade usage"); Note, Custom and Trade Usage: Its Application to Com-
mercial Dealings and the Common Law, 55 COLuM. L. REv. 1192, 1194-95 (1955) (examining
and defining custom and trade usage).
See generally Bederman, supra note 499 (discussing the origin and evolution of property
law, particularly the notion of custom); Stephen L. Carter, Custom, Adjudication, and Pe-
trushevsky's Watch: Some Notes from the Intellectual Property Front, 78 VA. L. REv. 129, 132
(1992) (commenting on Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated
Press: Custom and Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REv. 85 (1992)). Profes-
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The utility of trade usage evidence is straightforward enough: If a
practice is regularly observed in a particular industry, the parties can
be assumed to have contracted with reference to it. Naturally, this
calls for proof that the practice is sufficiently well known in the indus-
try55 6 that the parties either knew or had reason to know of it.53 7 Im-
portantly, it is not necessary that the parties are even conscious of the
usage, so long as the usage is sufficiently widely observed to justify a
conclusion that following the usage would be consistent with a reason-
able party's expectations. 53 8
'Ordinarily, a trade usage will not be a matter for judicial notice,
but will require proof.53 9 In repair-reconstruction cases, it seems
likely that expert testimony will be necessary. In fact, expert testimony
is often employed in defining trade usages.5 1
An important consideration for the application of trade usage to
the repair-reconstruction problem concerns limitations on the per-
sons chargeable with notice of particular trade usages.5 4' In repair-
reconstruction cases involving, for example, specialized industrial
equipment, or medical devices designed for use by trained personnel,
it is likely that the purchaser of the patented goods will be a sophisti-
cated market participant, perhaps even a fellow member of the trade.
Here, of course, it will be relatively easy for a court to justify the appli-
sor Carter argues that the resort to custom to establish the expectations of the parties in
contract cases, or to craft "local property rules" in property cases, is problematic because
both require courts to undertake "anthropological explorations" for which they may not be
competent. Id. In the context of the repair-reconstruction dichotomy, however, the analy-
sis of trade custom (through expert testimony) seems no more elusive (and in fact is likely
to be considerably less so) than the alternative-judicial application of the spentness
standard.
536. See 1A ANDERSON, supra note 528, § 1-205:31, at 319-20.
537. The Restatement of Contracts lays out similar guidelines for determining how usage
may affect the scope of contractual obligations:
(1) An agreement is interpreted in accordance with a relevant usage if each party
knew or had reason to know of the usage and neither party knew or had reason to
know that the meaning attached by the other was inconsistent with the usage.
(2) When the meaning attached by one party accorded with a relevant usage and
the other knew or had reason to know of the usage, the other is treated as having
known or had reason to know the meaning attached by the first party.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 220 (1979).
538. See 1 WHr & SUMMERS, supra note 529, at 132 ("[I]t is not necessary for both
parties to be consciously aware of the trade usage. It is enough if the trade usage is such as
to 'justify an expectation' of its observance.").
539. See IA ANDERSON, supra note 528, § 1-205:22, at 316.
540. See id. at 317 (citing New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Cruise Shops, Inc., 323 N.Y.S.2d 352
(1971)); 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 529, at 140 n.39 (collecting authorities).
541. See Elizabeth Warren, Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade: An Economic Rationale for
an Inflexible Rule, 42 U. Prrr. L. REv. 515, 523-31 (1981) (analyzing the standards for charg-
ing parties with knowledge of a trade usage in contract cases).
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cation of trade usages; both patentee and purchaser can be presumed
to have been familiar with the trade custom at the time of the sale. By
contrast, where the product is a consumer product, the purchaser may
be relatively unsophisticated and one could legitimately question in
any given case whether the purchaser should be chargeable with
knowledge of the trade custom.
54 2
V. RESHAPING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S REPAIR-RECONSTRUCTION
JURISPRUDENCE USING THE IMPLIED LICENSE MODEL
The Federal Circuit should consider using an implied license
model for the repair-reconstruction problem. This Part concludes by
setting forth proposals for a new repair-reconstruction standard based
upon the implied license model. It also proposes that the court re-
think the standard of appellate review for repair-reconstruction deci-
sions, and discusses how selected recent repair-reconstruction
decisions might be analyzed if they had been decided in accordance
with the proposed model.
A. The Repair-Reconstruction Standard Restated
To summarize the major proposals set out in preceding sections,
the standard for permissible repair should be reconceived along the
following lines:
(1) Replacement activities should be adjudged permissible if
they fall within the scope of the purchaser's implied license to use the
patented goods. The scope of the implied license to use patented
goods should be determined by balancing the reasonable expecta-
tions of the patentee and the purchaser as of the time of the sale, with
a primary focus on determining the scope of the patentee's apparent
consent. The goal is to reconstruct the bargain that the parties would
have made had they formalized an agreement. The patentee's unilat-
eral intentions might be relevant to, but by no means would be dispos-
itive of, the scope of the patentee's apparent consent.
(2) The reasonable expectations of the parties should be deter-
mined in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the sales trans-
542. See ANDERSON, supra note 528, § 1-205:14, at 314 ("In determining the sphere of
operation of trade usage, a court will be influenced by the fact that a particular party is or
is not a merchant who is familiar with or can be expected to be familiar with the trade
usage in question."); id. §§ 1-205:48-:49, at 327 (noting that "sophisticated" market partici-
pants are charged with knowledge of any usage of trade of which the party should be
aware, while "unsophisticated" market participants, in a similar transaction, might not be
charged with knowledge of the usage of trade).
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action. Language from Aro I which appears to constrain the relevant
circumstances should be repudiated.
(3) Evidence of spentness, especially evidence of the "domi-
nance" of original over new components, and evidence as to compo-
nent useful life, may be useful if it is understood as a proxy for the
parties' expectations. Accordingly, evidence of spentness should be
viewed as primarily functioning to fill in gaps in the evidence on
expectations.
(4) Courts should encourage the parties to submit evidence of
trade custom where such evidence is needed to supplement the show-
ing on expectations. In the ordinary case, evidence of trade custom
presumably would be submitted via expert testimony.
This proposal finds little support in the Aro I Court's opinion; it
does, however, find some support injustice Harlan's dissenting opin-
ion.54 While it may go too far to say that adopting this proposal re-
quires repudiation of Aro I in its entirety, it is clear that this proposal
diverges from the broad reasoning of Aro . Ideally, then, the
Supreme Court would adopt these proposals to put to rest any ques-
tion of the binding effect of Aro . In the meantime, the Federal Cir-
cuit might conclude that, after nearly forty years of experience with
Aro I, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court today would follow Aro !'s
broad reasoning, so that the Federal Circuit might consider alterna-
tives such as the implied license model.
B. Appellate Review
If the court adopts the implied license model for repair-recon-
struction analysis, the court should also revisit its statements regarding
appellate review of the repair-reconstruction determination. 5" Cur-
rently, the prevailing Federal Circuit view is that the repair-reconstruc-
tion determination is given plenary review.545
543. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 369, 372(1961) (Harlan,J., dissenting) (grounding the right of permissible repair in "the owner's
license to use the device[, which] carries with it an implied license to keep it fit for the use
for which it was intended," and endorsing an all-circumstances approach to repair-recon-
struction). At least one other commentator has argued that the minority opinions in Aro I
express a better view of the repair-reconstruction problem. See Hildreth, supra note 18, at
540 (contending "that the minority viewpoint states the superior measure of contributory
infringement in the area of repair and reconstruction").
544. See Am , 365 U.S. at 367 (Brennan, J., concurring) (reviewing the repair-recon-
struction doctrine as "a question of law as to relieve appellate review from the restraints of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)").
545. SeeAktiebolagv. E.J. Co., 121 F.3d 669, 672 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Whether defendant's
actions constitute a permissible repair or an infringing reconstruction is a question of law
which we... review de novo." (citing Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176,
1999]
While questions might be raised about the appropriateness of this
designation under current standards, plenary review would be entirely
inappropriate under the implied license model for several reasons.
First, it should be noted that the assertion that the repair-reconstruc-
tion question is not a pure question of law, or is at least a conclusion
of law resting upon important factual inquiries, enjoys at least some
historical support.
5 46
Second, the implied license model as set forth gives enhanced
importance to the parties' expectations. The determination of expec-
tations is a classic question for the fact-finder and should be subject
only to deferential review by the Federal Circuit. Where an eviden-
tiary gap as to reasonable expectations is filled by resort to supplemen-
tal evidence of trade custom, the determination of trade custom
should also be treated as a question of fact, just as in the UCC
context.
5 4 7
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit should treat the repair-recon-
struction determination as a mixed question of fact and law, as Justice
Harlan suggested in his dissenting opinion in Aro 1.548 Alternatively, if
the court insists on retaining de novo review over the ultimate conclu-
sion as to the scope of the implied license in repair versus reconstruc-
tion questions, it should acknowledge that the underlying
determinations of expectations and trade custom are questions of fact
subject to limited review. 549 On a related point, the court should also
217 (1980))), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1337 (1998); Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 45
F.3d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reviewing de novo "'the question of whether the defend-
ant's conduct constituted permissible repair'" (quoting Dana Corp. v. American Precision
Co., 827 F.2d 755, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1987))).
546. Early case law in the United Kingdom proposed deferential review of the repair-
reconstruction question. See, e.g., Sirdar Rubber Co. v. Wallington, Weston & Co., 1 Ch.
451, 452 (1905) (finding that "it is a question of fact in each case whether the work which
has been done may fairly be termed a 'repair'"); Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Holborn
Tyre Co., [1901] 18 R.P.D. & T.M. 222, 226 (1901) (same).
547. See IA ANDERSON, supra note 528, § 1-205:19, at 315. This will be particularly impor-
tant if, as will likely be the case, evidence of trade custom is routinely proffered through
expert testimony.
At least one court has expressed concern that if repair-reconstruction is denominated
a question of fact, patent owners could more easily avoid summary judgment, and that
"allowing such issues to invariably go to trial would place in the hands of the patent holders
a potent weapon to use against merchants dealing in unpatented components." Porter v.
Farmers Supply Serv., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1175, 1185 n.6 (D. Del. 1985), affd, 790 F.2d 882
(Fed. Cir. 1986). Although legitimate, this concern is outweighed by the need to leave
issues of expectations, and credibility determinations, to the fact finder.
548. Aro I, 365 U.S. at 380 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that "the question of 'repair'
or 'reconstruction' must be a mixed question of law and fact").
549. This, of course, is the approach that courts use in reviewing obviousness determina-
tions. See, e.g., Kolmes v. World Fibers Corp., 107 F.3d 1534, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (assert-
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seek to resolve conflicts in the case law concerning the allocation of
the burden of proof on the repair-reconstruction issue.550
C. The Implied License Model Applied to Recent Repair-
Reconstruction Decisions
This subpart concludes by examining the differences that the im-
plied license model might have made had it been applied in selected
Federal Circuit decisions.
1. Everpure, Inc. v. Cuno, Inc.5 5 1-Like other cases in which the
replacement activity affected both worn and unworn components of a
patented combination, Everpure, Inc. v. Cuno, Inc. is particularly vexing
when analyzed under the spentness standard. These cases become
ing that "[tihe ultimate conclusion concerning obviousness, as a question of law, is
reviewed de novo, the findings concerning the underlying factual inquiries are reviewed for
clear error").
The Federal Circuit has also taken the position that the issue of whether or not an
implied license exists is a question of law. See Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited,
Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (concluding that "the existence of an implied
license[ ] is a question of law" (citing Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d
903, 926 (Fed. Cir. 1984); AMP Inc. v. United States, 389 F.2d 448, 451 n.3 (CL Cl. 1968))).
The court should revisit this issue if, in the course of restating repair-reconstruction doc-
trine, it decides to treat the implied license to use patented goods as an implied-in-fact
contract, and to apply deferential review.
550. There is support for the proposition that the patentee bears the burden of proof
on repair-reconstruction as part of the plaintiffs general obligation to prove infringement.
See General Elec. Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 745, 783 n.17 (Ct Cl. 1978) (en banc) (per
curiam) (stating that the "[p] laintiff, of course, has the burden of proof on issues relating
to infringement (including 'reconstruction')"). Cf Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v.
Hesser, 131 F.2d 406, 409 (6th Cir. 1942) (discussing the possibility that where the nature
of the patented combination and the circumstances of its use make it practically impossible
for plaintiff to ascertain the facts concerning repair and reconstruction, the burden of
proof might be shifted to the defendant); Timken-Detroit Axle Co. v. Automotive Parts
Co., 93 F.2d 76, 76-77 (6th Cir. 1937) (upholding the lower court's decision to place the
burden upon the defendant to prove that his intended sale of parts would not be an
infringement).
On the other hand, it appears to be well established that the burden of showing the
existence (and presumably the scope as well) of an implied license is on the alleged in-
fringer. See, e.g., Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872,
878 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("As the alleged infringer, [the defendant] had the burden of estab-
lishing the existence of an implied license as an affirmative defense." (citing Bandag, 750
F.2d at 924)). Although sound arguments can be offered for either position, if an implied
license model is adopted for repair-reconstruction, it seems preferable to place the burden
of proof as to repair-reconstruction on the alleged infringer. In an analysis featuring the
balance of expectations, neither party is necessarily in a better position than the other to
have access to relevant facts. In addition, placing the burden on the defendant would
appear to harmonize repair-reconstruction law with the law for implied licenses generally.
551. 875 F.2d 300 (Fed. Cir. 1989). For a synopsis, see supra notes 279-287 and accom-
panying text.
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relatively easy cases under the implied license model. Rather than
perplexing itself with a difficult analysis of old versus new compo-
nents, the court could begin by assessing the parties' reasonable ex-
pectations, focusing particularly on the extent of replacement
activities to which the patentee reasonably consented. In Everpure, the
evidence that the patentee instructed users to change the cartridge
552
(with its sealed-in filter) on the device at issue evidences the paten-
tee's reasonable consent to regular replacement of the cartridge.
Moreover, there was no evidence that the patentee demanded that the
purchaser buy the replacement cartridges exclusively from the paten-
tee. A purchaser would reasonably have expected to be able to
purchase the cartridges from any source, and, of course, any necessary
adapter to mate the cartridge to the head. In this analysis, there is no
need for the court to resort to the fiction that the entire cartridge is
"effectively" spent when the filter wears out. Indeed, the physical
qualities of the device are relevant only insofar as they confirm that
the patentee and purchaser would reasonably have expected that the
entire cartridge would be replaced when the filter wore out. That is,
the physical qualities of the device are relevant only to supplement
other evidence as to expectations and the scope of consent.
2. Kendall and Sage Products."5 3-Kendall, Sage Products, and
other cases in which the patentee applies a "single-use-only" label to
the patented goods would also become easier under an implied li-
cense model. Like Everpure, these cases were difficult under the spent-
ness standard because the replaced component was not physically
worn out at the time of replacement, yet component replacement
seemed prudent and deserving of protection from liability. Instead of
straining to conclude that component spentness could occur when it
was impractical or infeasible to continue to use a component, the
court could turn instead to an analysis of the scope of the patentee's
reasonable consent. Under such a regime, the patentee in Sage Prod-
ucts, for example, would undoubtedly have argued that the "single-
use-only" label on Sage's inner container for sharps evidenced Sage's
reasonable consent exclusively to what the label says-single use of
the inner container. The alleged infringer, Devon Products, could
then have responded that reasonable purchasers would not under-
552. See Everpure, 875 F.2d at 303.
553. Kendall Co. v. Progressive Med. Tech., Inc. 85 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Sage
Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc. 45 F.3d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995). For a synopsis, see supra
notes 288-296, 297-304 and accompanying text.
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stand Sage's label to constitute a demand that purchasers buy replace-
ment inner containers exclusively from Sage.
Evidence of customary practice in the medical device industry,
offered to supplement the evidence on reasonable expectations,
might well be useful here. Suppose, for example, that expert testi-
mony demonstrated that it was customary practice, well-known to
medical device suppliers like the patentee, for hospitals to purchase
replacement components for medical devices from replacement parts
suppliers. The court would be justified in concluding that when Sage
sold a patented sharps disposal device, the purchase price reflected
Sage's reasonable expectation that the purchaser might well go else-
where to purchase replacement inner containers.
3. FMC. 554-The implied license model does not, of course,
provide a pat answer for the FMC case or other cases raising the issue
of sequential replacement activities. Instead, its primary benefit in
such cases is to avoid the riddle of the apocryphal axe. Presumably,
the FMC opinion would look very different if an expectations analysis
were the principal focus. The elaborate "economic" approaches to
spentness (enunciated by the district court) would be relevant only to
the extent of filling in gaps in the evidence as to reasonable expecta-
tions. Given this limited relevance, and the inevitable entanglement
of the "economic approaches" with the problem of the apocryphal
axe, one wonders whether courts would consider the economic ap-
proaches to be worth the effort in an implied license model.
Evidence of customary practice in the trade might be a particu-
larly valuable tool in sequential replacement cases. For example, in
FMC, the parties might have introduced evidence, derived from cus-
tomary practices in the grape harvester industry, tending to establish a
routine replacement schedule for grape harvester components. Such
a schedule could be highly relevant under an implied license model
to the extent that it revealed the probable understanding of seller and
purchaser about which components would routinely be replaced, and
how frequently, before any additional royalty obligation would be
triggered.
In the end, resort to the implied license model in a case like FMC
may not avoid all of the problems associated with the spentness stan-
dard, but it would establish an analytical framework that courts might
554. FMC Corp. v. Up-Right Inc., 21 F.3d 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1994). For a synopsis, see
supra notes 347-371 and accompanying text.
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find more palatable, in which the cumbersome spentness standard
would play, at most, a limited role.
4. Hewlett-Packard. 555-The implied license model would not
make the Hewlett-Packard case any easier. In fact, it might demonstrate
that the case was an uncomfortably close call. The record would have
to be supplemented to allow for any sensible analysis of the scope of
Hewlett-Packard's reasonable consent to the modification or refilling
of its patented inkjet cartridges, but it seems likely that Hewlett-Pack-
ard would have been able to make a fairly persuasive case that defend-
ant Repeat-O-Type's modifications fell outside the ambit of the
reasonable expectations of Hewlett-Packard and its purchasers at the
time of initial sale. While Hewlett-Packard's attempts to show its uni-
lateral intentions as to the design of the cartridge would be given little
weight under the implied license model just as they were in the actual
case, Hewlett-Packard's instructions to users to discard old cartridges
may at least have raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
a purchaser would reasonably have expected to be allowed to make
the modifications at issue. 56
555. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 1445 (Fed. Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1304 (1998). For a synopsis, see supra notes 273-277 and
accompanying text.
556. Some would argue that elevating reasonable expectations to the fore in the repair-
reconstruction analysis will simply encourage patentees to contract around repair-recon-
struction by attaching express conditions to the purchase of goods. Antitrust restrictions-
especially in the form of restrictions against tying as embodied in current patent misuse
doctrine-will presumably be available where patentees employ anticompetitive express
restrictions. SeeJames B. Kobak, Jr., Contracting Around Exhaustion: Some Thoughts About the
CAFC's Mallinckrodt Decision, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 550, 564 (1993) (ques-
tioning whether the Mallinckrodt decision might "render almost meaningless the distinc-
tion between repair . . . and reconstruction" as patentees resort to express reuse
restrictions, and worrying that the result will be a more limited right of permissible repair
for purchasers).
However, it is difficult to tell why this should be worrisome. If the express restrictions
do no more than express the patentee's unilateral intentions, they will not weigh heavily in
the expectations analysis for permissible repair and thus they will not render meaningless
the repair-reconstruction distinction. The express restrictions might, of course, go further,
amply demonstrating the patentee's intention that, for example, a particular component
in a patented combination be used only once and that the purchaser deal exclusively with
the patentee in purchasing replacement parts. If so, and the purchaser had notice of the
restriction at the time of purchase but willingly paid the asking price anyway, then it is
difficult to see why the law should have great sympathy for the purchaser. The purchaser
has, perhaps, contracted away some or all of the purchaser's permissible repair right, but
this should not be considered problematic, absent a violation of antitrust principles. This
last qualification is a substantial one, and a full discussion of it is outside the scope of this
paper. For a discussion of the antitrust aspects of Mallinckrodt, see Kobak, supra, at 559-65;
Richard H. Stern, Post-Sale Restrictions After Mallinckrodt: An Idea in Search of Definition, 5
ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 1 (1994).
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At the very least, the implied license model would have been ben-
eficial in Hewlett-Packard because it would have provided a role for evi-
dence of expectations. It would have allowed the court to embrace an
intent-oriented analysis without resting its decision solely on the pat-
entee's unilateral intentions.
5. Conclusion.-In one sense, the implied license model for re-pair-reconstruction is not radical. Indeed, even if the Federal Circuit
had decided every repair-reconstruction case in accordance with the
implied license model as outlined, it is doubtful that there would be
any dramatic shift in case outcomes.557
In another sense, however, the implied license model turns re-
pair-reconstruction jurisprudence upside down. Instead of establish-
ing the highly artificial notion of "spentness" or even "effective
spentness" as the analytical focus, and attempting to funnel all rele-
vant facts (i.e., those concerning the physical qualities of the device
and, possibly, the intentions of the parties) towards it, an implied li-
cense model establishes the parties' expectations as the focus. Spent-
ness is then relevant only to the extent that it bears on the ultimate
goal of proving the scope of the patentee's apparent consent, defined
in terms of expectations.
The implied license model is preferable because the expectations
analysis is more familiar to courts, and finds antecedent in other areas
of the law, providing a ready-made jurisprudence to which courts con-fronting repair-reconstruction problems may look. For example,
courts may appropriate established notions of trade usage as devel-
oped in contract law in order to evidence probable expectations in
the repair-reconstruction context. The implied license model also en-
courages a flexible, all-circumstances approach to resolving repair-re-
construction problems. Finally, the implied license model, by
emphasizing an expectations analysis, relieves courts from resting
their infringement determinations solely or even primarily on insolu-
ble riddles like that of the apocryphal axe. With all due respect to
Webster and Seward, it is time to move ahead from Wilson v. Simpson.
557. Perhaps this is because courts have actually been reaching for an implied license
approach to repair-reconstruction, while straining under the encumbrances of the spent-
ness rhetoric.
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